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HONOUR AMONG NATIONS :

A Critique of International Cant

BY E. H. CARR

IN the year 1857 the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Walewski (he happened to be an illegitimate son of Napoleon I) remarked in conversation with Bismarck that it was the business of diplomats to cloak the interests of their country in terms of universal justice. At the end of the American—Spanish War, President McKinley took counsel with the Almighty, and proclaimed that it was the will of Heaven that the United States should annex the Philippines. A few months ago, Mr. Winston Churchill announced in the British House of Commons that “there must be a moral basis for British rearmament and foreign policy”; and he proceeded to provide one. Appearances notwithstanding, Mr. Churchill belongs to the school of McKinley rather than to the school of Walewski. He himself believes in the “moral basis” as sincerely as McKinley did in the Divine Guidance.

A change has, in fact, come over the moral atmosphere since the days when international relations were the private preserve of diplomats. A diplomat serves his country, and nobody expects more of him. He would be open to criticism if he did anything else. But now that democracy has taken a hand in the game, new demands are made. “Patriotism is not enough” in the current phrase. We are not content to serve our country. We want to know that, in serving our country, we are also serving humanity at large; and our democratic statesmen are always there to assure us that we are. “There are American principles, American policies”, said Woodrow Wilson, that master of telling phrases, in 1917; “they are the principles of mankind, and must prevail”. At a recent meeting in London, that stout British Wilsonian, Lord Cecil, spoke in the same

vein of "our duty to our country, to our Empire and to humanity at large".

The prevalence of this identification of duty to country with duty to humanity presumably entitles us to register a moral advance. The Wilsonian formula certainly strikes a warmer, more exalted note than the old-fashioned "My country, right or wrong". But may there not also have been a certain falling-off in intellectual probity? Walewski and Bismarck at least knew what they were doing. Are we sure that we do? Have we discarded 'my country, right or wrong' because our moral vision has become keener, or merely because our intellectual vision has become more fuddled? These are troublesome questions. There are still moments of disillusion when we refuse to believe in our own idealism. "We asked the sons of this Republic to defend our national rights", said Warren Harding in his acceptance speech in 1920, "not to purge the Old World of the accumulated ills of rivalry and greed". And Harding swept the country.

The application of moral precepts to political problems bristles with notorious difficulties. Aristotle, who wanted to justify slave-owning, thought slavery "natural". Rousseau, who wanted to justify his theory of a social contract, held that men were "naturally" free. Spinoza and Hobbes, who wanted to justify strong government, declared that men were "naturally" enemies of one another. Modern writers, who want to justify pacifism, argue that man in his "natural" state lives at peace with his neighbours. It reminds one a little of some of the post-War discussions about disarmament. The Americans and the British, who wanted to get rid of the submarine, thought that it was by nature a pernicious and offensive weapon. (An American admiral once declared that "civilization demands that naval war be placed on a higher plane" by the abolition of the submarine). Oddly enough, the French and Japanese took precisely the same view of the battleship, but praised the submarine as a humane and defensive weapon. "Nations have always had that system of morals which justified their current rules of life", writes a contemporary French thinker. "Moral theories no more make our customs than our ideas about the constitution of matter make the

properties of bodies". If to "rules of life" be added "aspirations", one is constrained to agree.

But this is not the end of the trouble. There is said to be a tribe of aborigines in Brazil which has one word meaning alternatively "all of us" or "good", and another meaning "all the others" or "bad". Civilized man, though his speech is more complicated, assumes the identity, and draws from it ingenious conclusions far beyond the reach of the simple aborigine. He uses morality, as Shakespeare's Henry V. uses the Archbishop of Canterbury, to justify his most preposterous claims. During the War, it was common form to assume the wickedness of all Germans, Austrians and Turks. But the "war-guilt" clause of the Versailles Treaty was not merely the product of this unsophisticated emotion. It was a deliberate attempt to justify the extravagant Reparation articles which followed. Wherever racial discrimination is practised, stories are circulated reflecting on the morality (in particular, the sexual morality) of the persecuted or excluded race. When Stalin wishes to destroy his real or supposed opponents, he brands them as wreckers and murderers. We justify our actions by the attribution of immorality to the other side.

Conversely, we throw the cloak of moral decency round our own policies. The nineteenth century "two-Power Standard" for the British Navy became the "Pax Britannica"; and the exploitation of Africa masqueraded as "the white man's burden". Prior to 1914, the United States, a growing industrial Power with a highly elastic home market, found a high tariff policy advantageous. Now that home markets are saturated and the need is felt for developing export markets, other people's tariffs and quotas are a serious nuisance; and an all-round lowering of tariffs and other restrictions on trade has become an important American interest (just as it was a British interest in the nineteenth century). But are we content to represent it as such? Certainly not. We no longer speak in terms of national economic interest, but of universal moral appeasement. American principles, as Woodrow Wilson said, are the principles of humanity. Many Americans (including, it would seem, Mr. Cordell Hull himself) have seriously convinced themselves that the lowering of trade barriers is a *moral* objective, and that

the raising of tariffs and quotas is *morally* reprehensible. We have reversed the Victorian maxim 'Honesty is the best policy', and convinced ourselves that the 'best policy' (*i.e.*, the best policy for us) is the only honest one for the world at large.

It is this identification of national with universal interests, this transformation of a conflict between the desiderata of different nations into a moral conflict between Good and Evil, which has helped so much to embitter international relations at the present time. There is no more urgent task than to examine the basis of our current assumptions, and to consider how far we are entitled to identify our cause with absolute morality.

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Let us take first the most popular of all our slogans : peace. No British or American or French statesman to-day makes any pronouncement on international affairs without dilating on his country's love of peace ; and he allows it to be understood that this love of peace is a moral virtue by which his country can be distinguished from certain other less virtuous nations. Curiously enough, the representatives of these other less virtuous nations speak in markedly similar terms. It is not so long since Herr Hitler told his obedient Reichstag that peace was Germany's "dearest treasure" ; and the Duce, on the occasion of the *Führer's* visit to Rome last May, announced their common intention of seeking "effective guarantees of justice, security and peace". The official policy of Japan is "to co-operate with China for the maintenance of peace in Eastern Asia".

Nor is this coincidence of aim as odd as it looks at first sight. Everyone wants peace—even in war-time. As Lenin wrote in 1915, "absolutely everybody is in favour of peace in general—including Kitchener, Joffre, Hindenburg and Nicholas the Bloody ; for everyone of them wishes to end the war". Germany and Italy and Japan would all prefer to obtain their objectives without having to fight for them (Nazi Germany has hitherto succeeded in doing so) ; and, having attained them, they will want peace to enjoy them. Peace is the aim of all policy ; and mere desire for peace is not a moral quality, if it is a quality at all.

The point at issue is not whether we want peace, but what things we want more than peace, what things we desire so much that we are prepared to fight for them ; and, unless we are pure pacifists who believe in non-resistance, there are always some such things. When the Kellogg Pact outlawing war was signed in 1928, Great Britain explained that there were, nevertheless, "certain regions of the world" outside her own territory for whose "welfare and integrity" she would fight. The Senate of the United States dotted the same 'i'. Having observed that the Pact did not exclude war in self-defence, it pertinently added that "the exercise of the right of self-protection may, and frequently does, extend in its effects beyond the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of the States exercising it". Which perhaps explains, in case you have been puzzled about it, how Japan can be fighting a defensive war in China.

The hollowness of the morality which underlies our modern peace slogans can be strikingly illustrated by the juxtaposition of two well-known utterances, separated by just ten years of history. "The Right", said Woodrow Wilson in 1917 when he asked Congress to declare war on Germany, "is more precious than Peace". "Peace comes before all", said Aristide Briand from the tribune of the Assembly of the League of Nations in 1927; "peace comes even before Justice". Considered as abstract moral principles, both these contradictory pronouncements have respectable support. Any competent moralist could make out a good case for either of them. But when we look a little more closely at them, we perceive that these utterances are moral only in form, and that to decide between them on grounds of morality would be as irrelevant as it is difficult. In 1917, Wilson had made up his mind that it was in the national interest of the United States to go to war ; and he clothed this conviction in the appropriate garment of righteousness. In 1927, Briand was fearful of attempts, made in the name of Justice, to secure revision of a peace settlement favourable to French national interests ; and he had no difficulty in finding the moral phraseology which fitted this particular attitude. It is not surprising that these alleged moral principles contradicted one another. For they were not moral principles at all, but the reflection of opposite national interests.

Nobody will doubt that both Wilson and Briand, when they gave vent to these lofty though irreconcilable sentiments, were perfectly sincere. But that is, in a sense, the tragedy. Our heart remains pure. It is our head that has been corrupted. The self-criticism in which Walewski and Bismarck indulged in moments of frankness has vanished. In demanding from our statesmen this deceptive indulgence in moral gestures, we have debased the currency of intellectual honesty. We want to be bamboozled into thinking ourselves moral; and since few can successfully bamboozle others without first bamboozling themselves, clear thinking has become a disqualification for a statesman. Mr. Hull, the representative of a country which led the world in a high tariff policy, can sincerely believe, now that economic conditions have been reversed, in the moral virtue of lowering trade barriers; and Mr. Churchill, who regards German rearmament as immoral, can find a perfectly good moral basis for British rearmament. We shall continue to plume ourselves on the righteousness of the "peace-loving" nations, until our national interests demand that we fight; and our statesmen will then, without the slightest embarrassment, find some other moral principle to convince us of the rectitude of going to war.

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But, it will be said, there is all the moral difference in the world between wars of aggression and wars of self-defence. This conception has had a long run of popularity since 1919. At one time, Geneva drew up an elaborate set of rules which were to provide an infallible automatic test of "aggression", though it is significant that hardly any of the Great Powers accepted them. Mention has already been made of the elastic interpretation given by the United States and Great Britain to the notion of "self-defence". But this is not the worst. The whole criterion is unreal and fantastic; and when we seek to apply moral judgments to historical events, we do not in fact apply this criterion at all.

Historical experts are still divided about the precise right and wrongs of a fracas which occurred at Lexington, Massachusetts in 1775. But suppose some document were discovered to-morrow proving beyond dispute either that the English

troops committed an act of aggression against an innocent crowd, or that the crowd attacked the troops and compelled them to fire in self-defence, would anyone's opinion about the War of Independence be one jot altered by the discovery? Our views of the morality of the War of Independence, or of any other war, are determined in the long run not by any petty question of who sent the ultimatum, or fired the first shot, or broke the Geneva rules, but by our whole conception of the period of history in which the event was set. It is often hard to say who is the aggressor and who the defender. But this is a minor difficulty. The real trouble is that, even where one side was indisputably the aggressor, there is no guarantee that the verdict of history, cast in the light of more relevant facts than can possibly be known or appreciated at the moment, will go against him. Nobody except the pure pacifist really believes that it is in all circumstances wrong to overthrow the *status quo* by force.

Amid these shifting sands, some have sought a firm foothold in the principle of the "sanctity of treaties". In vain; for "sanctity of treaties" is itself a quicksand where the unwary traveller will soon find himself engulfed in the slough of national interest. Let us consider the post-War record of the principal nations in this matter of the sanctity of treaties. The United States have a clean sheet. (It is true that the dollar has been devalued, and that, when the Supreme Court only last year handed down a decision authorizing the discharge in depreciated dollars of obligations stimulating for payment in gold, the three minority judges accused their colleagues of violating the Eighth Commandment; but this would perhaps be carrying international morality too far). Britain and France have, with one conspicuous exception, a clean sheet. Germany, Italy and Japan—to mention no others—have violated several international engagements.

What conclusion should we draw from these facts? That the United States, as an international Power, are perfectly moral, that Britain and France are imperfectly moral, and that Germany, Italy and Japan are not moral at all? That would appear to be a widely accepted view. Yet another series of facts may perhaps give us pause. Since the War, the United

States have been in a fortunate position : they have never been subject to pressure, military, financial or economic, from a stronger Power to conclude a treaty or agreement distasteful to themselves. Great Britain, during the same period, was obliged to accept one such agreement at the hands of an economically and financially stronger Power—her agreement with the United States ; and by a coincidence, which would be odd if it were a coincidence, that is the very agreement which she has violated. Germany, Italy and Japan have concluded many agreements under varying degrees of pressure, ranging from the ultimatum which preceded the signature of the Versailles Treaty to the “ moral ” pressure applied to Italy and Japan at Versailles, and to Japan at Washington. They have broken most of them. By this time, we are perhaps in a position to establish a principle, though scarcely a moral one. The stronger the Power, the more firmly does it believe in the sanctity of treaties ; for the less likely it is to have been induced to conclude treaties inconvenient to itself.

Even the satisfied Powers, who have most to gain from upholding the sanctity of treaties, have not always taken the trouble to be consistent. When France defaulted on her War-debt obligation to the United States, she excused herself on the ground of a change in “ the determining circumstances ”. She thereby anticipated by rather more than three years the precise excuse given by Herr Hitler for his violation of the Locarno Treaty—a fact which did not prevent her from denouncing that violation as *immoral*. When Soviet Russia, after the Armistice, declared herself no longer bound by the Brest-Litovsk Treaty which she herself had signed nine months before, the Allied Governments applauded, though they themselves were simultaneously attacking the Soviet Government for its violation of agreements concluded by the Tsarist Government twenty or twenty-five years previously. So clearly, even among the most moral nations, does the sanctity of treaties follow the line of national interest. It requires little imagination to realize that, if the United States were compelled, as the result of a defeat in war, to cede Arizona and New Mexico to Mexico and to permit the unrestricted colonization of California by Japan, few

Americans would believe in the sanctity of the treaties in which these arrangements were embodied.

But we can perhaps carry the argument one step further. "The universal spirit of the law of all countries", wrote Rousseau, "is to favour the strong against the weak, and him that has against him that has nothing". Or as Adam Smith, whom nobody will suspect of being a Marxist, put it: "Civil government, in so far as it is instituted for the protection of property, is in reality instituted for the defence of the rich against the poor". Law creates vested interests and defends them; and "law and order", both in domestic and in international politics, is the natural slogan of the well-to-do and of the conservatives. Law may be sacrosanct in two senses. It is sacrosanct in what can be called the physical sense if there is sufficient force behind it to coerce the resister. It is sacrosanct in a moral sense if it rests on the common feeling of an overwhelming majority of the community. (In practice, the two senses tend to coincide, since law is rarely enforceable unless it has the majority of the community, at any rate passively, behind it). The present international *régime* established by the treaties is sacrosanct in neither sense. In contemporary conditions, "sanctity of treaties" is not a moral principle but the political slogan of the Powers satisfied with the existing order.

A curious chapter might be written on the geographical distribution of idealism. Its incidence will generally be found to vary in inverse proportion to the proximity of its object to the interests of the idealist. In the first half of the nineteenth century the English industrialist freed the slaves of Africa and the West Indies, while turning a deaf ear to the sufferings of the English worker, man, woman and child, in his own factories. The average American and the average Englishman to-day are sincerely and vocally indignant at racial discrimination as practised in Germany. But the Englishman suffers only rare twinges of conscience, hastily silenced, over racial discrimination in India; and racial discrimination in the United States makes most Americans at best only mildly uncomfortable. When the Council of the League of Nations in May last year discussed the recognition of Italy's conquest of

Ethiopia, the two members of the Council who formally objected to recognition were the delegates of New Zealand and Bolivia—the two countries geographically most distant from Ethiopia, and most completely divorced from any conceivable practical interest in the question. Once more, idealism had free play where interests were non-existent.

The same phenomenon has been particularly conspicuous in recent American reactions to European developments before and since the Munich Agreement. Americans, who, in American politics, are content to apply the strictest canons of self-interest, are not thereby deterred from advocating the settlement of European conflicts, in which they themselves are but remotely concerned, on a basis of pure altruism.

The outside observer, conscious of these inconsistencies, will be amazed to discover the extent to which the idealist, laying down moral precepts for others, can remain blind to the chinks in his own armour. At the last League Assembly which was attended by a German Delegation, a British Cabinet Minister attacked the racial policy of the German Government in a telling speech, which contained *inter alia* the astonishing statement that in the British Empire no person could be debarred from holding any office or occupying any post under the Crown "by reason of race, colour, or creed". Moreover, he got away with it. Rounds of applause followed the speech; and it was only afterwards in the corridors that a few bold critics ventured to whisper that the remark had been a little rash. It must be in virtue of some similar blindness that the most popular American coin bears on its face the surprising combination of the head of an Indian chief and the word "Liberty".

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What moral then can be drawn from these somewhat discouraging reflections? First and foremost, perhaps, the old-fashioned maxim, "Know Thyself". Many eloquent speeches have been delivered on the theme that a better mutual understanding between nations is necessary for an improvement in international relations. One is inclined to suggest that to understand other nations is a less difficult and a less pressing problem than to understand ourselves. The decrease in national self-knowledge and the corresponding increase in national self-

righteousness are among the penalties which we have paid for the vast extension of popular interest in international problems during the past quarter of a century ; and the easy assumption that these phenomena are confined to the totalitarian States would not be justified.

Just as the growth of a social morality depends on the existence of a sense of community among the members of the group, so the growth of an international morality depends on the development of what we must call a common international conscience. "No individual can make a conscience for himself". wrote T. H. Green in his *Prolegomena to Ethics* ; "he always needs a society to make it for him". Similarly, no nation, or small group of nations, can create an international ethic by imposing their own conception of morality, cast consciously or unconsciously in the mould of their own interests, on the rest of the world. An international morality can come only through a synthesis—or conglomeration, for no synthesis can be complete—of national moralities ; and if it be said that the process will be long and difficult, then one must reply that the road towards the formation of a true international community, and the road towards international peace, is also long and difficult.

Nevertheless, an international morality already exists in embryonic form. So much has been written in the last few years of the "international anarchy" that people tend to overlook the wide field of everyday life in which international law is recognized and, on the whole, observed. The decline in international morality since the War has had certain specific causes ; and some of these causes are by their nature transient. The international community was torn asunder by the War, when malice and all uncharitableness became the watchwords of every belligerent. It takes a considerable period to live down this legacy of hatred. International law has suffered much from the zeal of its friends who, after the War, sought to impose on it political functions which it was incapable of performing. Legislation which is in advance of the mass of public opinion, or which is designed to uphold the interests of a particular class, notoriously weakens respect for law ; and nearly all the post-War attempts to bolster up international law with fresh pacts, conventions and protocols fall into one or other of these categories.

Most of all, the cause of international morality has suffered a set-back through the concerted effort of the victorious Powers to identify it with the maintenance of the Versailles settlement. To uphold the *status quo* by force has been declared by the satisfied Powers the essence of morality, to destroy it by force branded as immoral. The dissatisfied Powers have replied by proclaiming a new morality of "dynamism", or the right of self-assertion against the tyranny of the *status quo*. That way madness lies. Progress will begin again only when we are prepared to do enough hard thinking to extricate our national interests from the tangled skein of moral attitudes in which we have disguised them. Conflicting national interests can be reconciled in a common international morality. But when we persuade ourselves that our divergent national interests are themselves morality, who shall find a meeting place between them ?

KISMET—OR REAL APPEASEMENT ?

BY THOMAS JOHNSTON, P.C., M.P.

THREE possibilities lie ahead of us : either the bankruptcy which follows upon a heavily armoured "Peace"—interspersed as that "Peace" is with major and minor international crises—or first of all a war, engulfing civilization and contemporaneously with it, the same bankruptcy; or, as the only remaining alternative, a speedy discovery and acceptance of international solutions for the problems of national hate, fear, greed and envy which beset every continent.

We in Britain have drifted far away from the policy of appeasement. It has come to be regarded with derision as a mere acquiescence in burglary with menaces ; at its best, a timid face-saving protest when the rulers of the Totalitarian States are engaged in violent appropriation of territory. So we are now seeking to organize the potential victims of aggression into a new alliance and providing for firm Staff talks and economic arrangements between the partners in the alliance ; among all classes of society there is a general acceptance of the idea of inevitability of a great war in which, once again, we are aligned with France and Russia against Germany and her allies.

One moves about the lobbies of Parliament, hearkens to journalists, business and professional men ; everywhere one finds the same refrain : it is Kismet, there is nothing more can be done about it beyond speeding up our armament production, intensifying our diplomatic activities and enlarging our hospital wards. Seldom if ever nowadays does one hear of any considered proposal for removal of the sources of the international enmities and hates. When any suggestion of the kind is mooted the reply is prompt that this is not an opportune hour for its discussion : we cannot seem to yield to threat. Yet for a certainty there will be neither peace nor security in the world

until the tensions are relaxed and the springs of inter-nation ill-will attacked at their source ; even if first we have a war, it is still true that there can never be peace and security until the causes of enmity are eradicated. No war will ever end war if the seeds of still another war remain germinating in the hearts of men.

It may, indeed, well be true that what Mr. Anthony Eden describes as exasperation with the Dictators has so swept this country that no Government could live which dared to formulate any proposals capable of being construed as farther surrender to Nazi threats. Nevertheless, the consequences of unreason are so appalling—and so certain it is that those who survive a war would require to sit round a table and plan new and more rational arrangements for security—that it were well now, Governments or no Governments, if we considered some of these rational, and indeed inevitable, rearrangements.

There is, for example, the question of Colonies.

At the end of the last war Germany was forcibly stripped of her colonial empire. She lost four colonies in Africa—Togo, the Cameroons, South West Africa and East Africa—over 900,000 square miles with an estimated population of 11,000,000 people. In the Pacific she lost New Guinea and Samoa, and in Asia, Kiachau, a total colonial empire of over 1,000,000 square miles and 13,500,000 of population. At the Versailles Peace Conference she was bluntly told by the victorious Powers that “Germany’s failure in the domain of colonial civilization is so evident that the Allied and Associated Powers cannot give her a second chance nor abandon thirteen or fourteen million natives once more to a fate from which the war delivered them.”

In so far as any evidence was produced for this verdict, it was to be found in the British Blue Book “*Report on the Natives of South Africa and on their treatment by Germany.*” This collection of atrocity stories has been vehemently repudiated in Germany, and by none more savagely than by General Goering, whose father was the first German Commissioner in South West Africa. The Prime Minister of South Africa, General Hertzog, in 1924, publicly expressed doubt whether any living person believed the contents of that volume, and two years later it was unanimously repudiated by the Provincial Council of South West Africa. The colonial guilt accusation, however, still rankles in Germany

and affords abundant opportunity for Nazi propaganda. True, it is that no colonizing nation has been free from some scoundrelly episodes in the history of its treatment of "natives", but there cannot be any real reply to the German who asks pertinent questions about atrocities in the Belgian Congo and as to why Portugal is considered morally fit and technically capable of running a colonial empire of 872,000 people inhabiting 807,000 square miles, while Germany is forbidden to possess a colony anywhere.

Nevertheless, to any suggestion of return of her former colonies to Germany there are several serious and weighty objections, some of which, indeed would appear to be frankly recognized in responsible quarters in Germany. At the same time, there are many uncandid and foolish objections offered which only serve to irritate men here and in Germany who are seeking the removal of the causes of friction and strife in the world. For example, what useful purpose is served nowadays by declaring that there can be no return of the ex-German colonies without the consent of the "natives"? The natives were never consulted in 1919 when they were taken from German and into British, French or Belgian mandatory control. Nor is much useful purpose served by declaring that Germany is to-day free to purchase any produce she desires in our mandated territories. Of course she is free—in peace time at any rate. But such freedom to purchase in our mandated territories in no wise obliterates the accusations of German inferiority and unfitness to govern which are the trumpeted pretence for the mandates. And it may be taken for a certainty that so long as this colonial stigma rests upon the German people there will be no durable peace in the world, all of us being required to pay year after year vast hidden subsidies through our armament bills for the privilege of continuing that stigma and the mandates which rest upon it.

Nevertheless there are real and substantial objections to a return *simpliciter* of the ex-German colonies. Obviously there are important strategical objections. New Zealand is unlikely to consent to Nazi submarine bases being created in the ex-German island of Samoa which she presently holds under mandate. Similarly Australia is unlikely to consent for strategic reasons

to a return of German control in New Guinea ; or South Africa to consent to a return of the ex-German territory which she holds under mandate : and France and Britain could hardly be expected by anyone outside of an asylum to surrender to Herr Hitler opportunities for striking at their sea-borne commerce or for drilling vast armies of negro soldiery which could be used at the first opportunity against the democracies.

Is there then a way out of the *impasse*? Or are we driven willy-nilly along the way to mutual ruin and destruction, we and Germany, simply because sane men cannot find a sane solution for what is on the one side largely a question of face-saving and dignity, and, on the other side, largely a question of dread and apprehension ?

I submit there is such a solution—the international control of all colonial empires ; not only the mandatory control of the ex-German colonies but the international control of all colonial empires.

If all the colonies were placed upon a similar status—if British, French, Dutch, Belgian, Portugues colonies, as well as the ex-German colonies, were administered under the control of an International Commission, then the exceptional stigma at present resting upon Germany would automatically disappear.

But this International Board system manifestly is a different affair from the present arrangement whereby colonial territories are handed out under mandate to different Powers. With the mandate there are, of course, limitations ; the safeguarding of the Open Door to the mandated colonies for the trade and commerce of the world, the insistence upon the idea of trusteeship on behalf of the natives ; and the annual reports to the Mandates Commission of the League—all are very valuable provisions, but they do not meet the objection that the mandatory Powers may someday use the colonial territory which they hold as a base for military and strategic purposes : or the objection that in any event the present mandated territories are all ex-German, and that the Mandatory Powers themselves hold other colonies free from any mandated limitations. Even were it possible to induce the Mandatory Powers to hand over their Mandates to Germany there is not the slightest reason to suppose that Germany would accept mandatory restrictions, or that she would

agree to report to any League of Nations. Again any universal mandate system for colonies means, *inter alia*, a surrender by Britain of her colonial trade preferences, and a surrender by France of her conscriptory rights over the natives in the Cameroons.

But most of these difficulties in the way of an equitable solution of the colonial question—certainly the prestige difficulties—disappear, if instead of a system of mandates given to particular Powers, we had an International Colonial Commission supervising all the colonies, developing colonial service cadres, operating the 13,000,000 square miles of colonial territory, and covering the colonial population of 300,000,000 people with a Free Trade system.

Such a proposal for an all-in international Colonial Commission, if made now, say by Britain and France, Holland, Portugal and Belgium, would have important re-actions in the common cause of world peace and security. To begin with, it would secure great support and adhesion among the general public in the "Have-Not" Countries; in a military sense it might be worth many divisions to us. If the proposal were spurned by the Totalitarian Dictators, who can say what forces of upheaval might be unleashed underneath their feet? On the other hand, were it accepted by the Dictators, there would then at last be a firm economic structure upon which an enduring peace could be built.

There are certainly millions of people in Germany and Italy now—people with old Socialist and humanitarian traditions and affiliations—to whom such a proposal could not be easily mis-represented. In the United States, in Scandinavia, as well as in the anti-democratic States, millions of humble folk would see in the International Commission an abandonment of the struggle between the Haves and the Have-Nots; they would at long last see a road of escape from the continual enmeshment of the peoples in the war system. There is no such road of escape observable now.

Of course, it is true that the colonial question is not solely one of prestige for Germany. The Nazi *régime* requires foreign currency if the Reich is to procure tin, zinc, and tea, and so Dr. Schacht has joined General Goering, in urging that a colonial

empire attached to Germany's economic system would enable Germany to purchase *some* raw materials without the necessity of buying foreign money. Nevertheless, if the question of colonial guilt were got out of the way if Germany were linked up politically and economically in a joint control of all colonial Empires in the world, the international tensions would be so relaxed that the money exchanges would offer no insuperable barrier to Peace.

What we must do, and that speedily, is to recognize the absurdity of persisting in adherence to a rule which in effect declares that, while Portugal is to be allowed to control seven million natives of Africa, Germany with her 37 Universities and her 265 Chairs of colonial sciences and languages is not to be permitted to have any colony! And, that absurdity once recognized, we must proceed to remove its ill-effects from the world, not by any surrender of territory to Germany, not by a betrayal of any African native to Germany, not by any weakening of our strategic positions—but by an international control in which Germany shares with the others of us, joint and equal ownership and authority in a common trust. This joint responsibility would involve a joint police—a joint air police. And out of that air police, who knows but that a real international police force for home, as well as for colonial, affairs might develop; and with it a Tribunal of Equity for the settlement of disputes other than upon the colonial issue. Upon the day that we can accept an international air force and a Tribunal of Equity, there is no longer necessity for national armies; peace becomes a positive system and not merely a breathing-space between convulsions.

Perhaps that international police force combined with Tribunal of Equity is not so far off realization as some people imagine. The joint naval force following upon the decisions at Nyon to prevent submarine piracy in the Mediterranean stopped that piracy *instantly*. Students of Scots history, and particularly the history of the Highland clans, know how we were cursed for centuries, right down to the second Stuart rebellion in 1745, by the private army system. There was no settled Peace, no security; every chieftain was a judge in his own cause, and promoted his cause with fire, slaughter and rapine. But

with the passing of the Heritable Jurisdictions Act in 1746, these private armies were forbidden : all disputes henceforth had to go to the Law Courts and any chieftain who contemplated imposing his will by violence upon his neighbours knew that he had to face the organized forces of the Crown. Banditry with armed violence disappeared after 1746. We have since had peace within our borders.

Nor is it only in the question of colonies that an international Commission of Control provides a key to world peace ; there are other private or national monopolies and privileges which simply cannot be maintained without irritation and strife.

Take the Mediterranean Sea. The armed forces of Great Britain are encamped at its ingress and its egress, at Gibraltar and at Suez. The Italians thereby feel menaced and aver that their commerce, which in recent years has reached nearly 17% of the total tonnage passing through the Suez Canal is paying unnecessarily high dues : that the developing colonial efforts of Italy in Abyssinia are being handicapped and that in the event of war Italian troops might have their life-line cut.

Now it is possible to put up all manner of specious debating replies to these assertions and apprehensions : to declare that during the Great War the passage of enemy ships through the Canal was never prohibited, and that any attack upon an enemy ship essaying passage through the Canal would require to take place in the approaches to the Canal and not actually inside the waterway. It is possible also to claim that if the ships of Italy pay Canal dues higher by 20% than would be charged in the Panama Canal, so do the ships of Britain and France pay the high Suez rates. To which, of course, Signor Gayda, promptly retorts that at any rate Britain gets back annual dividends amounting for the year 1937 to £1,975,658, to say nothing of the £3,500 per annum directors' fees drawn by each of eleven favoured British nominees, while the Italians receive neither dividends nor directors' fees. The controversy is endless.

It may well be that the Italian fears of blockade in the Canal in defiance of the constitution and the concession of the Canal Company are baseless, and it may equally well be that the annual financial disadvantage to Italy of the present system is not worth the cost of a forenoon's war preparation. Nevertheless,

here is a bone of contention ; here is a grievance. May we not consider whether it is worth our while to remove it ?

To begin with, we may as well admit frankly that we are not entitled to honourable mention for any part we played at the initiation of the Canal project. In fact we obstructed it by every means in our power.

On July 7th, 1857, Lord Palmerston declared in Parliament that :

“ Her Majesty’s Government certainly cannot undertake to use their influence with the Sultan to induce him to give permission for construction of the Canal, because, for the last fifteen years Her Majesty’s Government have used all the influence they possess at Constantinople and in Egypt to prevent that scheme from being carried into effect.”

Ten days later he declared the Canal project to be

“ one of the bubble schemes which are often set on foot to induce English capitalists to embark their money upon enterprises which in the end will only leave them poorer, whomever else they make richer.”

And on August 23rd, 1860, the same British statesman declared

“ That Company (the Suez Canal Company) is, as I have often said, one of the greatest and most remarkable attempts at delusion that has been practised in modern times. It is a complete fallacy from beginning to end.”

Another of the chief obstructionists of the Canal was Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, the British Ambassador to Turkey, who actually managed to induce the Turkish Government “to prohibit the mention of the Suez Canal in the newspapers of Turkey”.* In vain some British writers at the time pressed the idea that the total cost of the Canal would be “less by one-third than the sum expended on the railway from London to York . . . or about the same amount as that which was expended monthly by France and England in carrying on the Crimean War.”† The official British attitude was that the Canal would aid French designs upon our Eastern Empire—and so should be rigorously opposed. Later, in 1875, as everyone knows, we purchased the shares of the bankrupt Khedive of Egypt, and still later distinguished ourselves in opposing various proposals for an international ownership and control of the great highway. In 1882 the Italians proposed the establishment of an international police force to protect the Canal. At the Constantinople

* *The Gates of the East*.—C. L. Kennedy, 1857.

† *Ibid.*

convention in February 1888, our Government opposed international control as proposed by the French and supported by the Russian delegates "on the ground that such control would weaken the position of Great Britain in Egypt to the benefit of other Powers."† And to this hour we have persisted in our opposition to any international solution, although it is not clear that the sale of a number of shares to other nations and an inclusion of their nominees upon the Board of the Canal Suez Company, and an international police guarding the Canal, would be anything but a considerable national advantage to this country.

At the western end of the Mediterranean we have held Gibraltar for some 235 years. Prior to that the Spaniards held it for 242 years. And now one hears of howitzers at Pelayo near Algeciras, of long-range guns, of aircraft and submarine bases which might make the Rock less of an impregnable fortress than it has been in times past. Be that as it may, it is, nevertheless, a fact that we sit on Gibraltar at the Western exit to the Mediterranean Sea, parading our armed might in the face of the world, and here again I submit that an international control—not the handing over of a mandate to any other nation, not a "surrender"—is the solution, and that without an international control there can be no approach to national disarmament, peace and security.

Such international solutions for the *malaise* of our civilization would doubtless encounter stiff resistance from short-sighted imperialists; but support from even these gentry might be anticipated when once they grasp the idea that we are not referring to the self-governing Dominions, but to colonies only; and that we are asking for international control not of British colonial dependencies alone, but that the colonial empires of all the colony-owning Powers should go into the common pool; that the only visible alternative to such an international solution is our present annual armaments bill, a dying foreign trade, a certain war, and all-round ruin.

† *Suez Canal and League Sanctions—Geneva Research Centre.* VI No. 3, 1935.

SEARCHLIGHT ON YUGOSLAVIA

BY C. F. MELVILLE

B RITAIN has guaranteed Greece and Rumania, and, before this article is published, similar arrangements with Turkey will have been announced. The Agreements with Greece and Turkey mean that Britain is manning the "second line of defence", which runs through the Eastern Mediterranean, the Aegean and the Dardanelles, while the agreement with Rumania, linked with Poland, constitutes an outpost. (The first line of defence, running through Austria Bohemia, Moravia, was abandoned in 1938, when we and the French committed the tragic folly of permitting the German rape of Austria and Czechoslovakia. The third, and last line of defence is at our very door; it runs through the North Sea and the English Channel, and comprises Holland, Belgium and Northern France.)

But this strategic system is incomplete. In between the abandoned first line of defence in Central Europe, and the second line in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean, which is now being manned, stands Yugoslavia. Had the first line not been abandoned, Yugoslavia could have been counted in as an integral part of Britain's defences. At the moment, on the morrow of Mr. Chamberlain's speech of April 13th, Yugoslavia cannot be regarded even as an outpost of the second line. For Italy now has her bottled up in an Adriatic sea, which, since Signor Mussolini's Albanian *coup*, has been converted into an Italian lake. This, of course, was one of the main purposes of the seizure of Albania. Signor Mussolini, with the connivance of Herr Hitler, occupied Albania, with the double purpose (1) of warning Yugoslavia off from joining the British Anti-Aggression Front and (2) of providing Italy with a jumping-off ground for further penetration of the Balkans. This grip on the Balkans by Italy and Germany is planned as the counterpart in the Eastern Mediterranean to their domination of Spain

in the Western Mediterranean; the two together providing them with their final positions for launching their concerted attack upon the British and French Empires.

The Axis plan is starkly simple. Germany proposes to come down to the Northern Adriatic by way of Croatia and Slovenia, Italy to extend eastwards by way of Albania, the Dalmatian coast and Greece, to Salonika, while Hungary and Bulgaria—the former to be bribed with Transylvania, to be taken from Rumania, the latter with Macedonia, to be taken from Greece and Yugoslavia—are to be used as pawns in the grandiose German-Italian plan of *divide et impera*.

Since the absorption of Czechoslovakia by Germany, it should be noted, the Axis Powers have dropped the pretence, which served them so well at Munich, of racial self-determination. Their new slogan is based on a bogus appeal to "history". Thus, Italy, claiming the heritage of Rome and Venice, will demand the Dalmatian coastline. And, it is now being said quite openly in Herr Hitler's entourage that any territories which at any time came under Germanic sway—including, that is to say, those Balkan territories which were once with the old Austrian orbit—must become part of the Third Reich. This means Croatia and Slovenia and an outlet in Northern Dalmatia.

It is not surprising, then, that there are divided counsels in Belgrade, and that the Yugoslav Government hesitates as to the attitude which it should finally adopt. Four alternatives present themselves. Yugoslavia might prevent Italy seizing Salonika, by herself obtaining that port, as the price of military assistance to Germany. Or, conversely, she might co-operate with Italy in return for Italy preventing Germany taking Croatia and Slovenia. The other possibilities are co-operation with the Anglo-French combination, and neutrality. The first hardly exists, except as an idea germinating in the minds of a small section of opinion. The second may likewise be ruled out, for had there been a "deal" with Italy, Yugoslavia would already have obtained Scutari, in Northern Albania, as compensation for her inaction in the face of Italy's Albanian *coup*. The third—co-operation with the Anglo-French Anti-Aggression Front—is not possible without more definite, substantial and rapid assurances of help than Britain and

France at present seem able or willing to offer. Without the certainty of such help Yugoslavs feel that it would be suicidal at this stage, to come out into the open against their powerful neighbours. It would provoke a German-Italian invasion and the dismemberment of Yugoslavia before Anglo-French aid could reach her. There remains, therefore—for the time being at all events—only the last alternative, neutrality.

The upshot is that the Balkan State with the finest army and the best fighting spirit is not in any way linked with our Balkan line of defence. She is not even an outpost. Instead, she is a gap. This is bad enough. But the trouble does not end there. Gaps may be filled. The question arises : by whom ? By us or by the enemy ? For even supposing she succeeded in maintaining neutrality during a conflict, it might be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for her to prevent Italy and Germany turning her neutrality into a condition of “benevolence”, such as would enable them to use Yugoslav resources for the supply of their armies.

A Yugoslavia partitioned and reduced to impotence by the Axis Powers, or a “neutral” Yugoslavia, used by those Powers as a source of supply, would, in either case, be a fatal loss to the Anglo-French combination. It is no doubt true that Yugoslavia’s best chance of survival in her present form lies through co-operation with the West; only the present situation—political, geographical and strategical—would make it extremely risky for her to declare her adherence in advance of adequate measures for her protection from a swift German-Italian attack. It is not, as some British critics seem to think, that Yugoslavia has “sold out” to the Axis. It is simply that for the moment she considers the only safe policy is to lie doggo. The initiative, therefore, clearly lies with Britain. But something more concrete than a “cover note” will be necessary. A British guarantee would need to be backed up by immediate technical, military dispositions.

For some time past, however, there has been an inclination in this country—which the writer can only regard as mistaken—to mark time in regard to Yugoslavia until she “puts her house in order” internally, *i.e.*, arrives at a solution of the long-standing Serbo-Croat dispute. More recently there have been signs of a

welcome modification of this attitude. Perhaps it is beginning to be realized in Whitehall that others besides ourselves, and with less disinterested motives, are interested in the Serbo-Croat problems, and that therefore it would be a case of putting the cart before the horse to wait until the present negotiations between Belgrade and Zagreb are completed before making concrete proposals to Yugoslavia.

Germany for some time past has been planning a repetition on Yugoslavia of the tactics she employed so successfully in Czechoslovakia. Her plan is to engineer, simultaneously with German minority agitation, a demand for Croatian "self-determination". Happily the Croat, unlike the Slovak, leaders, are neither naïve nor venal. The menace to Yugoslavia from without has already done much to promote unity within. M. Matchek, the leader of the Croatian autonomous movement, has already made it clear that he has no intention of appealing for the help of either Herr Hitler or Signor Mussolini in the settlement of what he considers to be an entirely internal question. His declaration is timely. It should put an end to the rumours, spread by irresponsible political elements inside Yugoslavia, and exploited by hostile elements outside, that Croatia might appeal for the "protection" of Berlin, and Slovenia for the "protection" of Rome.

In fact the negotiations initiated between the Government of M. Svetkovitch and M. Matchek, before the present international crisis arose, have since been speeded up as the result of the crisis. This is a problem of some twenty years old. Yet already, in the space of a few weeks, agreement in principle has been achieved. M. Svetkovitch, with the full approval of the Regent, Prince Paul, has agreed with M. Matchek that the Yugoslav State should be reconstructed on some kind of federative basis so that the Croats will at last realize their desire to obtain administrative autonomy. The detail will necessarily present certain difficulties, and may take some time in the working out. Croatian autonomy implies also local autonomies for Slovenia and Serbia. There is the question, too, of determining the exact functions of the local administrations in relation to those of the central government in Belgrade. Further problems present themselves in determining the new provincial areas. To take

as example, the cases of Bosnia and Dalmatia ; these provinces are inhabited partly by Croats and partly by Serbs. How to find lines of demarcation satisfactory both to Belgrade and Zagreb ? Neither side underestimates these difficulties. But they are by no means beyond solution. For basically the problem is not a racial one. Serb and Croat speak the same language and are of the same racial stock. Their differences, are not ethnological, but traditional, cultural and historical. No minority question is involved. Therefore there is no ground for outside interference.

Obviously there is much preliminary work to be done—such as reforms of the press law, and of the electoral law—before the new constitutional structure can be brought into being. As to what that structure will finally be, it is not possible to say at this juncture, beyond the fact that the Dynasty is accepted by all concerned as “ above the battle ”, and that foreign affairs, defence and finance will be reserved to the Central Government in Belgrade ; that purely local affairs will be administered by local administrations ; and that all these administrations will have representatives in the Central Government.

Transition from a centralized to a federative form of State would present its problems at the best of times. How much more difficult it must be during times like the present, with war threatening, and with pressure being applied by powerful neighbours ? Moreover, recent events in Czechoslovakia have given to the word “ autonomy ” a dangerous sound. It speaks volumes for the level-headedness and confidence of Yugoslavia's leaders, that they are willing and able to contemplate such far-reaching changes at a time so fraught with difficulties and dangers. There can be no doubt, however, that the satisfactory solution of this internal problem will do a great deal to consolidate and strengthen Yugoslavia, and enable her more successfully to resist as a united nation any attempt on the part of enemies to disrupt her.

It is not to be denied that there are those in Yugoslavia who believe that if she threw in her lot with the Axis Powers she would fare better than in company with Britain and France. Similarly, it would be idle to pretend that there do not exist hot-headed and politically inexperienced elements which, not

seeing further than their noses, might fall for the blandishments of Berlin and Rome disguised as "self-determination".

But none of these elements have any place either in the Government in Belgrade, or amongst the responsible leaders in Zagreb. Disruptive elements in the latter centre, and opportunist ones in the former, would not be able to launch Yugoslavia on a policy inimical to her own true destiny and the salvation of Europe as a whole, unless the Western Democracies should play into their hands, and into the hands of the Axis, by neglecting Yugoslavia at this critical moment. The heart of the country is sound. Its instinct, profoundly, is democratic. The will to independence is strong and vital. But the Yugoslavs are realists. They are more impressed by deeds than by words. Therefore it is to be hoped that the leaders of the Western democracies—Britain and France—will without delay take the necessary steps to make it possible for Yugoslavia to join the anti-aggression front. For that way lies not only Yugoslavia's own true destiny, but also the reinforcement of our own defence by a valorous and war-seasoned people.

GERMANY AND WORLD POWER

IGNOTUS

“ Germany must be a World Power or nothing.”—*Mein Kampf*.

“ Only the most evil conscience can say we seek world domination.”

—*Herr Hitler's Wilhelmshafen speech, April 1st, 1933*

Prince Bülow, the German Chancellor, visiting England in 1899, wrote :—

“ The English politicians . . . do not know much more about conditions on the Continent than we (Germans) know about Peru or Siam. . . There is something naïve in their unconscious egotism but they also have certain credulity. They are not prone to suspect really evil intentions they are . . . rather indolent and very optimistic.”

This is largely true to-day and accounts for much of the prevalence of “ wishful thinking.”

How naïve the Germans think us is shown by a letter from the Counsellor of the German Embassy in London, afterward Ambassador in Washington, to the German Chancellor suggesting an arbitration treaty with England.

“ Such treaties are quite harmless and *de facto* of no importance. At the same time it is surprising to note the extent to which, in political matters, our ‘ practical Englishmen ’ are dominated by phrases. If we were to agree to an arbitration treaty a very large number of people in England would believe that the Germans had put off their desire for conquest and had become peaceable individuals. In consequence we could build a few more battleships, especially if they were not given too much publicity.”

At the present juncture few things are more important than a wider understanding in this country of German mentality, aims and policy. In his recent book, Mr. Harold Nicolson has sketched the origins of the German character. “ Underneath all the solid and magnificent virtues of the German race lies a layer of nervous uncertainty,” defined by Friedrich Sieburg as “ spiritual homelessness.” “ We Germans ”, wrote Sieburg “ are shifting sand, yet in every grain there inheres the longing to combine with the rest into solid durable stone ”. It is this wish for a real “ focus ” which causes the Germans to regard

'unity' as expressed by the State as something mystical and almost religious. It has led them to seek in the physical power of the State that sense of solidarity which they lack as individuals. Again, the contrast between the conduct of soldiers in mass and when isolated, for instance, is especially marked in the case of Germans. In one form or another this mystical idea has continually appeared in German history from the Teutonic Knights down to Hitler. To the more ruthless and materialistic characteristics of the Prussians, South Germany has added the romanticism of the Wotan saga. And the combination of both these elements in Hitler's character is a large factor in his hold over the German people.

German *Kultur* gradually became a doctrine of mastery, and it produced the doctrine that the State is above all moral law. The philosopher, Fichte, wrote "Between States there is neither law nor right but the right of the strongest". Frederick the Great adopted Machiavelli's doctrine that it was not only the right but the duty of a ruler to lie to others, and of the State to break agreements or treaties, if it were advantageous. Bethmann Hollweg's "scrap of paper" remark was thus not the momentary outburst of a harassed minister but a statement of policy. If Bismarck only occasionally used this method, it was, as his private writings show, only because it was, at that moment, inexpedient, not because it was immoral.

German policy, in spite of the change of rulers, has for long—sometimes unconsciously—been based upon the fundamental belief that German *Kultur* is something super-human which ought to be imposed upon the world. To this idea and for the state the young German is trained, and is often willing, to sacrifice his intelligence, his independence and even his life, to an extent not realized by more individualistic nations, and unknown in any other land. It cannot, moreover, be too clearly understood that German policy, unlike British, has a permanently war-like basis. The camouflage, deceptions and mendacious propaganda used, more or less, by all nations in war are considered a normal part of German policy in peace and are in fact specifically recommended in Hitler's book. Hence

the step from commercial and political manœuvres to actual war, at least in theory, seems to the rulers of Germany less profound than it does to the British. With such a conception of policy added to the ordinary German's belief in Britain's dislike of hard work and discipline and love of ease and comfort is it surprising that Germany should think Britain neither worthy nor able to retain her Empire?

The visitor to Germany who finds that "the people do not want war"—in the sense that the French, for example, wanted war in 1870—is right. German policy has always, and not merely recently, aimed primarily at achieving its ends by the threat of war, supported, however, by the knowledge that it dreads the idea of war less than its neighbours. While Britain dreads the idea of war itself Germany basically dreads the unsuccessful war.

Belief in the superiority of German *Kultur* and the right to impose it on the world led naturally to the idea of, and wish for, world domination. It is not, however, to be supposed that the average member of the German Navy League or Colonial League fully realizes or even shares this aspiration. Indeed, in spite of Germany's striking and costly failure in the colonial field propaganda has made him sincerely believe that Germany needs colonies for raw materials, "*Lebensraum*" or prestige. World power, however, is the fundamental ulterior aim of many of Germany's deepest thinkers. The hard fact, based upon statistical analysis, that the former German colonies were and must always be of little value to Germany as regards raw materials or emigration, which its Foreign Office, of course, knows, lends additional support to the belief that the demand for their return has some other motive. Even prestige hardly accounts for it.

Consequently, the idea of world hegemony and domination is not, as might be inferred from one of our Prime Minister's recent speeches, new, nor is it the creation of Hitler. It has been growing steadily in Germany since the founding of the Empire in 1871. Even the writings of Bismarck, though to the end of his life he was "still no colony man", show glimmerings of the conception. He supported the colonial idea with reluctance when he did so, in 1876, and tried to acquire a large part of South Africa with the help of the Boers, a study of his thoughts

shows that his object was not in reality, or at least entirely, mere settlement and trade but, like most of Germany's subsequent colonial efforts, a step in the long march towards world power. The Kaiser's demand that nothing should happen in any part of the world without consultation with Germany and the extravagant claims of Bernhardi's "*Weltmacht oder Niedergang*" were not merely the boasts of individual megalomaniacs but the expression, in an exaggerated form, of a feeling already widespread. It arises from racial, not personal, megalomania.

The idea of world domination was in fact seriously discussed and propagated for many years before the War to which it was, to some extent, a contributory cause. It was supported by many of Germany's principal historians and professors—always a powerful class in that country—and even some ministers. The lectures of von Treitschke, then Germany's leading historian, and of his successor, Delbrück, were numerous and warmly supported by many of the chief politicians, publicists and leaders of thought. In his "*Politik*" and "*Die Türkei und die Grossmächte*" he insists on the ability and right of Germany to succeed "that anachronism" the British Empire. The Colonial League, with many thousands of members, while ostensibly only interested in the acquisition of colonies for "trade and emigration" prepared maps and statistics of the World Empire to be acquired at the expense of Britain, Holland and France. Less discreet persons published these, and they were openly discussed with foreigners by leading industrialists such as the directors of Krupps, and of the big shipping companies. Although Germany then had free speech and plenty of criticism of its Government, there was remarkably little opposition to these ideas in the Liberal press.

And in 1939, however large we may like to believe is the minority in Germany opposed to Nazi methods, it is no longer possible to ignore the fact that the great bulk of the German people, however much they suffer, believe in Hitler and will follow him. His continuous and striking successes, from the reoccupation of the Rhineland to the almost complete reversal of Versailles and on to his recent extensions of German territory, influence and prestige in Central Europe, have largely obscured

or compensated for the heavy cost to the German people to-day. It is idle to distinguish between people and leaders.

It is not, of course, possible to generalize about 80 millions of people who during the past two generations have been formed into one Empire out of a score of different states, with many different rights and customs of their own. Prussian, and more recently Nazi, domination and education have done much towards unification. But even to-day the Swabian peasant and the Pomeranian labourer can barely understand each other. The average Münchener still jeers at, and the Viennese detests, much that is typical of Prussia, while the industrialist of the West and of Saxony and the merchants of Hamburg and Bremen are poles apart in their outlook and interests from the agriculturalist of East Prussia. But the whole nation is subjected, and remarkably responsive, to a propaganda equally energetic and unscrupulous, is unusually liable to mass hysteria and remarkably submissive to authority.

Visitors to Germany, impressed by the simple kindliness of the Bavarian peasant, for example, ignore or forget the inhuman brutalities of which his fellows were guilty when in France and Belgium—brutalities carried out not always under orders and such as the British soldier is incapable of committing. The attitude of the British Army in Cologne has only to be compared with that of the Germans in Belgium or even to that of Blücher's troops in Paris in 1814. Having been taught for generations, and increasingly so in recent years, to believe in force, it is only natural that the German character, for all its occasional sentimentality, should contain a more or less latent element of brutality.

On the other hand there are, of course, many other elements in the German character which will aid them and from which we might learn with profit, such as their diligence and endurance of hardship, their thoroughness and devotion to country. From our individualist standpoint their use of discipline and "system" are excessive, if perhaps our own are insufficient. "The Englishman's love of sport", wrote one not unfriendly critic, "leaves him no time for learning and his love of luxury no spirit for fighting" and most Germans believe it. Under the Nazi régime some of the less pleasant sides of the German

character have been accentuated—such as truculence and denouncement of neighbours. Business morality and the administration of justice, once highly respected, have deteriorated. Foreign merchants with a long and satisfactory experience of fair dealing, to-day meet too often with broken contracts and difficulties in obtaining protection from the German Courts.

Contrasted with British policy that of Germany displays a remarkable basic continuity, whether in Central Europe, Europe as a whole, or the world. Nearly all Hitler's recent conquests were foreshadowed in the writings of von Treitschke and other leaders of German thought 50 years ago ; for instance, that writer, in his *Deutsche Kämpfe* foreshadowed the lines of the German penetration of South Africa of which we have recently had definite proof. The acquisition of German South West Africa in 1884 was at the time openly supported as a move towards the acquisition of Cape Colony.

“ England has no system ”, said Frederick the Great, and the existence of a continuous world policy over a long period is alien to and not easily credited by British mentality. British Ministers seldom act on the basis of distant and hypothetical dangers, but empirically and for more immediate objects. But if Germany should ever acquire World domination it will not be “ in a fit of absence of mind ” as we acquired our Empire.

PROGRESS IN NATIONAL FITNESS

BY LORD ABERDARE

IT is nearly two years since the Physical Training and Recreation Act was passed in July, 1937, and since that time the National Fitness Council has been pursuing a well-defined policy of bringing to the nation a wider realization that physical fitness is equally important to the individual and the community. There is no single road which will lead men and women of different ages and different physique towards the common goal of health and happiness and the objects of the Fitness Campaign were authoritatively summed up in two sentences taken from the White Paper which was published before the Physical Training and Recreation Act was passed. In the White Paper it was stated :

The aim of the Government is not to secure that between certain ages every boy and girl practises certain physical exercises or achieves a certain standard of physical development, but to inculcate a wider realization that physical fitness has a vital part to play in promoting a healthy mind and human happiness. It is a way of life and an attitude of mind, the importance of which is continuous and not limited to certain years in early youth.

Thus, it is not the job of the National Fitness Council to do the job for others but to see that every assistance is given to those who are prepared to help themselves and to give sympathetic ear to every suggestion which is likely to bring facilities for physical recreation to large numbers. Obviously a good start is made if organizations which are already doing active work are assisted financially to widen their scope. No doubt the time may come when it will be necessary to advise and assist many new organizations, but at the moment the amount of lee-way to be made up is so considerable and the organizations doing good work in limited spheres are so numerous that it has been the obvious policy of the Council to build on foundations which, although in many cases small, are nevertheless sound and solid.

This country has a proud record to maintain of being the nursery of many games and sports. Its people have always delighted in hard physical exercise. Yet nothing is more deeply ingrained in the British nature than the determination to take this exercise in the manner which appeals most to the individual. It is a sorry fact that the motor-car has tended in recent years to encourage many to spend their leisure in a sedentary way, but leisure is not now confined to the week-ends and the growth in popularity of physical exercise which can be taken in small doses has helped enormously to improve the health of the nation. In this category we may include physical training, which appeals to increasing numbers, such sports as swimming, which has made great strides, and indoor winter court games like badminton and squash rackets, which appear to be particularly suitable for those members of the community rich enough to own a car.

But as interest in these games and others develop, facilities lag behind. On the face of it the Amateur Swimming Association with its million active members, to say nothing of all these people who swim regularly without belonging to the Association, has every reason to be proud of its membership. But on enquiry we find that there are fifty towns, each of more than 25,000 people and together having a total population of approximately two million in which there is no single swimming bath and less than a quarter of these towns have as yet taken advantage of the existence of the National Fitness Council to send in proposals for the provision of a bath.

That is a small example of the darker side, but there is also matter for satisfaction when we consider that since the Area Committees started working at the beginning of 1938 there have been 1,480 local schemes involving a capital cost of over eight million pounds for such facilities as community centres, clubs, social centres, village halls, providing in each case a gymnasium and/or other facilities for active indoor recreation and physical training, swimming-baths, playing-fields, camping sites and youth hostels, and also equipment. About a third of these schemes were submitted from local authorities and the rest from voluntary organizations. Needless to say the schemes submitted from local authorities, though smaller in number, were larger in scope, many of the requests from voluntary organizations

being for equipment. These schemes are first submitted to the local Area Committee, who consider them in the light of their local knowledge. It is the important task of the Area Committee to see that money spent in their Area is spent wisely. When the scheme is finally put before the Grants Committee, a grant may be made, according to circumstances, towards the total cost of a percentage which varies from between 25 per cent. and 75 per cent. So far grants have been offered to 835 schemes, amounting to £1,531,808. The percentage of the grant is based on (i) the extent to which the proposed facilities would increase provision for physical training and active forms of recreation and (ii) the economic circumstances of the locality.

With each application the responsible authority submits an estimate of the number of people who are expected to make use of the new facilities. Such figures must be to some extent arbitrary, for even if large numbers use the facilities from time to time their value to the fitness of the nation can only be estimated over a substantial period. Nevertheless, a real step forward has been made and it is particularly pleasing to note that there are roughly 305 schemes to which grants have been offered which involve facilities or additional facilities for the playing of outdoor games. Up to date the games covered by these schemes are in order of numbers, lawn tennis courts, 629; Association football pitches, 424; cricket pitches, 295; and a lesser but substantial number of grounds for netball, hockey, bowls, hurdling and running tracks—in addition to nearly 208 pavilions. Pavilions are most important, for it has been found that many good grounds are used far below their proper capacity owing to the difficulties of changing accommodation.

Unfortunately it is impossible to estimate the number of people who play games or take some regular physical exercise throughout the year. Much splendid exercise is obtained by the many walking and cycling clubs and associations. There are for instance 80,000 members of the Youth Hostels Association and nearly 100,000 members of cycling clubs associated in the Cyclists' Touring Club and the National Cyclists' Union, but when we come to games it is by no means so easy to judge as there is considerable duplication—and in any case many thousands of games—players play for clubs which are not

associated with any National Association. It has been estimated, for instance, that 50,000 men play cricket for clubs affiliated to the Club Cricket Conference, but the Club Cricket Conference is mainly composed of clubs around London and in a small number of counties in the south of England. There are 660 cricket clubs in the West Riding of Yorkshire alone, but how many cricket clubs there are in all it is impossible to say, while not even a rough estimate can be formed of the total membership of cricket clubs. What is known is that there are 20 million men and women in England and Wales between the ages of 14 and 45. Probably less than a quarter of these play games or take regular exercise, although it is probably fair to say that the National Fitness Council added half-a-million to their number in the first full year of its Campaign. I firmly believe that when every necessary facility is provided there will be few who will not take advantage of one or other of them.

No scheme, however well thought out, will succeed unless there is good leadership. Leadership is the determining factor. The Fitness Campaign calls for individual effort, but individual effort will be misdirected unless the local organizers, be they the local authority or a voluntary organization, supply good leaders. In the development of sports and games national organizations play a big part. They safeguard tradition and maintain a standard. A number of these organizations have been helped by grants to appoint additional organizers, while experimental grants are also being made to enable certain of these bodies to employ highly skilled coaches in training the voluntary coaches on whom clubs must rely.

The problem of instruction in recreative physical training for those who have left school can only be met if local education authorities are willing to play a far bigger part in post-school work than most of them are doing at present. The claims of the post-school population cannot be overlooked and indeed much of the good work accomplished at school is frittered away for lack of opportunity immediately the boy or girl leaves school. There is need, therefore, for (i) organizers with time and qualifications for the oversight of post-school work, much of it carried on by voluntary organizations; (ii) a nucleus of highly qualified full-time instructor-leaders; (iii) a larger number of trained

part-time leaders, all working under the guidance of the organizer and his or her colleagues. Liberal provision for physical training should be included in the facilities for evening education offered by the authority, while any voluntary organization, having suitable premises and sufficient numbers to form a class, should be able to look to the local authority to provide a well-qualified instructor.

Two notable additions have been made during the past year to the existing facilities for the training of leaders. To the men's college at Loughborough new buildings have been added which include a larger gymnasium, a covered swimming-bath, two squash courts and rooms for boxing and fencing, while to the already well-known women's colleges of Anstey, Bedford, Chelsea, Dartford and Liverpool has been added a college of the English Gymnastic Society at Nonington in Kent. Moreover, a fine site has been acquired for the new National Training College for men which is being established by the Board of Education. It is anticipated that this college when completed will not only provide a steady stream of leaders but provide for scientific research into various problems of physical education and be of service not only to teachers but also to school medical officers, whose part in a fully developed system of physical education is not yet generally realized. In addition there are many other training schemes already in being, including two residential courses of three months at Anstey and Loughborough, eight short refresher courses and many more local courses.

Much remains to be done and further experience may show the need for new policies. For the time being the Council must pursue its present policy in the knowledge that "well begun" is encouraging if not "half done".

DEMOCRACY AND COMPULSORY SERVICE

BY J. H. HUIZINGA

COMPULSION, the Prime Minister said last autumn in the House of Commons, is undemocratic. The pronouncement has since become one of the stock arguments in the endless controversy about the merits of the compulsory principle in national service. With all the respect due from a foreign observer to the Premier of the country where he enjoys hospitality, I would suggest that it is a pretty meaningless statement. It is a typical example of the danger of using abstract terms against which Stuart Chase warns so strongly in his thought-provoking book "The Tyranny of Words." For neither the word compulsion nor the word undemocratic, used in this abstract manner, carry any precise meaning. The term "compulsion" in itself conveys nothing to the mind. Only when it is stated what compulsion one is thinking of, compulsion of whom, by whom, to do what, does it become possible to discuss whether this specified compulsion is "democratic" or not. And, again, only when one has defined what is understood by that extremely vague term "democratic" does it become possible to discuss this question without floundering in a morass of ambiguity. Failing such definition of the two terms of the equation the statement must remain meaningless. The simplest exercise in logic will illustrate this. Compulsion is undemocratic; every organized society is based on a measure of compulsion (in the matter of compelling respect for the law); hence every organized society is undemocratic. There you have a logical deduction from the original premiss, which, I am sure Mr. Chamberlain himself would be the first to reject.

The first point to be cleared up, therefore, in attempting to bring some order in the controversy about the merits of the compulsory principle in national service, is; what sort of compulsion, by whom, of whom, to do what? Only the third part of that question offers any difficulty. It is when we ask:

compulsion to do what? that the uncertainty arises. People talk and write as if there were no such uncertainty, as if it were perfectly clear to what they are referring when they advocate or reject compulsion. Actually it is anything but clear. It is this failure to specify what sort of compulsory service is referred to which accounts for a good deal of the confusion on the subject. No less than four different things are covered by the blanket term "compulsory service." Some who use it are thinking of universal military service, conscription on the Continental model, some are thinking of compulsory civilian defence, A.R.P. and all that. Some use the words to refer to a compulsory national register, and still others speak of compulsion in relation to industry. No wonder, then, that those who have taken part in the public controversy fail to appreciate one another's point of view. For in arguing the merits and defects of an unspecified "compulsion" they are mostly—and often without realizing it—talking about widely different things. In the same way the debate about the pros and cons of the "compulsory principle" must remain completely sterile. To reject any specified form of compulsory service out of hand or even to refuse to discuss it because you have already made up your mind that you must reject the "compulsory principle" is little less than childish. For if the compulsory principle means anything at all it must mean the principle that the State has the right to compel the citizen to do certain things or to refrain from doing certain things; and that is a thesis which only the followers of Bakunin and Kropotkin can logically reject. Anyone who does not share the creed of Anarchism cannot possibly object to the compulsory principle, in fact he must accept it as the self-evident basis on which his ordered society has been built up. He will not waste his breath, therefore, arguing about a principle the universal acceptance of which by any ordered society, whether democratic or not, is clear to the most shallow mind. He will consent only to discuss specific applications of the compulsory principle; what things the State may compel the citizen to do without destroying the balance between the common good and the individual's highest good—or what civilized man conceives to be his highest good—his individual liberty and responsibility.

Now I think few will disagree with the statement that next to liberty, in its positive sense of freedom to develop personality as well as in the negative sense of freedom from State interference, life is the individual's most precious possession. In order to enjoy this possession he has already given powers to the State to protect it by compelling himself and his fellow-citizens to respect the law of the land. Some states, however, have found that this measure of compulsion was not sufficient to enable them to discharge their tasks of protecting the life and property of the citizen. For the individual needs to be protected against the enemy without as well as within. Owing to the system of international anarchy under which we live, and the constant vigilance and preparedness which it enjoins upon every inhabitant of the international jungle, these states have found it necessary to secure powers to compel the citizen to do his bit in the cause of national preparedness. Only thus could they give the citizen what he demands from the State ; security of life and property. The citizens of these states, not being suicidal maniacs, have readily admitted the logic of this measure, and seldom if ever has there been a voice raised against this additional encroachment on their liberties which in fact is the only means of safeguarding not only these liberties but life itself.

It seems, then, that the problem of compulsory service for the defence of the State simply revolves around the practical question : is it necessary for the survival of the State and its citizens ? Not a single question of principle is involved. For it cannot be often enough repeated, in view of all the high-sounding talk about objection on principle, that the principle of compulsion was already accepted the moment the inhabitants of this island emerged from their tribal caves to set up the beginnings of an ordered society. The only question that matters is whether it has now become necessary, in order to secure the survival and security of the citizens, to extend the application of this age-old principle to military service, civilian defence, the national register or the industrial war machine. It is not my task here to answer that question or to express an opinion as to the form of compulsory service, whether military, civilian or industrial, required to safeguard England's position in the world of to-day. That is a matter for the practical experts to

answer, the military strategists, the defence authorities and the economists. My object here is merely to render intelligent discussion of this problem possible by taking it out of the exalted sphere of democratic ideals and principles, which have nothing to do with it, to bring it down to the simple and prosaic ground of practical expediency.

Unfortunately it is not only irrelevant principles and ideals that are marshalled against the introduction of compulsion in the defence of the State and its citizens. There is an even more powerful and irrelevant objection which is regularly brought forward: compulsion is incompatible with British tradition. A less convincing argument could hardly be conceived. For what is the appeal to tradition but an appeal to the natural inertia of the mind? The fine phrases about compulsion being impermissible because it is contrary to British tradition do not really mean anything more elevated than that you must not take certain measures simply because you have never done it before. Nothing could be more "untraditional" than this misdirected appeal to tradition. For, if there is one tradition which has made Britain great and powerful, it is that of timely adaptation to changing circumstances, of political and economic innovation in accordance with the needs and the opportunities of the time. Those who object to the introduction of compulsion on the ground that it is contrary to tradition might as well object to anti-aircraft guns, gasmasks, balloon-barrages and all the other new measures that had to be devised to meet new dangers. They should in strict logic object to every growth, every change, yes, every manifestation of life, which is always a transformation of something that was before, a breach with tradition.

Speaking more specifically, it is clear that the objection to compulsory service on the ground of tradition implies an altogether amazing blindness to the geographical factors which have enabled England to acquire the tradition of safeguarding the realm on the basis of the voluntary principle. Thanks to her insular immunity from invasion, England could until a relatively short time ago leave the defence of her shores to a small professional fighting force, the great and glorious navy (not so voluntary at that if one remembers the press-gangs of earlier days),

occasionally supplemented by a hastily raised expeditionary force. Incidentally, it is, to say the least, doubtful whether these expeditionary land-forces of the past could always rightly be described as consisting solely of volunteers ; the yeomen that fought under their feudal lords in France were hardly what we should call volunteers, while Wellington's " scum of the earth enlisted for drink " were only as voluntary as their appalling economic position allowed them to be. But leave that as it may be. Even if we accept the doubtful claim that England has never known compulsory military service, at least in time of peace, it remains a strange reason for resisting the introduction of compulsory service in the completely changed circumstances of to-day, with the insular immunity from invasion gone for ever, with national survival having become the business of the entire nation, with the time for preparation at the outbreak of hostilities reduced to a few hours by the possibility of mass attack from the air. Again, I do not pretend to judge the practical question whether any one form of compulsory service would put this country in a better position to meet the new dangers with which it is confronted. I am merely concerned with pointing out the absurdity of confusing the discussion of this vital question of expediency with *a priori* objections to the untraditional nature of compulsion, which is nothing but an ostrich-like refusal to recognize that the good old days have made way for the bad new days, that things are not what they used to be, in short, that "*panta rei*" is still the law of life.

In passing a word or two may be said about the equally strange objection to compulsory service that it is " undemocratic." At an earlier point allusion has already been made to the difficulty of arguing this point without previously defining what form of compulsory service is referred to. Suppose, therefore, that we are thinking of the type of compulsory service which makes the greatest inroads upon the liberty of the individual : universal military training, or peace-time conscription, as it is generally adopted on the Continent. Even then it remains fruitless to argue whether such an imposition on the liberties of the individual is democratic, since the term " democratic " used in this way has no precise meaning. What is felt to be democratic by some is considered unbearable despotism by others. The term has no clear-cut

boundaries, and the content given to it by different individuals is largely a matter of taste and temperament, pride and prejudice. One may speak of a democratic system of government, that is to say, a political machinery, a set of rights and rules, but when the adjective is applied to something which is done through that machinery and according to that set of clearly-defined rules, the enactment of a law for compulsory service for instance, the term becomes a source of sterile confusion of thought. Is it impossible, then, to answer that burning question which agitates so many souls—whether compulsory service is compatible with democracy? Not altogether. For if logic cannot give the answer in view of the elastic meaning of the term “democratic,” life can. There is the experience of all the continental countries which have experimented with the problem, to show the way. France, Belgium, Switzerland, Holland, Norway, Sweden, to mention but a few respectable democracies, have all long since adopted compulsory military training or—to use the dreadful word—conscription. They have adopted it, not because of inferior democratic virtue as some people have suggested, but simply because they found it necessary for the defence of their liberties and their position in a part of the world where neighbours are not separated from each other by a comfortably wide stretch of water. They are not a little amused—(though as friends of England also distressed)—when they hear it proclaimed on the other side of the Channel that the democracy of Great Britain cannot be asked to accept the compulsory system because such a system is incompatible with the liberties of all true democrats. They do not resent the implied slur on their own democracies, they do not even raise their eyebrows at such amazing statements as Captain Liddell Hart’s (*The Times*, March 29th) that “the development of conscription has been an important factor in damaging the growth of the concept of freedom in those countries”. For they know that their system of requiring the able-bodied male citizens of every class to spend a period of time in the service of the State, far from damaging their democratic spirit, tends to produce a sense of fraternity and mutual understanding between the classes which they consider essential to true democracy and—it must be said—which they sometimes find it somewhat

difficult to discover under the many feudal aspects of English democracy.

Labour and the Liberals so far remain the staunchest opponents of compulsion. What is the explanation of this apparent paradox? Lack of space forbids me to go deeply into this question. But one partial answer may be indicated. Perhaps it is again history which gives the clue. Britain's historical *rôle* in a major war on the Continent, such as is now threatening, has usually been to supply the sinews of war rather than the fighting men. It may well be so again. More than that, there is a school of military strategists who strongly hold that it must be so again. As things are now, lacking a large-scale army ready for immediate action and possessing probably the finest and greatest industrial plant in the world, it will certainly be so again in the initial stages of a new world war. The vast number of men in the so-called "reserved" trades is the best indication that only a part of Britain's man-power, far smaller proportionately than on the Continent, will, in the first instance, be called upon to bear arms for their country. That puts a very different complexion on the problem of compulsory service from that which it bears in most democratic countries on the Continent. For if England is to be the world's arsenal rather than the breeding-ground of fighting men, compulsory service for the defence of the State may well come to mean compulsory industrial service rather than compulsory military service, industrial conscription rather than military conscription. It is not difficult to see that compulsory service of this kind, if it should be found indispensable to the security of the State, raises very much greater problems than those that the continental democracies have had to deal with in applying the principle of compulsion to military service. For whereas it is unfortunately still only too easy to compel men to train themselves to die for their country, it is a very different matter to compel them to produce the instruments for the death of others. Therein lies no doubt a partial explanation for the opposition of the Left to any form of compulsion, as well as for the reluctance of the Government to venture forth in peace time (if we can call it such) on a new path which may well lead into some very rough country.

WRITING FOR THE WIRELESS

BY STEPHEN POTTER

A GREAT many young authors are attracted by the idea of writing for radio. The experiences of a novice in one branch of this art may be amusing and even helpful.

My initial attempts are devoted to the constructing of what are called 'features'. Features is an unprecise term. One of the peculiarities of this newish art is that no critic of Principle has arisen to draw up its terms and definitions in some nicely illustrated and diagrammed *Faber & Faber* book; there has been no one to define its early, middle and late periods, and point out surprising analogies between broadcast drama and early Tudor interludes. And, confusingly, most radio terms are makeshift borrowings from outside. 'Features' has nothing to do with a newspaper article: it is a name for a radio dramatized presentation of fact. It may be historical record—the Retreat of Napoleon, or a biography of Dr. Johnson; it may be an anthology of American humour; it may be documentary reconstruction of a day in the life of a coal miner. More likely it will not fall under any heading at all—a contrast between high life and low life in New York, or a statement of the problematical course of the river Tyburn. Some recent successful productions which readers may have heard are equally difficult to classify. "*Farewell to Summer*," Herbert Sarjeon's delicate presentation of the nostalgia of a passing season: the American *Job to be Done*: some of the realistic Bridson and Shapley Voice of the Worker programmes: the impressionistic *Cross-Town New York*: or what was perhaps the most effectively dramatic broadcast of the past year, the imaginative *Matrimonial News* of Tyrone Guthrie—thoughts passing through the head of an overworked and thwarted shop-girl.

Writing plays or short stories for radio are separate arts of

which I know little : but I am beginning to believe that the problems of radio can be most usefully studied in these ' feature ' representations of fact. Straight radio drama and broadcast versions of plays are enormously improved by specific radio treatment ; but if this should be lacking they can always fall back on old-established techniques of stage-play construction in order to sustain interest. On the other hand, this restatement of facts which have no longer news value, and depend on no suspense-story for a framework, *must* make use of the new technique of broadcasting.

There are certain general rules, of course, which apply to all radio work. First the rule of intimacy. The recognition that, though the audience may number two million, it is a group of two or three which is being addressed. Generally speaking, the Big note and solemn exhortation are inferior to the unemphatic suggestion. Secondly, there is the special difficulty attending a medium which uses sound alone, the difficulty of sustaining attention. It is not merely that radio productions should be shorter than those which can use variations of scene as well ; the texture of dialogue and the tempo of the scenes have to be changed at more frequent intervals. Variations should be more marked and more frequent than in stage or cinema productions. It is true that these quick changes and variations largely depend on the producer, but the material which the producer most hates to handle is that which can be described by that useful word ' slabby.' When he sees three pages of dialogue evenly divided between three actors into speeches of even length his heart sinks. The necessity of breaking up long speeches is much greater in radio even than it is on the stage. The necessity for contrasted voices is greater still, for a reason most obvious to radio listeners, most often forgotten by radio writers, namely that it is rather a good thing for the listener to know who is supposed to be speaking. Every possible opportunity of using voices of different ages, sexes, and accents must be made use of. The author will find that the producer has a list of actors who, though not always of high fame among laymen, are deeply respected among his own kind for their powers of establishing an individual voice which is always unmistakably differentiated from all the other speakers in the cast.

One way of adding variety to sound—a way which inexperienced radio writers use to the utmost—is, of course, by using effects. If there is a reason why one scene should be played against a background of sound, it may well be an advantage. If at the end of the play the old genius is dying, by all means let it be on a stormy day and/or out of doors, so that a background of wind effects can be used to segregate this scene from the rest. But the majority of radio authors use effects far too much. I have just been sent a script by an author who recommended his piece because there is an opportunity in it of reproducing the sounds of “V type petrol engines, muffled exhausts, and Greek spies with their feet wrapped in blankets to ensure silence”! Authors should take note of what sounds are and what are not effective. Instructions in the script for an Effect of “weirs half-opened two hundreds yards distant” would not be inserted, for instance, if it were realized that all possible kinds of flowing water when reproduced on the radio sound precisely alike—and that they never sound like flowing water. All the pleasant pageant of sounds connected with engines and railways, on the other hand, are effective and realistic. Many percussion sounds, such as the striking of the keys of a typewriter, sound unrecognizable without the aid of the visual image of the act.

The question of ‘visual image’ leads to another obvious rule which is as obviously neglected. Shakespeare made capital out of the absence of scenery in his theatre by putting the description of the scene into the mouths of his characters. He did *not* leave it to the audience to piece out his imperfections with their thoughts: when he spoke of horses, the words he used made it impossible for the dullest member of the audience not to see them printing their proud hoofs in the receiving earth. Radio authors should be able to turn this disadvantage of the blindness of listening to an advantage, by making use of their powers of visual description.

The discussion of a concrete example may help to suggest some of the problems more specifically connected with ‘features.’ Suppose for instance the theme set is the River Tyburn. The Tyburn is one of the lost streams of London, which after a longish history above ground has in the last hundred years been

built over, diverted into sewers, sealed down, blocked up. Problem Number One is likely to be the exposition of the material. The compiler will study the subject and explore the sites. There will be a question to a pale young man in the Department of Geological Survey. There will be brief but crucial information from a bowler-hatted sewer foreman of the L.C.C. There will be talk from a grand character of a local builder who has struggled with the problem of damp in the foundations of No. 49 Carlyle Villas. There will be the dear old boy in the club whose hobby has always been the topography of seventeenth-century London. The compiler will be full of enthusiasm for facts which to him are fresh and fascinating, but he must now with great deliberation choose how to present them. He may be an adept at writing the historical scene which introduces the Tyburn tree, and the blessing of the water pipes by the Archbishop, but he will have to link these scenes together. How? An old and now discarded method was to get a pair of actors to fire questions and answer at each other, and reveal, as they barked away, some kind of connected fact. There are programmes which this method fits, but in general it is too hectic. A safe way out is the "narrator"; but the right kind of narrator is the most difficult job in casting. If he is too formal, he is liable to sound like a bureau of information. If he is too chatty, he will be reminiscent of the "it is not generally known" department of a Saturday paper. A better way is, I believe, for a compiler to base every part of his script on his own experiences while studying the subject—to recreate, perhaps, the characters who gave him his information, *e.g.*, the chatty old boy in the club.

Another problem is the "use of the van." How much, if any, of this local information should be recorded by the B.B.C. Recording Unit on the spot? Will the marvellous old workman with the Lancashire accent prove unexpectedly uncowed by the microphone? He may succeed if he is taken on his native heath among his own foundations, or he may be amenable to rehearsal and sound effective when introduced with professional actors in the studio. Much more likely such a juxtaposition will reduce him to eternal silence. An experienced questioner may draw him out or may bottle him up completely. Almost

certainly the best method for the author who is not also a producer will be to point and rewrite his conversation and have it played by actors.

It is on the treatment of such details as this that success depends, and the best method can only be learnt by experience. The last of these obvious but neglected rules for the novice in radio technique must therefore be 'Study the subject'. Study by listening. Radio listening is haphazard by tradition, switching on and off costs nothing, is easy; radio must suffer first if there is an interruption. Even students are affected by this. Some established authors have taken the attitude "it is best for me to come to radio absolutely fresh with a blank mind." The mind may be blank enough, but the manner often seems surprisingly jaded. Almost always such attempts are full of the embryonic mistakes of radio writing, a failure to appreciate the possibilities and limitations of the machine. The ordinary man instinctively distrusts the interpolation of the machine in art. He has, perhaps, seen the beautifully trained army of cinema technicians training their forces on to some inconsiderable actor mumbling something about "Oh my dear, if only I had understood." And he jumps to the conclusion that machines and art are opposed. But, in fact, of course, the problem of the right use of the new medium gives just the kind of stimulation which the effective artist will find helpful. To quote Lewis Mumford: "Our capacity to go beyond the machine rests upon our power to assimilate the machine."

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN JAMAICA

BY H. S. SHELTON

RECENT disturbances in Jamaica have made us aware of the existence of this island colony, and have given us an uneasy feeling that all is not well. The disturbances themselves were featured more than the incidents warrant. The important fact is not that, after a peaceful period of three-quarters of a century, there has occurred once more serious disturbance, but the economic situation which underlies the discontent.

It often happens, when conditions are bad and wages low, that the storm-centre is a group of better-paid labourers, not the very poor. In Jamaica the riots of last year started with the dock labourers of Kingston. This will not surprise anyone connected with Kingston, because these labourers are notoriously an unruly crowd. For Jamaica they are well paid. Before the trouble they received 9d. an hour, which has recently been raised to 10d. or 11d. according to the grade of the worker. However low this may appear from the European standard, it must regretfully be said that for Jamaica this is a good wage. Even after obtaining the rise, and after the trouble in the rest of the island had quieted down, there was still unrest at the docks. Last September it was reported that shipping companies had threatened to omit Jamaican calls unless the frivolous strikes ceased.

The great grievance of the dock labourer is not so much the wage as the casual nature of the labour. The principal reform wanted here is proper organization. The casual work is also to some extent seasonal, and there are too many applicants for the available labour. Proper registration of the dock labourers and greater regularity of employment is badly needed. To do this will displace some of them, and those displaced will have to be provided for in other ways. The ideal system is to register a

number of employees who can be given full work when the docks are busy, and employment in rotation in the slack time. When everything possible has been done the docks will probably remain a source of trouble, but they are an exceptional and minor feature of Jamaican life.

Normally the trouble is purely local and does not spread. Last year it spread. One of the reasons is seasonal unemployment. The tourists spend, for Jamaica, an enormous sum of money. Much of this is absorbed by the owners of hotels, especially those of the United Fruit Company, but some is distributed in the island. The tourist season is short. For all practical purposes it begins in December and ends at Easter. When it ceases there is considerable unemployment. In consequence there was a minor riot in Kingston in August, 1937. Nearly 1,000 men claiming to be ex-service men complained of starvation, gathered on the race course and tried to march to the house of the Governor. The police had to intervene and a few people were injured. The Governor received a deputation and explained what the Government were doing to settle ex-soldiers on the land.

In 1938 there was an exceptional cause of trouble. Owing to the low rate of wages in Jamaica many labourers have been accustomed to work in Cuba, Hayti, and other neighbouring countries where the nominal rate of wages is higher. In recent years these temporary emigrants have been finding the nominal higher wage illusory, and have returned in large numbers. Some of them have been forcibly returned. It will readily be understood that the arrival in the island of a number of destitute men at a time when employment was at its minimum was likely to cause trouble. These men could not find employment in Kingston, and many of them wandered all over the island and were everywhere centres of disturbance.

Outside Kingston, riots and strikes occurred in places where a considerable number of men were employed, in particular the estates of the United Fruit Company and the sugar plantations. On some estates there were attempts to burn the sugar-cane growing in the fields. That there was no serious destruction is obvious from the fact that the sugar production in the island was unusually high, and greatly exceeded the export quota. But

there were riots in a few of the plantations, and some damage was done. A substantial rise of wages was obtained, which rise was badly needed.

One other reason for the unrest was the centenary of the abolition of slavery. The rumour was circulated that, after a lapse of 100 years, free land would be available for the Jamaican negroes. This, of course, is absurd. Owners of land cannot be forcibly expropriated without compensation. It is reported also that there has once more been a tendency to "squat" on unused land. Again, this must be kept in check, but it does throw a light on Jamaican conditions. Although nearly all Jamaican land is owned by someone, there are enormous tracts of country which are practically unused. The maddest of mad agitators would not attempt to squat in ploughed fields or banana plantations. Although squatting cannot be allowed, the fact that so much of the land on the hills (and the greater part of Jamaica is on the hills) is derelict does show that the land required for settlement should be obtainable at a reasonable price.

To understand the underlying causes of discontent it is necessary to know something of the economic conditions of the island. It must be borne in mind that many of the conditions of Jamaica are peculiar to itself, and it is in some ways misleading to classify it as one of the British West Indies. Even geographically Jamaica is isolated from other British possessions. Cuba and Hayti are its next door neighbours, and the only British islands within 500 miles are its dependency, the Cayman Islands, and some of the sparsely inhabited Bahamas. From Trinidad and Barbadoes, where there was also trouble, it is separated by more than 1,000 miles of sea.

Economically also Jamaican conditions are peculiar. Unlike Barbadoes, with about 200,000 people in 116 square miles, there is no primary difficulty in the land supporting the population. Though fairly thickly populated, with about a million people in over 4,000 square miles, it is not overpopulated. Plenty of land is uncultivated, or badly cultivated. The perpetual summer and fertile soil of the island would enable it to produce sufficient for the needs of the population, or indeed for a population considerably larger. Another common error is to speak as if

Jamaica were dependent upon the sugar industry. Sugar is produced in Jamaica, but it is by no means the principal product. The small proportion of Jamaican land under sugar is shown clearly by the recent international agreement. Jamaica with an area of over 4,000 square miles is allowed 86,000 tons, whereas Barbadoes with an area of only 116 square miles is allowed 114,000 tons. This should be particularly noted because an extra preference for sugar and a larger allotment will undoubtedly be urged as a remedy for the present untoward conditions. It is not necessary to express an opinion one way or the other whether a concession of this kind is possible. What must be clearly understood is that no possible help that can be given to the sugar industry can have an appreciable effect on the prosperity of Jamaica. The extra land brought under cultivation and the additional employment available cannot produce any considerable effect in Jamaica, whatever help it may give to islands like Barbadoes.

The next point which requires emphasis is that the current rate of wages in Jamaica is abnormally low. This is fairly generally understood, but I think few people realize how low it is. When I was there in 1937 I made careful enquiries about this, and the facts are remarkable. So far as I am aware there are no official statistics, so we are dependent upon private enquiries, which, of course, can make no claim to be complete. In Montego Bay I was told that the current rate of payment for domestic service was 5/- a week, not resident, and food was not officially included. In Mandeville I was told that any decent employer would give 6/-. In the Blue Mountains the current wage for the casual employment of coffee picking was 1/6 a day, and there was considerable ill-feeling because the owner of a large coffee plantation was said to be trying to reduce it to 1/3. This is women's labour, but I was informed that the rate was much the same for both sexes, and that it was difficult to get more than 1/6 a day. Lord Olivier mentions the same rate or less for work on the land in St. Elizabeth parish in 1911, and it does not appear to have altered appreciably since then. The workers on the railway are better paid. The lowest grade on the staff of the permanent way get 2/6 a day, though probably some other workers are paid less than this.

The strikes have led to a considerable rise of wages in many occupations. Not only have the dock labourers received a considerable rise, but the employees on the railways have also benefited. So have the employees of the United Fruit Company and of most of the sugar plantations. It is to be hoped that the rise will spread to the smaller employers, even to those who employ domestic servants. It is to be hoped also that what has been done will be the beginning, not the end, and that wages will slowly be raised to a reasonable standard.

It would be a great mistake, however, to think that any reasonably possible rise of wages in Jamaica will produce settled conditions and prosperity. The improvement in wages is certainly needed, and in some ways it will ease the situation. But it may make things more difficult in other ways by reducing the available employment. We must here make a clear distinction between Kingston and the rest of the country. In Kingston the bulk of the population live by working for wages. Outside Kingston this is not true, except in some of the smaller towns, which are usually straggling villages of small population. The great bulk of the population live in isolated huts, small hamlets and villages, and, in the main, though a large proportion work for wages either regularly or casually, they obtain a considerable proportion of the necessities of life by the cultivation of their little plots of land.

The official figures for land-holding in Jamaica are remarkable, when we consider that it is doubtful whether the total population exceeds a million. The official figures for 1930, which appear to be the latest available, excluding house lots, are :—half-acre lots 44,929 ; half-acre to five acres 108,447 ; five acres to 10 acres, 18,227 ; over 10 acres about 16,000. The half-acre lots, which date back to the days of slavery, and on which the slaves used to grow their own food, are, of course, much too small, but the owner of a plot of five acres or even less can make a modest living. I was able to look over some of the older established holdings in the Blue Mountains, and those which are now being founded near Mandeville for ex-service men, and was greatly impressed by the industry and comparative prosperity of the owners. The land in some districts, as for example the Dry Harbour District, is most of it divided in this way. The

contrast between conditions in these parts of the island and those in Kingston is very marked.

It is difficult to estimate the proportion of Jamaican land held in this way. The figures themselves are out of date. Also the flaw in the statistics is the clause half-acre to five acres. Everything depends on the mean. A holder can make a living on three to five acres, modest and poor, it is true, but still a living. But not even a Jamaican negro can provide for himself and family on one acre. As a rough guess we can estimate that something less than 500,000 acres, or less than one fifth on the available land, is distributed in holdings of ten acres or less.

We begin to see the feature of Jamaican life which alleviates the very bad economic conditions. In the country districts the people who work regularly for wages are usually the dependents of these small landholders. The owners of the plots also work for wages on occasion, and the owners of the smaller plots form the enormous reserve of casual labour which is available for the times of the picking of the crops. The relative poverty of these people depends, of course, mainly on the size of the holding. Needless to say, unless regularly employed, or even if regularly employed at the current low rate of wages, the holders of the half-acre plots are miserably poor. As the size of the holding increases, the poverty decreases, as does also the willingness to work regularly for wages. The holders of plots of five acres or even more will, however, work for wages on occasion, and their dependents do so regularly. Generally speaking, these poor negro peasants work in the immediate neighbourhood of their homes. They cultivate their own plots, grow their own food, and build their own huts. Those with the very small holdings live in the miserable little one-room huts so common in the island. Those with the larger holdings can afford a better dwelling. It should therefore be understood that a considerable proportion of the Jamaican negroes obtain the primary necessities of food and shelter by their own labour on their own little plots of land. It is this system, which has grown up gradually without Government help, that makes conditions tolerable and gives some sort of stability to the

social structure, in spite of the deplorable conditions of labour. The main remedy suggested by the late Governor, and approved by the Jamaican Government, is the settlement of men on the land. Land settlement itself is no new departure, but a system which has grown up gradually, and which is even now one of the dominant features of Jamaican life. The new factor is Government support. Without the small holdings which already exist, even those so small as the wretched little half-acre plots, it would hardly have been possible for the vast mass of the Jamaican negroes to have obtained the bare necessities of life.

The problem of Jamaican economics reduced to its lowest terms is how to make the land support the people. A few foodstuffs such as wheaten flour and groceries are imported, but these are bought mainly by the comparatively well-to-do, and hardly at all by the very poor, at any rate outside Kingston. Speaking roughly, we may say that the Jamaican soil produces the food for its people and a very large surplus for export. From this point of view—the support of the people—it is the fifth of the land that matters. On the produce of this the bulk of the country people live. The small holdings also produce a share of the export products. The holder of five acres or thereabouts has a small tax to pay, clothes and other necessities to buy, and so must sell some of his produce. In particular he sells bananas in large quantities, but he also produces much of his own food, and some of what he does not produce he can obtain by exchange at the local markets. Many of the poorer people do not eat wheaten bread, but grow their own maize which is used as a passible substitute.

The small holdings are well cultivated and produce an enormous quantity of food. The irrigated estates of the United Fruit Company are also well-cultivated, so are most of the sugar plantations, but these cultivate almost entirely for export. They also provide a considerable amount of employment and so support the people indirectly. The same, however, cannot be said of the bulk of the large estates, especially those on the hills. There is, of course, some cultivation or they could not exist. Some of their uncultivated land also supports cattle on very bad grass. But much of it is unused and covered with cedar scrub not large enough for timber and hardly ever used as such. Now

we begin to understand what this land hunger means. The negroes who have no land, or only the miserable little half-acre plots, can make a living out of the land if they can get it, but much of it is owned and unused. It should be noticed also that the 3—10 acres plots on which the negroes make a modest living is not the best land in the lowlands, but the type of land which is elsewhere covered with scrub. In the Blue Mountains, in the district near Mandeville, in the hilly parts of St. Mary's parish and elsewhere, well-cultivated small holdings can be seen on all sorts of slopes, on land which but for those holdings would be waste.

Undoubtedly the main remedy for the untoward conditions of Jamaican life is to be found in the extension of the system of small-holdings. This was the policy of the late Governor, and last year the Deputy-Governor announced that £650,000 was to be allotted to the settlement of labourers on the land. It is satisfactory to note that this wise policy is being continued vigorously. There is not in the island sufficient employment for the inhabitants, and the rise of wages which is now taking place may decrease to some extent that which is now available. Moreover, with the exception of sugar, and possibly coconuts, all the common products of the island can be grown equally well on small holdings. The essential feature of the small holding in Jamaica is that the negro on the land grows his own food and builds his own hut, which is larger, and a more fitting human habitation, than the miserable over-crowded one-room huts in which the bulk of the labourers live. Some produce, of course, they must sell to provide other necessities of life, to pay taxes and the instalments on the cost of the land, but to a great extent the small holder is self-contained.

A word of warning is needed here. When there is unrest in a British colony, there is often an attempt to extract money from the British tax-payer, which money seldom benefits to any great extent those that need it. The amount allocated in the autumn of 1938 should be sufficient for the present. The result of lending British money would probably be to buy the land of the large owners at an extravagant rate, in consequence of which the holdings would be over-capitalized, and much of the advantage would be lost. One essential feature of a successful

extension of small holdings is the obtaining of land at a fair price. There is much land, especially on the hills, which is unused and for which the fair price would be small. In the low-lying regions there are swamps which could be drained by the prospective owners, the price of which, if they are privately owned, should be nominal. When drained they would make very fertile land for the small-holder.

It is important also that there should be no excessive capital expenditure in other ways. The standard of expenditure in Jamaica is very low. The holdings are usually on hilly ground not suitable for the plough, and the implements required are usually only those required for hand labour. Moreover, most of the common produce, such as bananas and coffee, are shrubs which have to be planted by hand. The newly established small-holders near Mandeville were providing themselves with dwellings better than the usual negro huts, but they were doing the work themselves. In any new settlement of small holdings it is usually possible to find a sufficient proportion of men with the necessary small skill in carpentry. The providing of reasonably satisfactory dwellings is, I believe, required by Government regulation. There is much to be said for this, but it is a point for consideration whether, if a large number of small holdings are to be established in a short time, some temporary relaxation of this rule may not be advisable. The tendency of the negroes to squat on the land and work it does show that, apart from a moderate price for the land itself, capitalization is to some extent an artificial problem. The important thing is to get the negroes on the land and earning a living. It is not desirable to enter into details, but it should be emphasized that unnecessary capital expenditure is detrimental to the whole scheme—and is only laying up trouble for the future.

The contention that this policy is the essential factor in the situation does not, of course, exclude other remedies and palliatives. Further help to the sugar industry will undoubtedly be suggested. Suggestions will also be made for the better marketing of fruits, coffee and other products. The former concerns the big landowners only, the latter, if it can be effected, will help small and large landowners alike. The Royal Commission will no doubt make suggestions on these and other

matters. As such suggestions will be freely discussed, it is not necessary to deal with them here. The point to be noticed is that they are of minor importance and that, in Jamaica, the effect will be comparatively small. The central feature is that there is a population of a million in an area of 4,000 square miles and that this population lives by the produce of the land. This area will easily support the population, and more, but much of the land is unused, and there is not sufficient produce to support the people adequately. A progressive rise of wages now seems probable owing to the new organization of the trade union type led by Señor Bustamente, but we must not forget that this may temporarily at any rate, reduce the available employment. The only permanent remedy is to bring more of the land under cultivation, and the only known means of doing this effectively is to put it into the hands of small-holders who will cultivate it. When that is done the people can be fed, and a larger proportion of them can be decently housed.

THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER IN INDIA

BY H. V. HODSON

INDIAN politics in 1939 can be understood only in terms of the struggle for power under the new *régime* of self-government.

Part of that new democratic power has already come ; for responsible Indian Ministries are in office in the eleven provinces of British India. But at the centre it has still to be achieved, and even in the provinces the structure of political forces is warped by stresses arising from the struggle for power in the coming federation.

The Indian National Congress, which is by far the most powerful single political group in India, officially opposes federation as laid down in the Government of India Act, 1935. In this official attitude there is no difference between the "Right" wing, now associated with Mr. Gandhi, and the "Left" wing, whose principal spokesman to-day is Mr. Subhas Bose, the president of the Congress. Both wings demand complete self-government and independence for India, and both demand that these be brought about through a constitution framed by an elected Indian constituent assembly. Neither wing regards the federal scheme envisaged by the framers of the 1935 Act as an acceptable step towards that end. If federation is forced through in precisely the form in which it was conceived four years ago, all the Congress leaders would no doubt be obliged to reject it and fight against it—obliged by their past public pledges if not by their present inner wishes.

The "Right" and the "Left" wings of Congress differ over tactics rather than principle. (The terms "Right" and "Left" are here used in connection with the constitutional issue only ; some of those who are on the Left in economic policy are sometimes to be found in the camp of the Right over matters of political tactics, and *vice versa*. While the "Left" will have nothing to do with a "dictated" constitution, however

modified, the "Right" are prepared to consider (and even to state, in private) the terms on which federation might be made palatable to them—palatable, of course, as a transitional stage only. More than one leading Congress member was at pains to assure me, during a recent visit to India, that the requisite changes in the federal scheme could be made without any formal amendments of the 1935 Act.

One of the desired changes that is often mentioned is the rapid Indianization of the army, in the sense both of removing units of the British army from India and of replacing British officers in the Indian army with Indian officers. This is largely a technical question. But for Congress the presence of British military in India has, above all, a symbolic significance as a token of inferiority imposed on them by an alien race. By means of Indianization, they hope to control the army from within as well as without. The demand for Indianization is thus at bottom subordinate to the struggle for coming democratic power.

This struggle can be conveniently analysed as a triangle of forces, the three apexes being the princes, the Muslims of the Muslim League, and the Congress as the overwhelmingly dominant political group in British India. There are, of course, other groups, any of which might in certain circumstances hold the balance of power in the federal Parliament. But their importance is secondary. The Sikhs are not well organized politically, nor are the Indian Christians a self-conscious political group. The European commercial community has generally adopted the line of not committing itself to other parties in Indian internal politics, while supporting—or at any rate not opposing—any Government that does not attack its own legitimate interests in most of the provinces where there are Congress Ministries. The European community has hitherto worked quite amicably with them. There are important peasant groups, which are likely to become increasingly powerful; but hitherto they have mostly sheltered under the Congress umbrella, except to some extent in Bengal and the Punjab, where there is a cross-warped Hindu-Muslim rivalry. The Untouchables might also become in the future a powerful political force, especially with a widening of the franchise; but they have hitherto lacked independent

leadership, barring Dr. Ambedkar in Bombay, and their strength is more likely to arise from their naming a price for their support of the Congress, or from their ability to detach a section from the Congress itself and thus form a proletarian Left-wing *bloc*, than from their independent political power.

The triangle formed by the three main groups is one of mutual antagonism. Although a pact of convenience between the Muslims and Congress is always possible, the two can never be lasting bedfellows except in common adversity; for the essence of the Congress' outlook is its claim to speak for all India and its denunciation of communalism, whereas the Muslim League is first and foremost communal and can never be anything else. Between the States' Rulers and the Congress there is the conflict between semi-feudal autocracy and doctrinaire democracy. Doubtless there is room here for compromise, but scarcely for alliance. While the princes and the communally-minded Muslims are united in hostility towards Congress, they are divided by the fact that the majority of the States (reckoning either by Rulers or by subjects) are Hindu, whereas the first article of the Muslim League's creed is hostility to the "Hindu *raj*". Nor is the Mussulman less desirous of democratic power than the Hindu, in the States as elsewhere.

The communal problem is to be considered as a resultant of this triangle of forces, and of the struggle for coming power. The communal problem clearly has two aspects: first, the violent outbreaks that occasionally occur over some alleged insult—cow sacrifice, or music in front of mosques—and secondly, the rivalry of the educated classes in political and economic affairs. The latter is by far the more serious aspect, in the long run, though it is the former that causes the wounds and deaths. For the religious rioting is essentially local and temporary, whereas the political and economic struggle is endemic throughout Indian public affairs, and it does much to increase and embitter the more strictly religious and fanatical feud. In its politico-economic aspect the Hindu-Muslim problem, like modern anti-Semitism, is to a great extent a by-product of large-scale unemployment, especially among the 'black-coated classes'. Such unemployment is notoriously chronic in India.

The political communal problem is itself to be conceived as

part of a struggle for power under a future autonomous *régime*. Of course the Muslims can never by taking thought change themselves from a minority to a majority ; and therefore they can never hope, as Muslims, to command a majority in an all-India democratic State. This is constantly thrown up against them by Congress spokesmen anxious to expose the futility of a communalism—not too difficult a task. It is hard to make out what exactly the leaders of the Muslim League do want. There is a good deal of personal ambition and jealousy in the attitude of certain of them. But their probable aim is to straddle the balance of power. They conceive of a Mussulman *bloc*, able by its solidarity and its tactical position to dictate terms to other parties and to nominate its leaders to office in coalition Ministries. The bogey therefore to them is a Hindu democratic *bloc* equally solid and commanding an independent majority.

There is a second objective of Muslim policy which is just as important. That is to preserve and strengthen the rule of the Muslims in those provinces where they have a majority : Bengal, the Punjab, the Frontier province, and Sind. The leverage that these Muslim provinces can exert upon the rest of India is regarded as vital to the Muslim cause.

At present, the Frontier has a Congress majority, and Sind is ruled by a coalition in which Congress participates. In both these provinces the Hindu minority is so small that the communal problem hardly exists, except in the form of mischief between debtors and creditors ; the nationalist sentiment comes to the top as soon as the anti-Hindu sentiment is removed. It is necessary always to remember that the Muslims are no less nationalist than the Hindus. The Muslim League is as firm for complete independence for India as the Congress is. Its governing body last December censured Sir Sikander Hyat Khan, the Premier of the Punjab, for declaring during the European crisis that the Punjab would stand loyally by Great Britain. He was obliged to acknowledge that he had not been speaking as a leader of the Muslim League. The idea of a loyal, Britain-loving community of Muslims, contrasting with seditious Hindus, which has been fostered by certain British politicians, is a pure myth. There are many loyal Muslims,

indeed, but there are also loyal Hindus. And loyalty is always a relative term.

In the Punjab and Bengal, important leaders of the Muslim League are in office. In Bengal the position of the Fazl-ul-Huq Ministry is precarious, thanks to its difficulty in satisfying the peasants' party. The Punjab is the true key to independent Muslim leadership in the provinces. Sir Sikander Hyat Khan's Ministry is not outwardly communal, containing as it does several Hindu Ministers. It is, nevertheless, a main bulwark of the Muslim defences in India as a whole.

The Punjab has a peculiar interest in preventing the domination of the Congress in all-India politics. The great majority of recruits for the army are drawn from the Punjab, most of them being Mussulmans. Although the exact sum is hard to compute, something like 10 crores of rupees (£7,500,000) are said to be spent every year in the Punjab in military pay, pensions and local stores. That expenditure is an essential buttress of the Punjab standard of life. This position would be threatened if ever the Congress were to come into control of defence—and effective control seems likely to pass quite rapidly to the hands of the Indian Ministries under the federal constitution. Not only do the Congress believe that they can reduce the numbers of the army; they have also adopted as an important plank in their platform the building of a "people's army", which would be raised on a territorial basis and would therefore rob the Punjab and the Mussulmans of their favoured position.

Since the Muslims must always be in a minority in all-India, some of their leaders have been looking for means outside the federal constitution to defend their strongholds. There has been talk of building "Pakistan", a Muslim polity (perhaps only an alliance or something even looser) covering the Punjab, Afghanistan, Kashmir, the Frontier province, Sind and Baluchistan. But, as yet, this is little more than the dream of a few pan-Islamic Indian thinkers. One prominent Muslim leader, however, discussed with me a project for constructing a new kind of federation in India, the units being larger and endowed with more powers than will lie with the States and provinces under the Government of India Act. In his scheme each unit would

itself be a federation or amalgam of States and portions of British India. Thus the north-western unit would include not only the Frontier province, Sind and the Punjab, but also Kashmir, and even non-Muslim States like Patiala. By enhancing the power of the component units in the federation this scheme would be calculated to increase the effective leverage of the Muslim *bloc* over the rest of India. It has not, however, been taken up anywhere as a political issue, and the communal problem in practice turns on the tactical opportunities presented by the federal constitution of 1935.

So, too, does the problem of advancing democracy in the Indian States. Just as it is important not to think of the communal problem merely in terms of wild Pathans, enraged by a religious affront, slitting Hindus' throats in the back alleys of Lahore, so it is important not to think of this matter of the agitation against the Princes merely in terms of an oppressed people rising against a debauched and tyrannous monarch in some petty principality. Such circumstances do occur, and it suits the promoters of a general advance of democracy in the States that they should occur; for under their cover Indian opinion—and indeed British opinion—may be worked up into an agitation against autocratic government wherever it may exist, in ill-run feudal States or in "model" States which already possess valuable representative institutions. In some of the more advanced States the standard of administration and of social services challenges that of British India. Yet the Congress, in spite of professions to the contrary, has encouraged agitation in these as well as in backward states like Rajkot, where Mr. Gandhi lately performed his fast.

The Congress, strictly speaking, is a British-India organization, without branches in the princely States; but of recent months it has been interesting itself more and more in the affairs of the States, until the achievement of democratic power by the States' peoples has almost come to be the first plank in its platform. Mr. Gandhi's fast, and his interviews with the Viceroy, have forced the issue still further to the front, to the discomfiture of Mr. Subhas Bose and his supporters, who wanted to focus Congress energy on a campaign against federation at any price. Now the leaders of the Congress are, no

doubt, genuinely anxious to improve the lot of oppressed peoples and to urge on the advance of democracy throughout India. But they have a second motive. Through the creation of representative institutions in the States, they hope to enlarge their own power, not only in the individual States themselves, but also in the federation-to-be.

From the point of view of the Congress, this would be desirable under any federation between British India and the Indian States, but under the 1935 constitution it is positively necessary. If and when all the States accede to the federation, the Federal Assembly will consist of 250 representatives of British India and 125 representatives of the Indian States. Of the 250 British Indian seats, 82 will be reserved for Muslim electorates, and a further 63 for Sikhs, Anglo-Indians, Indian Christians, Europeans, women and representatives of labour, the landholding class, and commerce and industry. This leaves only 105 "general seats," and of these, again, 19 will be reserved for the scheduled castes, generally known as the Untouchables. In other words, in a House of 375, only 86 seats will be open for unrestricted democratic competition. It is among this residue that the Congress has the liveliest hope of success. It may well be able to secure the election of individual members in almost every other group, but not enough to give it a chance of an independent majority. In the Council of State its apparent opportunities are as small. With a full complement of acceding States, the Council of 260 members will contain 104 States' representatives, 49 members elected on the Muslim communal franchise, and 26 representatives of other special interests, leaving only 75 seats open for general election.

If we are to understand the reaction of the Congress to this arithmetic, we must remember that the Congress claims to speak for the whole of British India—and has justified its claim to the extent of forming the government in seven of the eleven provinces. It is beyond challenge the dominant party of the Hindus of British India. Yet with all its power it sees no chance of forming a majority government at the centre of the promised federation. It would have such a chance, in spite of the weightage given to the States and the minorities, if the communal electorates for Muslims and Sikhs were abolished and reservation of seats

substituted. But that is impossible without a serious breach of faith towards the minority communities.

The next alternative road to power for the Congress at the Centre is a pact with the Muslims. A recent attempt to bring this about failed, partly for personal and tactical reasons, but more fundamentally because the ideologies of the Congress and the Muslim League are incompatible. The League must be *the* Muslim organization or perish. But the Congress cannot acknowledge such a position for the League, since that would instantly brand the Congress itself as only a Hindu organization.

Deadlock having been reached along this line, the Congress naturally turned to the possibility of securing a majority by way of democratic representation for the States. The outcome of the present movement for representative and indeed for responsible government in the States is therefore of great importance for the future of federation and of the relations between Great Britain and India. If the Congress efforts are successful, and the bulk of the States come to be represented in the federation by elected members, perhaps with a proportion of nominated members—then the Congress will have the chance that it feels (not without reason) it ought to have, to form a government of all-India. It may need allies in order to do so, but it will not be condemned to remain but one party among many, with perhaps 80 members in a House of 375. If the Congress were able to look forward to such a chance of power under the new *régime*, it is scarcely conceivable that it would unanimously refuse to co-operate in running the federal constitution. The history of Indian politics since the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms all points the other way.

In this event, the Muslims, for their part, would see looming ahead that rule of the Congress which the Muslim League stalwarts identify with the detested “Hindu *raj*”. This, they declare, the Muslims would “fight” rather than accept. It is not very clear on what front the Muslims would fight, or how literally the threat is to be taken. If physical fighting is to be understood, then the Muslims might do any of three things : they might incite the Muslims in the army to mutiny, or they might stage a general armed up-rising among the Muslim population of northern India, or they might plot with tribesmen

beyond the north-west frontier or with foreign Powers to let down the barriers against the invader (the third alternative would obviously imply the first also). It is extremely doubtful whether the Muslims are determined enough or desperate enough or well enough organized to attempt any of these methods, though they might perhaps provoke sporadic and isolated outbreaks of trouble. Nor is it out of the question that when the Hindu *raj* was once established, and British power had melted away from India's internal affairs, the Muslim areas in the north-west might attempt a forcible secession from the federal State. Indeed, some people think this highly probable.

In the earlier stages, it seems that the Muslims would "fight" mainly with political weapons. They have not hitherto regarded civil disobedience as a legitimate technique, but they are beginning to take this leaf from the Congress book, and they could exert considerable pressure through the methods of non-co-operation and passive obstruction which the Congress has perfected. There is always the possibility of serious trouble from this quarter. But in "non-violent power politics" the Muslims are no match for the Congress. A minority can make political process difficult, but it cannot make it impossible, as a majority can. In the Punjab and Bengal, alternative governments could be formed if the Muslim League Ministers resigned and organized passive resistance to authority; but if the Congress Ministers resigned in Bombay, Madras, Bihar, the Central Provinces or the United Provinces there would be no alternative Administrations whose legislative activities would not be frustrated by such resistance. What general elections in these provinces might then bring forth no one can tell. It seems certain that if the Congress do not see in the federal scheme, as eventually introduced, the opportunity of obtaining effective power in the all-India parliament they will put into operation the whole machinery of civil disobedience and political obstruction, which is capable of bringing all but the bare rudiments of government to a standstill.

But are the princes ever likely to extend them that opportunity by compromising over their own representation in the federal Houses? On the face of things, the answer certainly seems to be "no". The princes cherish their authority and privilege, and

are manifestly not prepared meekly to hand them over to the Congress or to any other democratic organization. They would certainly seem unlikely to surrender power to a federation in which their States would be represented, not by their own nominees, but by democratic partisans who might be radically opposed to their own policies. Surely the princes would prefer to stay out of the federation, which they are still perfectly free to do, and to stand the racket of Congress agitation within their own frontiers, appealing to the Paramount Power to implement its duty to defend them ?

But this is not the whole picture by any means. Many of the wiser princes and dewans realize that time is on the side neither of absolute monarchy nor of local sovereign rights. The tide of democracy and of centralized authority is advancing. If it is not canalized, it may swamp the Indian States altogether. If the Rulers do not grant some form of representative government now, they may find their powers eventually swept away altogether by the pent-up force of popular demand. If they do not enter the all-India federation on the relatively favourable terms now offered them, they may eventually find themselves confronted by a great independent Indian national federation which will offer them far worse terms or simply swallow them up. British power and will to protect their privileges are unlikely to grow greater, and may well grow less. Of course there are some Rulers too thick-headed or short-sighted to appreciate these truths, and others who accept them but say : " The present system will last out my life-time ; and what if after me comes the deluge ? " .. But the wise men are cautious and silent.

With the rising tide of democracy the Muslims are bound to be a permanent minority in India as a whole. Yet it is better to be a minority with privileges than a minority with none, and in the long run that is the real choice before the Muslim community. The present federal scheme may indeed foreshadow Hindu rule, but it also perpetuates Muslim communal privilege. The Muslims of the north-west have always the alternative possibility of forcibly separating themselves from the rest of India. That contingency is always to be reckoned with. Perhaps it is the one thing that could reverse the flow of Indian democratic self-government, which is now in spate.

WOODPECKERS OF ENGLAND

BY RICHARD PERRY

THE first note in my nature diaries is of the vivid scarlet of a solitary pied woodpecker leap-flying in tremendous soaring bounds over a plantation of young spruce. He, surely, was a distinguished precursor of the hundreds of his genus that were to follow him through twelve volumes of field notes, and maybe sixty more to come. That was in 'hearty, homely, loving Hertfordshire'—a well coined phrase, but descriptive of the tranquil beauty of that once lovely county. If, now that I have wandered a little over the wilder country of Britain, I can no longer dwell in peace in Hertfordshire, finding it ever more urbanized and intolerably confining, for it knows not the untamed sea nor boundless mountains, I do not think that I shall find anything fairer than its wide commons and parklands of incomparable beeches. Nor shall I forget the lifting heads of the red stags on the green rides at dawn : their funnelled breath jetting in misty streams ; nor the sweet, shivering notes of the willow warblers in the green glades. For was it not some wistful chord of their plaintive songs that made me of a sudden, on an April day, wish to know something of a world unknown ? Sending me out on an exploration from which I have not returned. Nowhere else in Britain have I heard birds sing as they did in those shady woodlands. And where better should I watch woodpeckers, all three, and nuthatches and treecreepers too, than in the Wilderness, with its acres of old timber and pink willowherb, strong with the charmed scent of wood smoke ?

Towards the end of June that same year at Whipsnade—that monument of broken idols—I caught his staccato *quet/quet*, a little higher pitched than the redwing's mellow call-note, but deeper pitched than those of his crimson-crowned young who accompanied him. And at primrose time the following year I

found myself in the depths of that loneliest of English counties, Herefordshire : heart-breaking to think back upon, with its orchards of singing chaffinches and interminably rolling wooded hills and lush pastures, with here a farm and there a farm, and no other dwelling for thousands of acres. In the hanging woods over a combe I located, for the first time, a sound that had long puzzled me : the ventriloquial *drumming* of a woodpecker. No one, I suppose, will allow me to term the *drumming* musical, yet it has some power to stir the emotions. When I hear it anew each spring it is as fraught with meaning for me as the clear call of the cuckoo. Apart from its being a pleasantly woody sound, an eminently appropriate love-note for so arboreal a bird, it is vibrant with that same latent passion throbbing in the electric thrumming of a nightjar. It stirs me. I like to listen to this creaking in the tree-tops as much as to the songs of small birds. Its elusiveness heightens its charm.

A few weeks later by a Hertfordshire river I made the acquaintance of that bounding triangle, the little barred woodpecker, his white wings saliently barred, and heard that same querulous *quet*, and also his chaffinch-like run of *pinks*. This strange song of the little woodpecker, who also *drums*, though less frequently than his big brother, is really a spring development, persistent in May and June, of that customary *kee-kee-kee-kee-kee* whereby the unwary often confuse him with plagiarist starling, with nuthatch, or with wryneck who, in my experience, is a very local summer visitor—just as the exotic hawfinch, suddenly obvious in winter flocks, is responsible for many spurious records of waxwings. This spring song might be compared to the diminutive ‘yaffling’ of a green woodpecker, or to the screeing whinny of a dabchick.

By the accidents of fate nearly three years passed before I actually watched a pied woodpecker in the process of *drumming*, again in Hertfordshire. And the manner of it was this—I was walking along the banks of the Ickle, and had just put up a snipe, when I heard that powerful knarled grating, that brought with it a rush of memories of lovely Herefordshire and of the golden valley of Ashridge. The *drumming* came from the fields between the two railways, where I had heard a woodpecker *queting* some weeks before. Expecting to locate the *drummer*

on one of the hollow dead trees, I picked him up, however, on a living elm, and was rewarded by his flying down to the trunk some twenty feet up, and actually beginning to *drum*.

At irregular intervals he hammered deliberately, but incredibly rapidly and forcefully, with his bill upon the bole. In the intervals of hammering he turned his head from side to side, as if listening. After some minutes of hammering he bounded off again: a strikingly beautiful bird sideview, salient white wing-stripe flashing against black body and copper-red rump.

All the *drumming* was at one spot on the bole, and at its conclusion, I went over to inspect the tree. The *drumming* spot was an oval patch some four inches by two, which had been stripped of its outer bark, exposing the reddish fibre beneath. At the top centre of this patch was a hole half an inch across and a quarter deep: narrowing inwards as though made by the conical bit of a brace. Some eight feet below this patch was another much worn at the centre, and pricked all about by the bird's bill. On big portions of the bole from which the bark had long been stripped, so that the surface was green and weathered from exposure, were countless one-sixteenth of an inch-bill pricks, but no indication of any *drumming* centre.

Further investigation, after climbing up to the actual *drumming* patch, showed that a crack at one side of the patch permitted of an air space behind it perhaps half an inch deep, perhaps more: so that when I tapped the patch with a florin, I obtained a feeble but almost perfect reproduction of the woodpecker's *drumming*. The exposed red surface was not fibre but the actual bole of the tree. The secondary patch, eight feet below, was not hollow and produced no sound: so that it was evidently found to be unsuitable, and was abandoned.

It is clear, then, that in this instance the *drumming* was actually produced by the hammering of the woodpecker's bill upon *living* wood, and amplified by the airspace behind the patch and by the vibrations set up by the incredible rapidity of the hammering: estimated, I think accurately, at eight to ten blows a second. What more natural than that the woodpecker, who employs his powerful bill in boring both for food and for nesting hole, should also use it to hammer out his love notes? Such a development of its primary uses is entirely

in keeping with the universal inter-relation of all avian instincts and impulses : as natural as a fulmar petrel's ejecting oil in anger at rival males, or as a nervous spasm at the presence of a human being (as the heron or gull disgorges), or passing it on to his mate in affectionate display and to his chick as food ; and a thousand other such instances.

In January of the next-year, when I was rocking gently on the smooth waters of the Granta, on a morning with just the slightest suspicion of frost to give the air the clean inspiriting tang of March, instead of a wonderful blue day in mid-January, two pied woodpeckers *drummed* to each other, and then the male came chasing the female through the trees, with strange *pewking* cries : a beautiful study of scarlet and white and black in the sunlight. The previous year I had heard different pitches of *drumming* : one shrill and staccato, another dull and deadened ; but I had not been able to determine whether this was a distinction of sex or wood. Here, however, was an identical pitch of *drumming* from male and female : nor can one confuse their identity, for she has no scarlet at the nape.

In April that year I located a little woodpecker *drumming* in some woods on the Norfolk coast, but could not distinguish any difference in its pitch or power from an average *drumming* of a pied woodpecker. Considering that he is half as small again, this was remarkable : on the other hand the higher frequency of his blows, up to fifteen a second¹, would permit of a greater amplification. This particular bird *drummed* on a number of living sycamores.

At six o'clock a few mornings later, when I was watching a red squirrel asleep along a sycamore branch, with tail over back and head in front paws, so that he resembled a large Spanish chestnut, my eye chanced upon a little woodpecker—no doubt he of the previous occasion—and I heard him *drum* with widely differing pitch from two young sycamores. One would conclude, therefore, that the *drumming* pitch of both woodpeckers is determined by the precise material of the *drumming* centre, and possibly by the emotional condition of the *drummer*.

The arguments of that minority who still deny the mechanical origin of the *drumming* are that a woodpecker is osteologically

¹ See The Handbook of British Birds.

incapable of producing so great a sound by hammering on wood or metal without suffering serious injury ; that there is no proof that the *drummer's* bill actually makes contact with the wood—a theory exploded in my instance, and therefore, granted the sameness of the action of all birds of a species, probably in all instances ; that photographs show that the bird *drums* with open bill : which, again makes mechanical *drumming* an osteological impossibility ; and that the spring utterances of bull frog and drumming woodpecker are almost identical : a significant parallel, in view of a bird's reptilian origin, supported further by the mechanical sounding, but vocal, thrumming of a nightjar and the batrachian croakings of such unlikely species as nightingale and red-backed shrike.

If I had not examined my own *drumming* centre, I should have been in entire agreement with these arguments, for the usual objection to a vocal origin, that the pitch of the *drumming* varies according to the material of the *drumming* surface—wood, metal, galvanized sheeting—is no objection to, but actually a support of, that argument : the essence of which is that the *drumming* surface acts as an echo-sheet, throwing back and amplifying the vocal utterance with a sound appropriate to the precise material of the surface : just as the bull frog's *ownch* is controlled and amplified by its submarine production. My instance, moreover, confirms the presence of a sound-box necessary to a vocal amplification, and it is strange that records of actual bill marks on the *drumming* patch are so few. But, having found such marks in one instance, I must, therefore, until further opportunity for experiment occurs, favour a mechanical origin, and explain away both the osteological difficulty and the recorded absence of bill marks, by suggesting that a woodpecker does indeed *drum* with open bill, but only just impinges on the *drumming* surface, so that only a constantly used surface would eventually be worn down into that bit-like depression in which I was able, through the binoculars, actually to observe the bird hammering during the entire period of his drumming. The little woodpecker, moreover, already has one vocal spring 'song', and would be unlikely to have a second.

That for the present comprises most of my little knowledge of the spotted woodpeckers : for they are rare or absent, in the

comparatively wild places in which I have lived ; but I have still to consider the third and most gorgeous of British woodpeckers, lovely birds all : the green woodpecker or, as I prefer him, the yaffle. He was also recorded in the first note in my field diaries, but for a better study of a colouring unique among British birds, I must be allowed to skip two or three years—to an occasion when I was especially impressed with his gorgeousness. To a February day on the Norfolk coast : the sun God's perfect day of pale skies, misty and white at the horizon, deepening to rich blue at the dome, with a line of cumuli along the north-east seaboard. But dominant to the exclusion of all other phenomena, was the sea, whose conched roaring hardly permitted a north-westerly breeze to whisper through the dry marram bents of the dunes, or the distant hum of an aeroplane to impinge upon her intensity of sound. And the lines of white surf rolling away into the horizon's mists set up in my consciousness an impressive sense of the unbreakable continuity of Nature.

On such a morning, when the blizzard of the previous night still dwelt upon the dunes in a pall of frozen snow, and brackish pools on the salting were iced, I chanced upon a pair of yaffles at the base of a dune—not the first time that I had encountered them in this rather remarkable environment. In the strong light the crown of the male who stood listening, or watching me above the bents, in characteristic pose, with head 'snaked' back and uptilted bill slanting upwards—probably from his natural arboreal posture—was a blood-scarlet frayed at its edges with orange : an almost unnatural pre-Raphaelite staining, contrasting vividly with the black lores about the peculiarly glassy eye, and falling shaggily over the soft olive back and golden rump caught so brilliantly by the sun when with laughing squawks he bounded from me in heavy flight, leaping largely through the air. And what a noisy, heavy bird he is, flying through the undergrowth of the woodlands, though it is always a pleasure to see him, green and yellow and red—that scarlet mantle that shades to black according to the light's refraction—hopping up a tree-trunk, working around it to the hidden side : an irritating habit he shares with all arboreal species. Despite his tropical gorgeousness, he blends as invisibly into the greenery

of an English woodland as the oriental pheasant, copper purple and scarlet, into the brazen beech-coverts of autumn.

What do yaffles find to feed on down there in the sandy wastes of dunes in February? Certainly not ants! The yaffle despoiling the turfy anthills of some heath is a familiar sight, and rather an odd one: for this parrot of the English woodlands is fundamentally the perfect arboreal species, from the very nature of his zygodactyle foot and exceedingly long sticky tongue, coiled in his throat, so admirably adapted to flicking hibernating small game from their deep lairs in barken crevices. Am I to assume that yaffles have been despoiling anthills from the beginning of time? If I am not to, there arises a nice point: how am I to account for such a habit being universal among yaffles? That one section of the martin family, the French breeding, should revert to ancestral habits during the Great War, and nest in caves is intelligible: but that *all* yaffles should despoil anthills requires me to believe that such a habit has proved so advantageous to the species that in the course of thousands of years all non-‘anting’ yaffles have been bred out: just as it seems not unlikely that within a comparatively short historical period at least two species of British gull, and perhaps four, will become wholly terrestrial instead of partially pelagic.

If the glorious parklands of Hertfordshire are a paradise for yaffles, and, of course, magpies and jays, the covert, hedge, and field country of Gloucestershire is no less so: for the ecological environment of all three is similar, and the yaffle can do with a more open type of country than other woodpeckers. Nor can the hunting shires of the Midlands, where I have seen ten yaffles in a morning, be accounted any less a paradise. And in every month of the year there rings joyously over parkland and covert the earth-pure *queek-queek-queek-queek-queek* of the laughing yaffle: a cry that many country folk must confuse with the devilish ‘water-bubbling’ notes of the cuckoo’s mate. I have heard both call at once a few yards from me, without my being able to discern any more obvious distinction than that the cuckoo’s notes were more staccato and more liquid. And this brings in the curlew: for over the heather moors of the Peak, where the yaffle haunts the dales, I have known myself to confuse momentarily the ‘bubbling’ of nesting curlew and

coo ; though no man is better acquainted with the curlew's infinite diversity of cries.

The yaffle's cry is fresh with the scent of rain on new earth and there is nought like a shower of summer rain to set the 'rain-bird' laughing noisily, although his cry does not presage rain as the country folk like to think—but why should they not think it? I doubt whether my happiness is the greater for knowing that most of the quaint lore of my squire forbears sprang from their wishes being fathers to their thoughts. I have gained knowledge, but I have lost, as England loses day by day, the pleasant country-flavour of things: that innocent state when every little portent of beast or bird provided pleasant gossip. I live in an age of noisily acclaimed progress: a most unhappy progress that reduced homely country mysteries to cold urban facts. I should like to meet a countryman who believed in hibernating swallows. I would not disillusion him.

REGULAR RUN—*A Story*

BY OLIVER WARNER

AGNES Lowther kept a boarding-house. Her's is a maligned race, for those who keep boarding-houses, though neither better nor worse than their fellows, are often more unfortunate in the moods of those with whom they come in contact. When people go on their annual holiday to the sea they are apt to become so released, so uninhibited, as to be born anew. This rebirth is, alas, seldom perfect.

Agnes Lowther, whose livelihood lay with such migrants, usually saw them at their worst. By day she dwelt underground, in caverns of domesticity, and her uprisings had four principal causes. She rose to answer bells when the maid was occupied; to make complaints; to defend herself; and to demand payment. Her appearances were, therefore, sinister. Her consolations, on the other hand, were few. She did not drink; she was not religious; and she did not read. She merely supported life to the best of her ability, and hoped to be able to give up taking lodgers before she grew old.

The name of her boarding-house was "Elgin". Miss Lowther, if asked why, would retort that "Elgin" was the name of the house when she bought it, and that it would remain "Elgin" until she left. As she said, it was as much to the point as "Sea View", the next house, which looked out, not on to the sea, but on to the village green.

South Bay, where she lived, was a pretty place in its way. It consisted of a pebble beach, a small harbour, Customs offices, a group of warehouses, two inns, a row of boarding-houses, and a growth of bungalows. East and west along the coast rose downs; south was the sea; north lay a road to a market town Maypole, two miles inland.

In May, the place began to stir. In June, it came alive: the inns flourished, tradesmen came in twice a day from Maypole,

visitors began to bathe. In July, the population swelled heavily ; in August, it became over-crowded ; in September, it was nearly as full ; while in October, the winter lifelessness began to take a grip upon it which never relaxed until May came round again.

Winter was usually unspeakable. Even in summer South Bay could be a windy place, but in winter the gales would lash the smooth pebbles day after day ; slates would be ripped from roofs and clatter to the ground ; often for a week on end windows in a given quarter had to be closed tight, to prevent them being blown away. Skies would be drab with a drabness equal to that of any industrial city, rain would stream down, and only fools, and those who had to live there, would be found in South Bay alive or dead.

That was the point. Tom Lowther did not *have* to live there. His sister had. That was how they differed so implacably. Tom would have lived anywhere but in South Bay, gladly, while for his sister it meant sustenance, and she knew well enough how easily are connexions lost, how hardly gained.

Tom would have lived anywhere . . . on some one else. He was fifty-two, a portly figure with a large grey moustache and deep-set eyes which, as he stood in the doorway of " Elgin " on one of the quieter evenings, gazed westward and seemed to be seeing visions. More than one person, who did not know Tom Lowther, had remarked this dreamy appearance. But, if they waited a little, they would see a watch pulled from a waistcoat pocket, a clearing of the throat, a spit, and then—if time were ripe—a solemn walk across the green. There was only one reason, Tom considered, for walking across the green, and regular times for doing it.

" Evenin', Tom," the landlord of the ' Labour in Vain ' would remark : " reg'lar clock you be."

" Aye," Tom would reply in his slow voice, " a clock as wants winding up."

He would then proceed to wind up until his cash was exhausted or until there remained not a soul in the bar who could be expected to offer him even a modest half-can.

The ' Labour in Vain ' swung a sign which caused amusement. In a wooden tub was a nigger boy, and over the tub stood two

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stout women, trying to scrub him white. Agnes Lowther, who, when she thought, thought to the point, sometimes mused on the peculiar appositeness of this sign to her brother's character. Nothing could make black white. Her brother . . . yes, she disliked him even more than he disliked her, which was saying much. It was ten years since he had done a stroke of work.

Ten years ago the two of them had been left a few hundred pounds. Her's had been invested in "Elgin," his in gin, and when London had done with him he had come to South Bay, a squeezed and mildewed fruit, to find her just beginning to make a fair living.

If she could, she would have turned him out without a second's thought, but there was no doubt that it meant the workhouse, and from his childhood Tom had possessed the faculty of minor blackmail. So long as she, Agnes Lowther, continued to give him the wherewithal for "modest drinking," as he called it, at the local inn, and decent bed and board, he—so he let it be understood—would behave respectably. Otherwise, he would not, he felt bound to admit, think twice about disgracing her, and upsetting the summer visitors. Affairs continued on this basis for four years, neither better nor worse—except when Tom interfered with the maid, and there were means of stopping that.

Tom was like a dog in more ways than one. He was faithful—to the 'Labour in Vain'; he had his regular run; and he never knew when he had had enough. If he had the money, he would spend it without pause and without haste, till the last penny. What was money for? Agnes, of course, knew all this. She knew exactly how much she could afford to give him, and so did he. He knew, further, that if he spent more, no threat he could make would prevent Agnes from declaring that "Elgin" could no longer support the two of them, and simply selling up. He was lazy, stupid and worthless, but not quite such a fool as to chase away the goose which laid his sodden eggs.

Things were balanced well enough, always provided there were no windfalls. With a windfall, his more dog-like qualities would have a chance to assert themselves, and he would take too much. That meant, quite simply, that he would be turned out of the inn drunk at ten o'clock, stagger across the green, and

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banish his surfeit either in the hall or on his bedroom floor. The rest Agnes could tolerate, but these occasions, with his singing—for he sometimes sang till overtaken—were insufferable. More often than not he would have forgotten his key, and have to be let in. If she kept him waiting, he would, when let in, fall straight on to the mat. If there were people in the house, she and the maid would lift him downstairs into the kitchen. If not, he stayed where he had fallen until he recovered himself, and then he would swear at her for an undutiful and cruel sister.

One October Tom had some luck. It came in the form of a ten-pound win in a shilling sweepstake. Agnes was among the first to hear of it, and asked him for something towards a wireless which would brighten up the winter. Tom's eyes glazed in their visionary sheen. "Wireless be damned", he said, and the subject dropped.

The same night, he had one of his more opulent drunks, forgot his key, and crashed on to the mat when she opened the door. As there was a visitor, the last remaining, the maid had to be summoned. In the morning, Agnes issued an ultimatum. The next time it happened, she would refuse to let him in. For two nights he remembered his key. On the third, the first process was repeated and, incidentally, he wrenched the bell-pull out of its socket and sang until twelve. After he had gone to sleep, she abstracted all the money she could find from his pockets. Next morning the visitor gave notice.

When Tom discovered the loss of his money the row was unparalleled. He laid hands on her, and only the maid, giving him a slash with a poker, prevented serious damage. The poker hit him hard on the back of the head, and he retired to bed for a week or two as an assertion of authority. The maid left.

When he resumed his normal habits, the weather had settled into hard winter. On most nights, it froze; in the daytime the wind blustered, and South Bay seemed more devastated than usual. On Tom's reappearance at the 'Labour in Vain,' the landlord and one or two cronies were so pleased to see him that they contrived to send him home very drunk indeed. Of course, he had forgotten his key, and, as the bell had not been mended, it took a good deal of thumping and bawling before

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Agnes let him in. By that time it was so cold that he felt a trifle sobered; sober enough to inform his sister that, if ever she kept him waiting in the cold again he couldn't answer for what he'd do to her.

It was about four weeks later, near to Christmas, before the next occasion. This time it was a birthday celebration. There was a layer of snow on the ground, and an extra drop inside was very warming. But ten o'clock found Tom Lowther pretty far gone. He staggered across the green to "Elgin" more uncertainly than usual. His feet seemed worse after this bout than they had ever been before; there was a bit of a pounding in his chest; and God, it was cold!

Bang went his clumsy hands on the door. It was habit. No answer. He fumbled in his pocket. "Ah . . . all right then, damn and blast the woman," he mumbled. "I'll . . ."

Suddenly, his knees gave, and he sank heavily and peacefully to the ground.

Agnes, in her bedroom, was not sure about the bang. Anyhow she had warned him. She turned out the gas and went to sleep.

In the morning, when the milkman came in from Maypole, Tom Lowther was still on the step where he had fallen. His nose was in the snow, and the key in his hand. But he would never drink another drop, for he was stiff.

Next year, "Elgin" prospered. Agnes was very glad about the key.

SKILLED TRAINING FOR THE UNEMPLOYED

BY JOHN ARMITAGE

NOTHING in the story of the two million unemployed is so little appreciated as the fact that the vast majority are not only out of work but out of the habit of work. Many of the men unemployed to-day have been without a real occupation since their schooldays, and notwithstanding that some of the intervening time has been taken up by casual and occasional labour or by some blind-alley job, such as an errand boy, these boys who have now grown up into men, are mentally, physically, and in any case occupationally unfit to take a decent job even when it is offered to them. As time passes the demand for skilled labour will become urgent, and already Labour Exchanges in many parts of the country are finding it impossible to supply from their overflowing books a man who can genuinely be called skilled. The word *skilled* is of elastic interpretation, but even if we accept men whose amount of skill is limited to a single operation we find that many who offer their services have little or no real experience, and what experience they have is rusty through lack of use.

The Ministry of Labour and the Commissioner for the Special Areas have been doing something to mitigate this evil. Training centres, such as those at Park Royal, Slough, Leeds, Birmingham and elsewhere, have been set up to train men in skilled occupations during a six months' course. Briefly the procedure followed is the same with all men as soon as the covenanted period during which they receive unemployment pay is over. The men are turned over to the Unemployment Assistance Board and their pay is continued after an interview and enquiry, the famous 'Means Test'. From the Employment Exchange record and the investigation undertaken by the Unemployment Assistance Board, an estimate of individual needs is made, due account being taken of their home circumstances.

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The number of men who can be sent to a six months training centre is necessarily few and, not unnaturally, it has been found that a proportion of those sent, following an interview, are unsuitable. More likely than not failure will be due to the inability of the man to apply himself to the task in hand. This may not be his own fault, but obviously it is important that, with the unemployment figure as high as it is, there should be no wastage, and in an effort to get the best results, the Ministry of Labour have now inaugurated at Wavertree, Liverpool, a "Preparatory Centre", which will take men for a preliminary six weeks' course. In addition a duly appointed Selection Panel can accept for this centre other men who seem to fulfil the necessary requirements, although undecided about the work they wish to do. The Selection Panel of three includes a Technical Officer.

A "Preparatory" Centre stands in the same relation to a six months Centre as does a preparatory to a secondary school. A similar experiment has been tried once before in South Wales, but Liverpool is particularly suited for a proper trial as, out of the 73,000 unemployed, many have known only casual work at the best, and there are men who are potentially good workmen if proper training and then work can be found. Men who pass their six weeks training with credit will be given an opportunity to attend a six months centre—curiously enough there is not one in Liverpool—on the recommendation of the Preparatory Centre manager and his deputy. Attendance at the Preparatory Centre is voluntary, but the men are expected to keep strict discipline during working hours, and if they do not they will be required to leave. The Centre is designed to take 150 men, half in the morning and half in the afternoon. The morning session begins at 8.30 and lasts until 12 when dinner is served. The second session begins with dinner at 12.30 and work from 1 p.m. until 5.30.

The course lasts for six weeks, the men working in the mornings one week and in the afternoons the next. Every man who attends the centre receives in addition to his mid-day meal two shillings per week, on top of his unemployment pay, and his bus fares, should he happen to live more than two miles away from the centre. It had been intended originally that work

could begin for the day at the normal Liverpool time of 8 a.m., but the morning rush-hour causes many tram delays, and Liverpool employers find it difficult to take disciplinary action if any of their work-people are late. As lateness is a serious offence—the men ‘clock on’ as they would in any normal factory—the hour has been fixed at 8.30.

When I visited the centre, housed most successfully in four tubular corrugated iron Nissen huts, it was the end of only the second week. The full complement of workers had not yet been reached, but on every side there was a fine spirit of keenness, and the first batch of men showed every sign of profiting from their experience. The men were of all ages, ranging from 18 to 35. Youth tends to predominate, as it should, but no one is turned down on the grounds of age unless he is more than 35.

The men are consulted as to their wishes and also advised on what trade they should take up. Intending bricklayers, for instance, are tried out on a scaffold to make sure that they will be able to work at heights. Not unnaturally the various engineering trades have the biggest appeal, as the boom in engineering makes it more likely that the man will eventually find a job. At the ‘Preparatory’ Centre men can begin their elementary training, for instance, as fitters, sheet metal workers, or welders, but they can also begin their training as carpenters, bricklayers, and painters, and at various other general trades.

School, or as it is called the lecture room, is also a very important part of the training. Many of the men have forgotten all they ever knew of elementary mathematics, and when they first arrive they are given a simple dictation and a few addition sums. Listening to a lesson, and afterwards going through the exercise books, gave an astonishing insight into the progress that it was possible to achieve within a fortnight. Not only had the men progressed from simple addition to multiplication and division of decimals, fractions and areas, but they showed a tremendous improvement in neatness and in their setting out of problems. Many men are dense about mathematics, but from the start it is impressed upon them that if they are corrected a dozen times in a morning for the same fault, it is because this is the quickest method for overcoming the difficulty. More than half of the first batch of men have

taken homework. However, the idea of teaching the men mathematics is severely practical, and those who will need it most, according to their trade, receive the most instruction.

In spite of some outside opposition the 'Preparatory' Centre shows every sign of being a big success with the men. There is a long waiting list, and it is likely to grow larger, as those who are already being trained begin to tell their friends about it. To watch the men at work was a pleasure; their eagerness was obvious, and in many cases it was possible to pick out a man and say—'there's a man who should have been skilled long ago'. The centre has obvious attractions, and the good mid-day meal rewards labour in the right coin. It is worth mentioning that on the day of my visit I enjoyed the same meal as the men; nor had the chef any reason to expect a visitor.

Liverpool, although it still awaits a six months centre, has a Ministry of Labour physical training centre at the Gordon Institute, Birkdale, open during the day. The Ministry of Labour run a number of these centres in the Special Areas, but elsewhere it is usual to leave physical training in the hands of voluntary bodies, helped by grants from the National Fitness Council. From the men's point of view the official Ministry centre is to be preferred especially as attendance is likely to assist them in getting work.

Under Army instructors three hundred men divided into eight classes receive three hours training each week, each period lasting for one hour. One hour, every other week, is devoted to swimming at neighbouring baths and the men are supplied with shorts, vest, gymn shoes and bathing dress, all these garments becoming their property at the end of three months training providing their attendance has been satisfactory. In addition each man can have a hot shower after his physical training hour, followed by a ration of half-a-pint of milk, drunk through a straw from the bottle, and two chocolate wheaten biscuits.

A superintendent, helped by two instructors, is in charge of this centre, and it is at once obvious that great interest is taken in the men as individuals as well as in their training as a squad. The great aim of the training is to keep the men physically and mentally alert so that they may be able to take

when it is offered to them. The hour's training looks strenuous, but actually lively is a better term, for although it keeps the men brisk and busy the whole time, no man is pushed beyond his individual capacity. Comparison is avoided with studied care, and beginners perform with the rest, as self-consciousness is the first enemy to be overcome.

On the whole the physical training centre has a satisfactory record with regard to the number of its men who afterwards find work, but physical training does not produce jobs by itself, and undoubtedly an effort should be made not to lose sight of the men after the end of their three months. Obviously three months is a generous period to give to any three hundred men when there are 70,000 unemployed on Merseyside; yet to lose sight of these men after training is to undo much of the good that has been done. By some means or other time should be found for giving these men one hour's training each week in order to assure them that they are not forgotten. It is possible that in this way the men would be encouraged to practise a little at home; they would not care to find that they were falling back.

No doubt when the social history of the last twenty years comes to be written in the light of its after-effects, England will receive many bad marks for the haphazard manner in which she has treated the appalling problem of its unemployed. If so, the various Governments of that time will receive less blame than the general public, whose terrifying apathy, particularly in the South, has allowed the problem to be regarded as insoluble. The figures published each month, showing a slight rise or a slight fall, mean nothing more to the occupied middle classes than tables of data, like cricket averages, which are interesting from a theoretical or statistical point of view. They see the unemployed as in a film and not as men and women whose falling standards reveal the real failure of this country.

LABOUR—WHENCE?—WHITHER?

BY J. H. HARLEY

THE Conference which is soon to assemble at Southport will doubtless be regarded in after-days as marking a conspicuous milestone in the history of the Labour movement in Great Britain. Not that there is any doubt of the verdict which will be recorded when the tellers return the totals of the vote on the issue joined by Sir Stafford Cripps with the Party Executive. To the vast majority of the working population of this island the watchword of a Labour Party free and independent and unfettered by entangling alliances, has become a dogma—one might almost say, a hall-mark of their creed.

Yet it is not sufficient to point to the formidable forces arrayed against Sir Stafford and then to pass on as if the whole question had been settled. Just as it is the most sinister and disheartening feature of the present crisis in affairs that the nation has long been, as it were, cleft asunder on a question of foreign policy, so, in our own internal troubles, it is surely of great import for the future of the Labour movement in Great Britain that it should seem to be performing the baleful operation of *hara-kiri* in the presence of its official foes. At the very time when it desires to face the responsibilities of a not too distant General Election with all its elements strongly united, in order to obtain some decisive parliamentary majority, it is obliged, by the action of Sir Stafford, to embark on a debilitating domestic controversy, where it is made to appear in the *rôle* of rejecting all efforts of help, in order to languish in a sunless isolation. How is it that Transport House has had to make such a momentous choice? . . . What are the elements of the past history of the Labour movement which have brought it into the situation in which we, unfortunately, find it to-day?

Some really adequate history of the British Labour movement

certainly yet to be written. The biographies and autobiographies of leaders are too often devoted to their own glorification, and fail to give any idea of the constant and devoted work of the forgotten rank-and-file who from 1889—the date of the inception of the Independent Labour Party—gave the political movement its tone of a *religious* propaganda. A recent volume of reminiscences by S. G. Hobson entitled: *Pilgrim to the Left* is useful because in these earlier days Mr. Hobson was a real pioneer, and he has preserved in some of his chapters, that spirit, which—manifested in many a crowded public meeting—made the Labour Party first spring into the full blaze of publicity in 1906. S. G. Hobson, indeed, has a strangely perverse idea of the unimportance of political action in hastening a Labour Party to its Party's goal, but, interlarded among other chapters of his own personal history, he enshrines many precious memories which are of value to anyone who seeks, with some degree of comprehension, to understand the nature of the crisis which has now to be faced.

The first point to be remembered about the present Labour Party—and it is deeply significant in relation to the discussions of Southport—is that originally it had no firm dogmatic basis. The old Independent Labour Party indeed, which was its influential and animating spirit during its early days as the Labour Representation Committee, claimed to be a socialist body and defined its object, somewhat grandly and comprehensively, as the “collective ownership and control of the means of production, distribution and exchange”. But even the Independent Labour Party preferred to hide its light under a bushel, and the name of “Socialism” was by definite design banished from its nameplate. The consequence was that socialism became a kind of abracadabra to be muttered in quietude as the conspirator mutters his password and not a creed to be studied and questioned in the light of day. A member of the Party must not speak of it too openly lest the weaker spirits in the Trade Union movement should imagine that he and his associates were out as real conspirators to capture and manipulate the movement!

But it was not simply the fact that it had no firm dogmatic basis, which constituted the primal weakness of the old Labour

Representation Committee. It did not even claim to be a party. A party, if it means anything at all, is distinguished from a group in an advanced democratic country by the fact that it can supply, if the electors so decide, an alternative Government. Now the Labour Representation Committee, as its objects were defined at the inaugural meeting in 1900, never aspired to form an alternative Government. It was by its own confession not a party but a group. It proclaimed its

“readiness to co-operate with any party which, for the time being, may be engaged in promoting legislation in the direct interest of Labour and may be equally ready to associate itself with any party in opposing measures having an opposite tendency.”

Toryism at that time had become definitely identified with a policy of keeping down the worker. The Trade Unionist was content to see the real spirit of Conservatism in a legal decision like that of Taff Vale. And besides, these Tories, cloaked in London as the Moderates, were short-sighted enough to constitute themselves the opponents of State action in any shape or form. The Fabians had identified Socialism with an extension of the activities of the State, province, or municipality. “Capture the County Councils” cried Mrs. Besant in 1889—“Socialism will come”. The Tories, like the king who used a broom to sweep back the Atlantic, were obliged to look on the gradually increasing use of the machinery of the State or municipality as a movement to be opposed at any and every cost, and, moreover, this prejudice still acts to the detriment of the country even in the world of State subsidies and State regulations which we see unfolding before us to-day.

The Labour candidate, then, felt comparatively comfortable when it was a question as between him and the Tory. But how about the Liberals? There the issue was not nearly so obvious and clear. It was no use thinking that gas and water Socialism could be of any avail as a rallying-call against a Liberal, for had not Liberals and Labour men alike combined in London to constitute themselves a Progressive Party which gave a new vision to the Metropolis? Nay, had not Keir Hardie, in his address of 1892 to the electors of West Ham, said that he was in agreement “with the present programme of the Liberal Party so far as it goes?” And, worse still, had not the same Keir Hardie, as S. G. Hobson reminds us, written an open

to such a convinced opponent of all State action, as the late Lord Morley, in which he quite seriously called on him to come out and lead the new Labour Party to victory. This did not look as if Keir Hardie—at any rate—imagined that there was a great deal to pick and choose between Liberalism and Labour.

So far indeed as he did find a main issue as between himself and Liberalism, Keir Hardie was content to concentrate on the question of unemployment. That had never been a burning question with the old Liberalism. S. G. Hobson, who has dived into a book of reference on this subject, finds that the word “unemployment” was first used in quotation in December, 1894. Mr. Gladstone was colour-blind on the relations of Capital with Labour. In the 1906 Parliament Victor Grayson created a first-class “scene” by insisting that the House should turn its attention to the Unemployment question which he deemed of pre-eminent importance. Besides—and, as S. G. Hobson asserts, much to the annoyance of the Fabians—Keir Hardie almost compelled Parliament to appoint in 1895 a Parliamentary Committee on the subject. But then the Labour Leader had no very clear ideas as to where could be found a remedy. He was most insistent in trying to revive an old Elizabethan law to provide work for the needy, but he had certainly not developed ideas of socialism as a planned economy. In fact his remedies would not carry us very far in the modern world; and, moreover, the younger Liberals under the influence of Green and Toynbee, were beginning from 1905 to devote more and more attention to social questions. Obviously the boundaries between Liberals and Labour were becoming exceedingly undefined.

Neither was the missing element which had to differentiate between Liberals and Labour supplied by the varied speculations of Ramsay MacDonald. The latter was in the main a self-taught man, and his reading, though wide and varied, was never profound. He had a conception of the State as an organism, but he had never worked out this conception in order to throw light on its institutional life, as Plato did in the Republic or as did a group of contemporary sociologists, notably Rene Worms. The bio-state, as most of its exponents, such as Izolet, have seen, leads necessarily to a surrender of any individual life

of the cells under the control of an autocratic cerebral system. MacDonald, who had been nurtured on "Mill on Liberty", recoiled from such a grim anticipation of Fascism, and quoted certain biological experiments of his own time which led to the conclusion that an individual cell continues to have a particular life of its own, independent from the organism of which it forms a part. But he never worked this idea out completely and systematically, and though he claimed to have brought in Darwin to offset the influence of Hegel, it is doubtful whether he knew much of Darwin, and he certainly did not know much at first hand about Hegel. The result was that he could not throw much light on the difference between Liberalism and Labour; his theoretical speculations were kept very far apart from his practical political life. In the latter sphere he was a most inveterate opportunist with no systematic scheme to correct his tendency to political eclecticism.

Vague phrases that invite to the measureless inane are no substitute for firm-cut ideas, and the lack of any real systematic outlook coloured the whole tactics of the Labour men when the Liberals came into power in 1906. There were the serried ranks of the victors, composed for the most part of young men, positively yearning for social reforms, so that one of them was even ready on a Private Members' day, to sponsor the Labour Party's Unemployment Bill. The Labour members, as has been pointed out, were a group rather than a party, and they desired to keep themselves apart from the two official Parties so that they could combine, if need arose, with either. But how were they to resist being absorbed by the Liberals? Calling themselves a Party, as they later did, did not bring them much help in distress, because that change was unaccompanied by any clear details of a really distinctive programme. Obviously the only way to do it was to forbid Labour men to have any truck with the Liberals. They must enter into no entangling negotiations. They must not dwell with them on the same platform. If Liberals, in a two-membered constituency, withdrew one of their candidates, and the Labour men did the same, the remaining Labour candidate must not condescend to join his name with the remaining Liberal, on the same election address or polling-card. He must have a separate election

address and a separate polling card, so that there might be no temptation for him to be confounded with his colleague. In the House of Commons itself, the orthodox Labour men and the unorthodox or "Lib-Labs" glared across the gangway at each other as if animated by undying hatred. He who transgressed one of the most insignificant of these commandments was anathematized. He was banished as a hopeless heretic from the fold. The merest suggestion of any arrangement with the Liberals sent the hounds off baying in full cry.

It is doubtful, at the same time, whether all these precautions against assimilation would have been successful in elevating the Labour Party from a group into the proud position of His Majesty's Opposition, had the War not supervened. The rank and file of the Independent Labour Party, which was still a force in the country, did not like from the first the apparent suppression of any emphasis on the socialist aims of Labour. Obscure mutterings became an open revolt, and in 1909 Messrs. Keir Hardie, Macdonald, and Snowden resigned from the Independent Labour Party, content to be known *sans phrase* as members of the Labour Party alone. In 1910 it begun to be clear that a movement against bureaucratic Socialism was in full swing, and the appearances of a Syndicalism, Industrial Unionism, and at last S. G. Hobson's Guild Socialism showed that the old definition of Socialism would need to be seriously revised. The Labour Party did not give much countenance to these new movements, save that Lord Passfield induced them to add, much to the annoyance of Macdonald, the conception of a National Minimum Wage to the old idea of the extension of State functions and officials. Then came Lloyd George's virtual destruction of the unity of the old historic Liberal Party, and the Labour men found themselves not only a party in name but a party in literal reality.

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How then, as His Majesty's Opposition, were they to define their leading aim and object? They had mounted into a position of vantage over the Liberals and they had to sustain themselves in the same proud pre-eminence. As a result of the movement of ideas during the course of the war "Workers' Control" appeared definitely to be winning the day over the old

"State Control". Nay, more, the younger and more aggressive spirits of what was now the Liberal group were feeling the force of some parallel tendencies, and, though they were never tempted away in the direction of any real Workers' Control, they definitely succumbed to the plan of governing the basic industries at least by public Corporations. Could His Majesty's Opposition show that they had a more excellent way? Hardly, if Mr. Morrison's London Transport Bill is to be taken as our guiding criterion. The latter did not appear to distinguish itself in any striking or essential fashion from the Liberal programme of "Britain's Industrial Future". It confronted the Trade Unions, who believed in some sort of workers' representation, with the refusal to give their workers any such representation inside the governing body of an industry on the significant plea that the workers were simply one "interest" among many other "interests" which, with equal justification, could clamour for co-ordinate representation. Besides, when the second Labour Government fell and Mr. Morrison's Bill was delivered to the hungry wolves, the succeeding National Government found it easy—the Prime Minister being in no wise unwilling—to eliminate the Minister of Transport from the scheme and to substitute for him a body of electors as grotesquely chosen as were those of the Holy Roman Empire. Had the Labour Party's schemes for the future Government of Industry included any representation of the workers which approached to workers' control the case would have been different. The framers of "Britain's Industrial Future" were very sceptical about the value of workers' representation, and more than sceptical about workers' control. Even in Labour and Socialist circles there were, as it already had been pointed out, high influences operating against the presence of Workers' Representatives in the governing body of industry. S. G. Hobson thinks that the Fabian Society made the great mistake of its history when in 1919 it refused to admit into its Basis "a steadily increasing participation of the organized workers in the management, both central and local, of industry transferred to the community". Also, there might have been a line of cleavage found between Labour and Liberalism on the question of finance. Sir Stafford Cripps, in his Minimum Programme, only asks for a certain control of the Bank of

England, and the Labour Party would extend that control to the Joint Stock Banks as well. But then the Executive of the Party were not at first very keen for this extension, and it was only after animated Conference debates that at length this was carried as a contribution from the rank-and-file.

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What, then, in view of the above-mentioned facts and tendencies has been the consequential attitude of Labour towards the Liberal group during these recent years? History shows that democratic government can only be carried on efficiently and with real stability when there are two parties and only two, and where the party which is to form the Government, when it does form a Government, can obtain a majority sufficiently large to enable it to form a consistent and powerful Executive. Now the existence of an additional group or groups is a standing obstacle in the way of such a strong and consistent Government, especially when this additional group within a Party is composed of skilled and experienced men whose influence is out of all proportion to their number and who advocate Proportional Representation as a means of completely perpetuating their power. The very nearness of their programme to the main opposition party makes such a group all the more insidious. As Coleridge wrote :—

“ To be wroth with one we love
Doth work like madness in the brain.”

Who can wonder, then, that the underlying object of the Labour Party during all these recent years has been to end by all possible electoral means the existence of Liberalism as a separate group within His Majesty's Opposition. There was to be no truck with these Liberals, even when the result was such an election as that held recently at Holderness. There was to be no pooling of programmes. A fight was to be waged, determined, unwearied, and implacable, until the last Liberal faced the Speaker's chair, and the Labour Party remained at last in solitary possession of the Opposition benches of the House. If a young Liberal desired a parliamentary career and had real progressive instincts the way was not made too hard for him to join the Labour Party. There were no differences which he ought to regard as fundamental in their programmes, and why

should he desire a little conventicle of his own? This was the course of action which had already been pursued with a certain amount of real success when Sir Stafford Cripps launched his Memorandum. It had not been pursued with entire success because there still remained a vigorous Liberal group, and the most influential and intrepid spirits in Liberalism refused to pass over. But there were strong grounds for believing that, as time went on, the remaining members of the group would just dwindle away.

At this stage it may be objected that there are not only the Liberals but also the Communists to be considered, when it is a question of group alliances. Has not Sir Stafford Cripps in the past been a supporter of a Workers' Popular Front which claimed that the Communists rather than the Liberals were to be enrolled in the main phalanx of Labour? May it not be that he still has his gladder eye fixed on the Communists? The answer is that the whole purpose of his Memorandum is to provide a strong opposition majority in the coming General Election, and it is inconceivable that any electoral expert could have encouraged him to believe that the roping of the Communist Party of Great Britain into a general Opposition *bloc* would have any effect in increasing the numbers of that *bloc* after the Election had been held. It may be considered as a subject worthy of discussion whether it is advisable to bring in Bolshevik Russia into some League to 'enforce Peace', for, as at present considered, that League is not to be ideological, and Russia knows that peace is her best friend; but the British working man has the deadliest antipathy to any complete system of totalitarian government, and the British Communists, when they have intervened in a British election, have hurt rather than helped the prospects of a candidate.

Granting then, as we surely must, that the all-embracing purpose of Sir Stafford's campaign is to produce the biggest possible majority for an Opposition *bloc* against the Government at the next General Election, it is obvious that it is with Liberals, and not with Communists, that any examination of the resulting prospects must chiefly be concerned. The real point, of course, here is, that there are seats in different parts of the country where an anti-governmental candidate might win if

Labour and Liberalism did not run separate candidates of their own. If, as some of the newspapers reports indicate, Sir Stafford offered to withdraw his Memorandum provided that some concession was made to him on this point, then it seems a pity that some attempt was not made to close with this as a practical sort of compromise. In such a case the arrangements would be purely local, and they would involve no withdrawal or abatement of the party's immediate programme. Besides, if the Labour Party is not simply to be a class party but a really comprehensive party it must give more practical opportunity to all elements of the country which are inclined to rally to its support. In the Universities there have been resounding victories for Labour ideas, but the brilliant young men who win them never find their way into Parliament—or afterwards figure in some group of young Liberals, or even Communists. Besides, the Trade Unions, as Mr. Cole has reminded us in a recent survey, are hardly keeping pace with the latest developments in industry, and the skilled technicians are not always to be found as enthusiastic adherents of official Labour policies. Added to this there is a tendency in many constituencies to prefer local men and the nominees of some powerful Union to others who have previously distinguished themselves in Parliament or have a known capacity for parliamentary strategy and debate. So far as the Trade Union candidates are concerned this tendency can be easily understood, for it was the defect of the old Liberal Party that it did not give sufficient electoral representation to the representatives of the organized Workers.

But the most telling and conclusive reason why the Labour Party should lengthen its ropes and strengthen its stakes is that we live to-day under the perpetual shadow of war. At recent general elections the Labour Party has always by the superior strategy of its opponents been manœuvred into an unfavourable position. It was the longest and most convinced supporter of 'Collective Security' but Lord Baldwin won an Election by stealing its thunder. It was the prime author of the Geneva Protocol which aimed not simply at averting but at banishing war for ever, yet Mr. Chamberlain, after Munich, looked like working it into a position where it would have to appear before the country as the opponent of peace, or at any rate of what was

called, by a fine irony, appeasement. Of course, it cannot be denied that with a Labour Government at the helm and Hitler or Mussolini in the saddle, there would always be a more imminent danger of war, for with these men the term "Communism" or "Bolshevism" is a symbol rather than a clearly defined concept, and it is certainly broad enough to include British Labour and thus to make it the object, as happened in the case of Spain, of a Holy Crusade on the part of the Dictators. In these circumstances it is clearly important that the Labour Party, if it desires to win public confidence, should appear before the electors as going one further than its adversaries, and as advocating an international body, with police powers, which would not only avert war but would effectually prevent it. It is at this point that Sir Stafford Cripps shows himself sadly ineffective. He never did understand the League of Nations, and his comments on foreign politics generally have been singularly inept and one-sided. It is not simply that his Minimum Programme is inadequate. There can be no great measures of Socialist constructive reform whilst war is lurking on the horizon. War is a menace to all progressive advance. It marks the most conspicuous triumph of the deadly spirit of reaction. Other questions are quite overshadowed by this and if when the Labour Party came to power, the dictators lined up their forces for aggression on the plea that here was an effort of Bolshevist encirclement, then any resulting war would indeed be "a war to end war"; and every democratic combatant would engage in it with a sustaining hope in his heart. If the war, as it surely would, were waged successfully in the cause of peace, then a measure of International Security would be the all-important measure of the day. National Socialism would become a memory of the past, for the Economic Conference which would in this event form an adjunct to International Security would plan its economic problems, such as the rationing of raw materials, from an international rather than a national point of view. In order to secure as early as possible some guarantee for such a beneficent result, the Labour Party cannot afford to neglect the attainment of a single vote.

EBB AND FLOW

BY STEPHEN GWYNN

THERE has been ebb and flow with a vengeance ; let us look at the whirlpool. After Herr Hitler's latest performance Mr. Chamberlain spoke in a tone that the people approved, and there was a general feeling that if the determination to resist further aggression against Germany's neighbours was to be declared, it came most effectively from the man who had made most personal exertions to avoid a war in which England would be ranged against Germany. That was all to the good. The democracy of the United Kingdom showed a tolerance which was exemplary, for it is in the nature of democracies to turn savagely on any man who has let them be fooled. Beyond yea or nay, Mr. Chamberlain was overreached at Munich, and the scrap of paper which he read out triumphantly on his return, bearing Herr Hitler's signature beside his own, is now an object for mockery. Yet the English continued to like the man and trust him ; if his nature had been too honest to suspect double-dealing, they refused to blame him for that ; and they preferred unmistakably to rally round him rather than any other. They were quite ready to fight under his leadership, if Germany should infringe the independence of Poland. Mr. Chamberlain made it perfectly plain that any action of Germany which Poland thought it necessary to resist by force would be resisted also by England, co-operating with France.

This declaration contented the House of Commons and contented the English people. When Mr. Lloyd George—who is not wholly without experience—asked how even the combined forces of France and England were going to bring help to Poland, unless Russia also was prepared to come in, he was angrily rebuked by a very typical Englishman, Sir Henry Page Croft. The general sense was, evidently, that England's declaration,

made also in the name of France, would suffice to stop Herr Hitler. And probably that was a correct judgment, at least for the moment. There was relief, which lasted nearly for a week; Parliament closed its doors, Mr. Chamberlain went off to fish in Scotland where many, and not least the writer of these lines, hoped that he would be as lucky as he deserved. But then suddenly the defect in his declaration was made patent by a new move in quite another quarter of the European chessboard.

Mr. Chamberlain had asked the English people to be ready to fight and he had defined—so far back as last September—what they must be ready to fight against. They must resist, as

Defence of British Rights they had always resisted, the attempt of one ambitious Power to dominate Europe and possibly to dominate the world. He made it clear that Germany by swallowing up—in defiance of Herr Hitler's assurances—a people which was not German, had given plain evidence of such ambition. If Germany made a new aggression on Poland, there would be a new step towards domination; the balance of power would be destroyed. He did not say, as Mr. Gladstone would probably have said, that Poland was a country long divided and enslaved which the combined effort of England and other Powers had restored to her rightful place in Europe. He did not say that aggression should be resisted because it violated all the principles embodied in the League of Nations—once “the sheet-anchor of British policy.” He said in effect simply that if Germany continued on her career of successful aggression, attacking Europe piecemeal, Germany would become the master of Europe, and the rights of England would be at her disposal. On these representations, England showed complete readiness to stand up to Germany, in defence of the balance of power.

But then came a move for which Mr. Chamberlain's formula had made no provision. Italy proceeded to occupy Albania, a country to which neither England nor her partner France had any definite obligations. Albania was no doubt a member of the League of Nations, but Italy had already established a complete precedent for disregarding that consideration. The action was unquestionably lawless aggression, but the

democracies were not pledged to defend international right—except, indeed, by their pledges in the League of Nations, from which they had already liberated themselves by disregarding them. The only question for Mr. Chamberlain, or rather for England under his leadership, was whether Italy ought to be regarded as an ambitious Power aiming at universal domination. Germany indeed applauded and approved Italy's action; but Germany and Italy could hardly be considered as the same State. Unless they were so considered, whatever strengthened Italy might be regarded as favourable to the balance of power, by lessening the chances of a complete German domination. It might even be argued, and doubtless will be argued, that under Italian rule Albania should become materially and morally a more civilized country; we heard that about Abyssinia. It may be urged in fact that there is no great harm done to anything except to international law and respect of pledges; and these are things which Mr. Chamberlain has not asked England to defend. There are agreements guaranteeing the *status quo* in the Mediterranean, and Italy by gaining control of both coasts on the Adriatic will have greatly altered that status in her favour. But Mr. Chamberlain, after what he asked of the Czechs to avoid European war, could not well let war loose because British sea communications might some day be rendered difficult. At the same time the Prime Minister must speak to the democracies and the small nations in terms more appealing than those of the balance of power.

The Duce's stroke was a masterpiece, for it was no more likely to be resisted than was the occupation of Memel, and its result may be to decide Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey that power in the South of Europe, like power in the North, rests with the Axis. But for the urgent moment the problem is to hold back Germany. Unless Russia co-operates, neither Poland nor Rumania can be secured against successful invasion, though, at the end of a war in which Germany has been broken, they may be restored. Nobody can suppose that Russia will co-operate to keep the balance of power at a level that suits England. But Russia showed good will to co-operate in the work of the League of Nations. There are still people in England who think that Russia is a contamination;

**Power—and
Principle**

one hereditary legislator in the Lords rebuked the Archbishop of Canterbury for having advocated co-operation with such a State. He went on to declare that the forces which would ultimately triumph were those which had Christianity behind them—and that we should “set aside the madness of the League of Nations which had landed us in our present position”. With great respect to this eminent peer, I should venture to say that the English people had rightly regarded the League of Nations as an attempt to bring Christianity into the dealings between one nation and another; and that, if Mr. Chamberlain talks to the English people about Christianity rather than the balance of power, he will get a fuller response. He need not call it Christianity; law and justice are less controversial names; but a League for the defence of law and justice is a thing for which the British people would make all sacrifices—provided that they knew that law and justice would be defended, without any regard to the balance of power.

As things stand, the English people, who felt on Thursday before Easter that they knew where they were being led, by the evening of Good Friday were completely puzzled. If Mr. Chamberlain had said simply, ‘we stand against lawless aggression in Europe,’ Signor Mussolini’s action would have been a direct challenge to the English people. But Mr. Chamberlain had stated the issue in such a way that the dictators could outmanœuvre him, and they did so—spreading confusion in the party which Mr. Chamberlain had hoped to rally throughout Europe. The nations that are out for aggrandisement have a clear purpose. England does not want aggrandisement, but the British have prepared, morally and materially, to fight. Yet no one knows what England will fight for, in spite of all Government utterances, since nobody can exactly measure the danger-point on the balance of power. Every time that the balance is tilted a little further against the interests of democracy, and England does not fight, confirms the deplorable impression that England will not fight at all—or not until it is too late.

Certain general conclusions seem to emerge. First, that the ideal of the League of Nations is an ideal necessary to be pursued unless civilization is to founder in anarchy; but

secondly that this ideal cannot begin to be realized without the active help of the United States. They helped to plan the institution, but then, deciding that it was not necessary for their protection, walked out. England took a leading part in attempting to work it, but always with a belief that this action was philanthropic. Now, the development of air power has shown the English that they are part of Europe; that their security, such as it is, depends on alliance with France; and that if security against growing aggression in other parts of Europe is not afforded, neither France nor England will be secure. It is a weakness in Mr. Chamberlain's position that he has, so far as the public knows, accepted the absorption of the Czechs as final. Mr. Roosevelt uttered other views on this vital matter. But probably Mr. Chamberlain felt that from him assurances of future liberation would not be welcome. It would, however, strengthen his leadership if his detachment from the memory of the League did not seem to be so complete. It could be strengthened still more if some of his colleagues were replaced by men like Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden, who have the faith in collective responsibility and the will to assert it. Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini are plainly determined to re-draw the map of Europe to begin with. Sir John Simon and Sir Samuel Hoare are very able and very prudent men—for times of peace; but they are associated in the public mind with the idea of surrender. They have not succeeded, as Mr. Chamberlain himself has done, in conveying the will to fight.

* * * * *

Two very original books about Ireland have been published this last month—both the result of out-of-the-way reading. For twenty years Mr. M. J. MacManus has been collecting old Irish books, pamphlets and broadsides; and out of them he has put together in *Irish Cavalcade* a string of extracts ranging from 1550 to 1850, illustrating social life, very much as a film might do. This anthology begins by telling us what fashions of dress were forbidden to Irish men and women by a law of Henry VIII. One may conclude not only that in 1559 Irishmen wore a long "glib" of hair and a moustache but that they continued to do so; and

that ladies were still seen in a "kyrtle or coat tucked up, or embroidered or garnished with silk, after the Irish fashion". although that fashion was prohibited by law. At the other end of the cavalcade we meet amongst others Anthony Trollope—an excellent observer of manners. But why nothing from Asenath Nicholson? the surprising American lady who went through Ireland as a volunteer Bible reader, staying in the poorest cottages—where the country folk, though they knew she was a crank, and a Protestant crank, accepted her as a holy woman? She is the best witness to the highly civilized behaviour of the pig, when pigs lived in. We have all sorts of amusing stuff including a description of Sunday in Dublin in 1725—attributed to Swift, who certainly did not write it. But it is astonishingly like a passage in Ulysses, or in O'Casey's *I knock at the Door*. Mr. MacManus is on the staff of Mr. de Valera's paper *The Irish Press*, but I notice with pleasure that to him the word "Irish" has an inclusive signification, lumping Protestant and Catholic, Gael and Saxon in one general view.

Mr. MacLysaght, on the other hand, in a very careful historical study *Irish Life in the Seventeenth Century after Cromwell*, is bound to recognize the distinction of races which certainly

**Truth and
Prejudice**

existed—although it was more truly a distinction of religions. There was little to mark off the O'Brien or the O'Hara or the O'Neill who sat in

Grattan's parliament from their fellow members—like them, Irish gentry. There would have been still less in 1680, for the century of penal laws had not begun. Admittedly some Irishmen had a cult of race like Herr Hitler's; both Mr. Macmanus and Mr. MacLysaght quote The MacDermot's greeting to some company which included an Anglo-Irish peer. "O'Hara you're welcome; Sandford, I'm glad to see your mother's son" (his mother was an O'Brien) "the rest of you may sit down as you can." But except to such as this eccentric there was no insistence on racial difference, and the country folk, who were generally of Gaelic race, gave their devotion to the "old stock." in one of the Big Houses, even if the founder of the House had been English. There was, there had been since the time of the Norman Conquest and for that matter, since the time of the Gaelic conquest, a strong absorptive power in Ireland; and even

after the ten years of devastating war in Cromwell's time, and the confiscations which followed, fusion might have gone on, but for the proscription of the popular religion. The result was to make the Catholic Irish in the eighteenth century and the nineteenth a far more devout people than they were in the period which this book studies. Mr. MacLysaght does not hesitate to show us that the Irish standard of sexual morality which became proverbial in the period of oppression had not been at all so high when the Irish people were relatively free. In short, this is a truth-telling work, and admits that agriculture, the country's main business, advanced more quickly under English rule—and though Mr. MacLysaght writes with a practised pen he writes with the inbred knowledge of a farmer. If the book were free from strong prepossessions, it would not be what it is, a live piece of work; but after 300 pages of his own the author, gives 120 more, in appendices, printing here for the first time a great mass of illustrative material—especially half a dozen letters written by John Dunton, an English bookseller with a taste for travel, who combined business with pleasure on his journeys, and wrote vulgar, indecent but entertaining descriptions of all that he saw and heard, somewhere about the year 1700.

THE FORTNIGHTLY LIBRARY

THE BROWN DANUBE

BY ELIZABETH MONROE

MUNICH AND THE DICTATORS, by R. W. Seton Watson. *Methuen*. 5s.

MILLEN BASTIONS, by G. E. R. Geyde. *Gollancz*. 16s.

HERE THERE IS NO PEACE, by Hamilton Fish Armstrong. *Macmillan*. 6s.

RUSSIAN DESTINY, by Graham Hutton. *Harrap*. 7s. 6d.

The story of the last fifteen months, humiliating to anyone except a Nazi, is now beginning to piece itself together in the plain Englishman. Items of news from the different capitals are accumulating to prove that one dictator is an astute gambler, that the other is his chosen pawn, and that the two between them duped the democratic statesmen. Dr. Seton Watson, Mr. Geyde and Mr. Hamilton Fish Armstrong all contribute to the record, and from their united evidence emerges the fact that Herr Hitler is methodically pursuing the programme he laid down in *Mein Kampf*, the following being the guiding principle of that policy :

"A shrewd victor will, if possible, keep imposing his demands on the conquered by degrees. He can then, in dealing with a nation that has lost its character—and that means everyone who submits voluntarily—count on its never finding in any act of oppression a sufficient excuse for taking up arms once more. On the contrary, the more the exactions that have been willingly

endured, the less justifiable does it seem to resist at last on account of a new and apparently isolated (though to be sure constantly recurring) imposition".

This quotation is far too little known. It should be read and marked by everyone who is unsure whether to consider its author a genius or a madman. It should be inwardly digested by every British Cabinet minister before every discussion on foreign affairs, for it is the key to all recent events in Europe.

The most striking fact, then, which emerges from the three books is the extent to which Germany's success last year was the outcome of careful planning. Everything was pre-ordained, stage by stage: the Press campaign in which German opinion was prepared for a righteous struggle; the by-play which throughout the early summer blinded the democracies to the fact that the Sudeten problem was no longer an internal question for Czechoslovakia; the careful bribing of the Paris press which enabled the *Führer* to prise a chink in the Anglo-French armour wide enough to permit, first of Godesberg, then of Munich. Here and there, of course, he was attended by luck; for instance, who could count upon the chance that a French foreign Minister, receiving on September 26

that categorical assurance of British support for which M. Poincaré would have given his eyes in July 1914, would be sufficiently craven to report it as a message "without confirmation" and to fail to contradict *Le Matin's* assertion that it was a "clever lie"? But, except on one or two such occasions, luck seems to have been only an incidental factor of his success; the chief elements were accurate calculation and diplomatic skill. If the British premier has always had before him the facts which these books now place before us, it is extraordinary that he should for so long have continued in his belief (now happily rescinded) that dictators will in the end respond to gentle handling.

Of three stories which differ only in emphasis, Dr. Seton Watson's is the most moving. He writes not only as a historian, but as the man who worked harder than any Englishman to promote Czech independence—as the staunch personal friend of that "remarkable triumvirate, Masaryk, Benes and Stefanik". What is more he is impressive in his sincerity. His previous book, *Britain and the Dictators*, was a "reasoned defence" of British policy up to the end of 1937. Since Munich, he has altered his view, and his latest volume explains the reasons for the change of heart of a clear and well-informed thinker.

Mr. Gedye's contribution is different, for he was a man-on-the-spot—the last honest journalist to leave Vienna, one of the last to leave Prague. *Fallen Bastions* is a brilliant title; the contents live up to it. The story of the fall is punctuated with unpublished documents and vivid descriptions of scenes which cannot be witnessed and understood

except by a man of vast knowledge and indefatigable readiness to spend weary days and nights jumping in and out of taxis.

Mr. Hamilton Fish Armstrong, being an American, ought to add something to the sum of information; in fact, his book, though accurate and well-written, is the least valuable of the three. For one thing, he does not present a typical American view; he cannot, because the editor of *Foreign Affairs* knows his Europe too well. For another, he postulates that "it is not for an American" to discuss the moral issues. His survey is incomplete because, unless you take morals into account, you cannot discuss Munich. You can record events, but you cannot help being arid in the eyes of English readers.

Mr. Hutton's *Danubian Destinies* treats of a different subject; it looks not back at the past, but forward to the future. It is an estimate of Germany's ability to organize the Danubian basin to her liking, and, since on this problem hang all our destinies, everyone ought to read it. It supplies some useful information about the economic position of the Reich, and about the reactions to German policy of the various and mixed collection of human beings who inhabit the countries beyond the south-eastern border. But it makes its most valuable contribution to our knowledge where it contests that fatal defeatism which leads Englishmen to think of the dictatorships only as aggressive, and the democracies only as vulnerable. Totalitarian economic and diplomacy are weak, says Mr. Hutton, because the power which practises them can never allow itself time to organize its gains for future development. Thus,

Germany succeeds in so complicated an area as Danubia, her success will be the result "not of her own merits, but of others' shortcomings".

SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1937 (Volume I.). 25s.

(Volume II.) 18s.

By Professor Arnold J. Toynbee.
Oxford University Press.

BRALTAR AND THE MEDITERRANEAN, by G. T. Garratt. *Cape.* 10s. 6d.

WORLD WAR IN SPAIN, by Arthur Loveday. *John Murray.* 6s.

With his customary perception and mastery of phrase Professor Arnold Toynbee sheds more light upon the dark places of the international waste land and jungle than all the journalists and scribes put together. The *Survey* for 1937 is in two volumes (as in 1935). Special sections on Poland and her neighbours by C. A. Macartney, Palestine by H. Beeley and World Economic Affairs by Professor Alan Fisher are extremely valuable, but *Stifex maximus* is Professor Toynbee and his devoted famula, V. M. Boulter.) Events seem likely to impart a nasty typical value to the facts and judgments which are the subject of Vol. II.—'The International Repercussions of the War in Spain'. As he says, in a world possessing a more or less effective system of international law and order, Spain (and the same applies to Turkey and Denmark) might enjoy the happiness of having no history; "but in the struggle of all-against-all for world power—then the potential strategical importance of Spain and her possessions is bound to become actual".

In Vol. I. we see the sides lining up—the Anti-Komintern Triangle versus

the protagonists of a world safe for democracy—'all-against-all' is not quite accurate, but it will serve as an image of the anarchy of power-politics. Time and again Professor Toynbee returns to this fundamental truth—that an ordered society is the one and only remedy for our international discontents; whereas the definition of a Great Power "at any time during the four centuries before establishment of the League" still holds good:—

"a parochial 'sovereign' State which was strong enough to be able to venture to do what it willed in defiance of all comers: the conscience of the rest of Christendom was immaterial".

The League—like patriotism—is not enough: so much we have learnt in passing through the present vale of tears. And it has failed, mainly, through the shortcomings of the governing class of the foremost 'democratic' States. That is the lesson of each of the sections composing Vol. I.—dealing respectively with the line-up, relations between the four Great Powers in Europe, Mediterranean developments, and the war in China; hence "the first aim of the Triangle Powers was to 'anæsthetize' the three democratic Powers by gassing them with anti-Communist propaganda". And it finds specific illustration in the antics of British and French policy-makers when confronted by the *soi-disant* ideological war in Spain.

Professor Toynbee is particularly good at effects of historical perspective—as when he observes, in a footnote, that "Spain, apart from Catalonia and the Basque Provinces, was a living museum of the spiritual life of the

Western World in the age of the Wars of Religion"—and then draws an apt analogy with the position of the Six Counties *vis à vis* modern Ireland. On the question of Intervention he does not pretend to detailed knowledge, but he presents admirably the known facts—i.e., that Italian intervention has been extensive and continuous, German intervention of a military character limited, because of the check imposed on Herr Hitler by German public opinion; and that "the military intervention of the U.S.S.R. was not only subsequent to Italo-German intervention but also consequent on it". Finally, on the all-important strategic issue the author has a devastating comment (likewise in a footnote) on the wishful thinking of those who asserted in season and out of season that any Italo-German hegemony in Spain after hostilities ceased was 'inconceivable'. Before the main section of Vol. II. there are compact and well-proportioned analyses of the Spanish background and of the course of the war. No one should presume to hold forth on Spain without having read, marked and digested this volume.

Mr. Garratt's study comes pat to the occasion to focus and underline the major theme of the 1937 Survey. It is a brilliant piece of work—and it acquires particular significance, in my judgment, from the fact that the film 'The Menace to Gibraltar' shown throughout the U.S.A. has been strictly excluded from this country. First we have a brief disquisition on Gibraltar as "petrified history", with amusing sidelights on the "attacks on churches and images which were, apparently, in past centuries a peculiar and marked feature of the occupation of southern ports by British sailors": then a

discussion of the strategic value of the Rock, first following the improvements in artillery from 1860 onward and later with the coming of the aeroplane and the submarine, and finally, in Part III. 'The Era of Imperial Decline'—the kernel of the book with its tremendous and tragical topical import.

Mr. Garratt adduces, without, it is true any very substantial evidence, that there was a secret 'diplomatic arrangement' between London and Rome which was the basis of the Non-Intervention Agreement: whether, however, Germany decided to take this line, that completely upset the apple cart, and, while Germany and Italy were continually manœuvring against each other in Spain, they could always combine to levy the most effective blackmail against the feckless rule of France and Great Britain, hopeless ignorant of the living dynamics of Spain.

While a certain discount needs to be made, there is an unpleasant amount of truth in Mr. Garratt's analysis of the British mis-handling of the Mediterranean situation—due, he suggests, to

- (1) The underestimating of air power, due to a great majority of senior officers being 'two-dimensional' men by instinct and upbringing. Over sixty per cent. of British armament expenditure is on the surface boats of the navy, and those who live and work in such boats have proportionately large say in policy.
- (2) A complete misreading of the Spanish situation, due to the naval officer's quite natural prejudices against the Government on account of certain incidents involving the Spanish navy at the beginning of the war, and also to the only Spanish 'contacts' which most of them possessed through Gibraltar.
- (3) A contempt for Italians as fighting men based on memories of the European War and on the 'ocean' sailor's poor regard

for Italian seamanship. There may be some justification on both these grounds, but it leads to under-valuing the importance of the Italian air force, and possibly also of those light and speedy surface craft which suit the Italian temperament.

These are the reasons, Mr. Garratt suggests, for the "false optimism" generated in high circles about Spain—which must be added the slight and possibly unconscious bias of British Ministers abroad, many of those in key-positions being Catholics and having Italian family connections. We shall soon see whether Cassandra is right.

Mr. Loveday is of those who believe with a touching faith that "General Franco and Spain are fighting on behalf of Christendom and all Western civilization against an onslaught on Western Europe by Marxian Communism". That is the meaning of his title, which most of us would interpret differently. His observations on the international aspect of the Spanish conflict are consequently worthless; as regards Spain's domestic politics there are a number of inaccuracies but, allowing for the author's prejudice, it is a handy little primer on Spain. Political judgment, however, is not Mr. Loveday's strong point: nor is one very impressed by that of his sponsor, Sir Arnold Wilson, who writes in his preface: "no Englishman need fear that Spain will enter into an alliance directed against Britain"! What else, then, is the game—Berlin—Tokio—Burgos Pact?

W. HORSFALL CARTER.

ROBERT LAIRD BORDEN: HIS
MEMOIRS (2 vols.) *Macmillan*. 42s.

It is sometimes hard to believe that men shrink from having "greatness

thrust upon them". In the short spell of a lifetime it is worth shouldering any burden so as to leave behind an accomplishment, and a memorial. Yet many, for example, declare wholeheartedly, "I wouldn't be Prime Minister if you paid me" (presumably more than the official salary); and of these Robert Borden was assuredly not least.

Only under insistent pressure did he consent to stand for Parliament in 1896; but, characteristically, once he had agreed, he mastered both his nervousness and his distaste, and "devoted his whole time and energy to his candidature". Five years later he became Leader of the Opposition and of the Conservative Party, accepting the position again, "from which he shrank", at the urgent demand of his colleagues. With great difficulty he was dissuaded from announcing his acceptance for one year only; and both in 1905 and 1910 he proffered his resignation as leader.

It was not that Borden hankered after leisure. In the terse, almost primly written, pages of his memoirs, he is revealed as an incessant worker. He might almost be cited as an illustrious example of the genius which is 'an infinite capacity for taking pains'. There are numerous references to the exhaustion of body and spirit from which he suffered when a merciless sense of duty forbade him the rest that his doctors had ordered.

Mr. Meighen, in his preface to the Memoirs, remarks that the key to his success in an uncongenial atmosphere was "ceaseless, indomitable toil"; and adds the illuminating comment that "his pre-eminence was only reached when his responsibilities became

immense". He seems to have been almost immune from human weakness, and, as such, a little aloof from his fellows, except when aroused, and then, like Achilles, terrible in his anger. His self-control has affected his writing, and even perusal of two volumes leaves little vivid impression of the man himself.

A man such as Borden becomes a part of history and is remembered as a political force more generally than as a man. His political career can be considered best in two aspects, Canadian and Imperial. It is safe to say that his relations with Canadian politics will not interest many English readers of his memoirs. His lengthy, but nevertheless succinct, chapters on the pre-war sessions of the Canadian House of Commons are oppressive to those unfamiliar with the Canadian scene. "Reciprocity" and Canadian railways filled Ottawa with sound and fury, but leave in the mind of an English reader only echoes of uncomprehended strife.

The politically inclined, however, do gain an impression of Canadian parliamentary life, which may or may not be true. The English reader is astonished at the frequent charges of ill faith and of graft—and is struck by the universal use of "my hon. friend" as a parliamentary appellation. English parliamentary etiquette has been imposed on Canadian M.P.s rather like a ready-made suit of clothes. It does not seem that there are many good fits.

Perhaps Borden was most in his element when he was representing Canada in England. His utterances then had striking force and dignity. He had pondered deeply on the relations between Canada and England, and so had formed a clear conception of the place and destiny of the Dominions within the Empire. In many ways he

was the apostle of Dominion nationalism insisting always upon the sovereign rights of British self-governing communities. But his sense of the Empire was equally strong; and it was the basis of his creed that the nationhood of the Dominions was the cement of Imperial unity.

The Great War was to him a tremendous example of his beliefs in action and inspired him with a purpose that extended beyond a victory in arms. To him as much as to anyone belongs the achievement of a British Commonwealth of Nations, and with it a place among the immortals.

W. F. WENTWORTH-SHEILDS.

HENRY GRATTAN AND HIS TIMES.

by Stephen Gwynn. *Harrop*. 15s.

THE YOUNG MELBOURNE, by Lord David Cecil. *Constable*. 10s.

These two biographies form a study of their period, the late 18th and early 19th centuries, the more illuminating in that the characters of their subjects were so strongly contrasted and their backgrounds so diverse. Grattan's nature was fundamentally simple, while Melbourne's was too complex for him ever to attain to inner harmony. Melbourne, who on his elder brother's death became the heir to an ample fortune, spent his life in the heart of the Whig governing class. Grattan, too, was a Whig, but the bulk of his fortune was derived from a grant from the Irish Parliament for services rendered, and he only frequented Holland House in later life because he had failed to attain the object nearest his heart—an united Ireland governed by an Irish Parliament. The differences between the men are so many and so obvious that it is unnecessary to labour them.

What is interesting is that in spite of them all there is an unmistakable family likeness which makes them both representative of their time. Both were products of an age and a class which had left behind the religious animosities of the past without being disturbed by the economic troubles of the future. Both reacted with alarm to the doctrines of the French Revolution, and both pinned their faith to property as the cement of the structure of society. For both the winning of the war with France tended to overshadow all other issues, so that while Melbourne became more and more attracted to the Canningite Tories, Grattan, in the years immediately before the Act of Union, stressed, as he had always acknowledged, the importance of the English connection, and deplored the enrolment of what he called "the poverty of the nation" in the Volunteers.

As a historical study, Mr. Gwynn's is the more important book. Grattan's character does not emerge from his pages with the same pellucid clarity as does Melbourne's from Lord David Cecil, nor has Mr. Gwynn made the most of the opportunity of portraying the social background in which Grattan lived. But what we may lose in our knowledge of Grattan the man we gain in our understanding of Grattan the politician and orator. Mr. Gwynn has succeeded admirably in presenting that combination of statesmanlike ideas with the lack of statesmanlike qualities which makes Grattan one of the most interesting failures in political history. He took the existence of social and political privilege for granted, but failed to see that in Ireland there could be no compromise, between the ascendancy of the Protestant caste, to

which he belonged, on the one hand, and the dominance of the Catholic majority on the other. He saw that Ireland could be neither free nor united until the Catholics were emancipated, for the Protestant governing class was too small to be able to maintain its hold without outside help. He did not realize that, however much statesmanship might mollify the feelings of the expropriated Catholics for the Protestant expropriators, an independent and united Ireland must be a Catholic Ireland. After Grattan's triumph in achieving legislative independence in 1782 the essential weakness of a divided county manifested itself, and the effective leaders were realists like Fitzgibbon, who by working for Union maintained Protestant rule for another century, and Wolfe Tone, whose United Irishmen laid the foundations of contemporary Eire.

As biography, Lord David's work has all the graces, some of which Mr. Gwynn's lacks. The Whig world could not be more faithfully portrayed, the development of a character could not be more subtly appreciated. The book is so perfect that one wishes a little more had been attempted and that one had been allowed to see Melbourne in action as well as in growth. Lord David Cecil's prose is so exquisite, his powers as a historian so manifest, that it is a little disappointing to find that they are employed on a task which cannot, after all, give them full scope. Even if, as Lord David suggests, Melbourne in espousing politics as a career mistook his true vocation, it is as a statesman that posterity chiefly takes interest in him, and it is as a statesman that his character mainly manifested itself.

W. T. WELLS

BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, by Carl Van Doren. *Putnam*. 15s.

BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, by E. S. Scudder. *Collins*. 15s.

The city of Philadelphia has chosen for its two most famous citizens very opposite types of memorials. William Penn tops the City Hall, 500 feet above the metropolitan bustle of his offspring. Benjamin Franklin is most conspicuously commemorated by the Institute that bears his name, one of the most enterprising agencies of scientific education in the Americas. The symbolism is not inappropriate, embodying the aloofness of the Quaker statesman and the endless curiosity of the scientist-politician. Yet by its stupid ignorance the world at large has, at least in the case of Franklin, reversed this estimate, and reduced him to the petty stature of a Poor Richard with a knack for diplomacy, a parish pump philosopher who happened to be at hand when the American Revolution broke out. Mr. Van Doren has set out to rescue Franklin from this judgment, and I think there can be no doubt of his success. The Franklin he has chosen to recover is the Franklin whose "mind", as he says, "was a federation of purposes, working harmoniously together"; the Franklin, who, at the age of seventy crossing the Atlantic to represent his insurgent country at the court of Versailles, amid the perils of the voyage could occupy himself with noting the temperature of air and water each day, with a view to establishing the course and speed of the Gulf Stream; the Franklin whose pen could run as easily to the satire of the *Edict by the King of Prussia* as to the whimsey of the *Dialogue between Franklin and the Gout*; whose interests ranged from

spelling reform to mesmerism and whose inventions included the kitchen stove and bifocal spectacles. Directing this versatile intelligence is always the warm humanism of a tirelessly benevolent spirit; it is not the least of Mr. Van Doren's achievements that he has not only shown this working unity of mind and heart in Franklin, but has also contrived with easy mastery of the technical problems of biography to tell his story so that the life and times, the personal and the public, interweave in natural connection.

It is no reflection on Mr. Van Doren's skill to suggest that his brilliant success could not have been achieved had he attempted it on a smaller scale. Franklin constitutes a huge subject and demands a big book to contain him. These 780 pages are not one too many, either for the interest of the author's tale or the stature of the subject. Mr. Scudder, who has aimed less high, has inevitably to be content with less success. Indeed his book is in a different category from Mr. Van Doren's, brief, popular in treatment, a rough delineation rather than a precise portrayal. It is typical of the difference between the two books that Mr. Van Doren investigates the authenticity of the famous "We must all hang together, or most assuredly we shall all hang separately", while Mr. Scudder is content simply to report it. Nevertheless, barring an occasional misprint or misstatement, Mr. Scudder will serve as a tolerably accurate guide to those who are approaching his subject for the first time.

The last serious biography of Franklin was written in 1864, since when although a great mass of new detailed and corrective information has appeared it is doubtful whether there has been

any discovery sensational enough to change our main conceptions of him. Mr. Van Doren's book would be sufficiently welcome merely as a graceful incorporation into the picture of the details hitherto isolated in countless monographs of scholarship and as a corrective to popular belittlings. But the peculiar appeal of his book will lie, I think, not in the novelty of his portrayal but in its consistent honesty. For the rest Franklin himself will answer. Set before us with this accuracy and grace, he makes his own sufficient appeal to our distempered times, as a man who in times no less distempered, a citizen, in both senses, of the New and the Old Worlds, preserved a health and humanity, not by any ivory tower retreat but by a critical acceptance of the ordeal of his generation. "America," Hume wrote to Franklin, "has sent us many good things, gold, silver, sugar, tobacco, indigo, etc.; but you are the first philosopher, and indeed the first great man of letters, for whom we are beholden to her". To that debt Mr. Van Doren's biography is no trifling addition.

H. G. NICHOLAS.

TWILIGHT ON PARNASSUS, by G. U. Ellis. *Michael Joseph*. 15s.

CIVIL JOURNEY, by Storm Jameson. *Cassell*. 7s. 6d.

The Novel, from its association with popular frivolities, suffers from the absence of any criticism of a greater calibre than that supplied by routine book-reviewing. It is a serious disability, and Mr. Ellis's book should have helped to remove it: modern fiction needs a critical expositor able to bring the past into focus upon the present, and to establish criteria by which we

can assess the achievements of our contemporaries. Unfortunately, Mr. Ellis has a most disorderly mind, a lack of all but the crudest discrimination, and a basic misunderstanding of the purposes of fiction. His subject is apparently the post-war novel, from its Victorian roots to its contemporary flowers; but his book rambles along without any indicative statement of what he is proposing to demonstrate or to explore. Various hares are started, abandoned and re-sighted later; the opinions of Leslie Stephen are examined ponderously, and Mr. Holbrook Jackson is taxed with describing the 'nineties as more homogeneous than they were in fact. These, and many other bits and pieces, are scattered about the pages while Mr. Ellis wanders away into the most astonishing irrelevancies. Thus, in discussing whether or not Leslie Stephen

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was right in saying 'Shakespearean drama had behind it a general national impulse', Mr. Ellis examines the status of actors in Elizabethan times, notes that they eventually became less 'migratory' and feels impelled to add that 'the drama attained a settled site in London with the opening of "The Theatre", a timber structure erected in Shoreditch by one Burbage'. This gratuitous information has no bearing whatsoever upon Stephen's remark: neither the site nor the fabric is of the remotest relevance, while the air of erudition with which 'one Burbage' is introduced seems to imply that the name will be entirely unfamiliar to Mr. Ellis's readers. Nor is this an isolated example, for Mr. Ellis's approach, at its most direct, is never more than circumambulatory.

The quality of Mr. Ellis's judgment may be easily illustrated. Katherine Mansfield is never mentioned; Joyce and Forster are not examined; Aldous Huxley is analysed at great and tedious length, and held to have 'covered a range of human problems that has only been exceeded by Bernard Shaw and H. G. Wells'; William Gerhardt, Evelyn Waugh and Anthony Powell are treated as a concluding galaxy of talent; the three big influences—French, Russian and American—are left virtually untouched. As a specimen of Mr. Ellis's style I noted the phrase 'a series of fragrant erotic encounters'. His level of literacy may be gauged from his frequent misspellings—*érasez l'infâme, bête noir, analagous, unenobled, non sequiter, ebullition, juvenalia*, etc.

Miss Storm Jameson's *Civil Journey* is a refreshing contrast. Miss Jameson, with most engaging modesty, claims to be no more than one of 'the infantry-

men of literature'; moreover, *Civil Journey* is only an informal collection of *ephemeræ*—lectures, prefaces, book reviews, etc. In every way it is an unpretentious collection; but Miss Jameson knows how to write, just as surely as she knows her own limitations. Her prose is clean and sharp, aimed directly at the heart of the subject. The emotion which it communicates is personal and vivid and well-controlled. For all their apparent diversity, these essays without exception belong to that territory where literature and the moral and political world have their common frontier. Miss Jameson is not a profound thinker, but (almost as rarely) she is an honest one. Her modesty and her integrity preserve her from floundering out of her depth. She is a distinguished novelist, and she has reflected on her craft: she is also a woman of deep political and social feelings, and she has reflected on these. It is her reflections, sensitive, balanced and rigorously honest, which make up *Civil Journey*. Whether she is lecturing on the Novel or recollecting pre-Hitler Berlin, Miss Jameson has an equal regard for her twin preoccupations—the art of writing imaginative prose, and the contemplation of that *histoire morale contemporaine* which is the novelist's abiding subject. One may not be wholly in agreement with all her views, but the sincerity and unforced simplicity of Miss Jameson's manner make *Civil Journey* a very pleasant book to read.

DESMOND HAWKINS.

Hitler's *Mein Kampf* is constantly referred to in our pages. Readers may be glad to know of the unexpurgated edition published in translation by Messrs. Hurst & Blackett at 8s. 6d.

OUR CONTRIBUTORS

For the benefit of our many overseas readers we provide here each month a brief sketch by way of introduction of our contributors to THE FORTNIGHTLY public.

Detachment is difficult enough, heaven knows, in these days when the policies of the contending Leviathans known as Great Powers are bringing such fearful miseries to hundreds of thousands of blameless men and women. But the acute and unprejudiced student of international affairs cannot help noticing the inveterate tendency of people of every nation to identify its own national interests with morality. Hence a clash of national attitudes—reaching far beyond the plane of politics—which was bedevilling the ordinary inter-State friction long before Herr Hitler's Germany made a fetish of the ideological war. There is thus some salutary 'de-bunking' to be done in this field, and THE FORTNIGHTLY is fortunate in securing such plain words on international cant as are to be found in the article with which we lead off this month. The author, E. H. Carr, holder of the Wilson Chair of International Politics at the University College of Wales, Aberystwyth, is no stranger to our columns. A man with a wide range of interests he has contributed articles on a variety of subjects over the period of the past seven years. After Cambridge (Trinity College) he entered the Foreign Office as a Clerk in 1916, and was later transferred to the Diplomatic Service,

rising to the rank of First Secretary and head of the Southern Department when he resigned in 1936. As a member of the Foreign Office delegation to the Peace Conference in 1918-19 and of the British Delegation to the League of Nations Council and Assembly he has had unusual opportunities of observing human foibles in connection with high policy. Apart from a primer on 'International Affairs since 1918', he is the author of books on Dostoevsky and Karl Marx.

The present international situation—power in contest with power—is ugly enough in all conscience, confirming all the Cassandra-like utterances which have appeared in the review this past year. With events moving so swiftly our 'roving camera' can only select those features of the landscape which seem to have something more than an ephemeral interest. The fate of Yugoslavia, with the constantly menacing movement of the German-Italian pincers, is a case in point. C. F. Melville, now Diplomatic correspondent of the *Sunday Dispatch*, has had years of special experience as a student of Mid-European tangles. 'Ignotus' conceals the identity of a man who has, like Ernest Hambloch (whose recent book '*Germany Rampant*' should be widely read) made an intensive study

of German aspirations to world mastery. He was a contributor to the REVIEW in the days of W. L. Courtney.

But any forward-looking person must agree that we shall get nowhere by merely 'cursing the Germans'. The problem is far deeper than the peculiar wickedness of any war-like nation; and, as Professor Carr's article reminds us, those who distinguish the democratic countries as 'peace-loving nations' are to say the least, disingenuous. Thomas Johnston, the M.P. for West Stirlingshire, supplies a welcome tonic in his article rejecting the prevalent feeling of 'Kismet . . .' and outlines what we consider to be the only remedy appropriate to the continuing and increasing international tensions. Thomas Johnston was Lord Privy Seal in the last Labour Government. He has made his career in Scotland as Founder and for 27 years editor of that lively journal, *Forward*; but he has also established a reputation at Westminster for his thoughtful and independent views and cogent speaking. He contributed an impressive article to THE FORTNIGHTLY on Scottish Home Rule . . . in October, 1937.

Another aspect of the struggle for power is treated by H. V. Hodson, who met a number of interesting personalities in India on his way back from the British Commonwealth Relations Conference at Sydney last autumn. He is editor of *The Round Table*.

H. S. Shelton, who contributes interesting and little-appreciated data about the conditions in Jamaica, is a writer on a wide range of subjects—science, philosophy, and in recent years, education. He also contributed to the

REVIEW when W. L. Courtney was editor.

In the home field the controversy about compulsory service for the nation still rages. THE FORTNIGHTLY published last November a thoughtful article on this subject of national service by W. T. Wells. While the question is *subjudice* there is no occasion for the review to take a line for or against. But the article by J. H. Huizinga does, in our opinion, demolish the facile assumption which so many island-Englishmen still cherish that conscription is *per se* undemocratic. J. H. Huizinga has been in London for three years in the responsible position of chief correspondent of the *Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant*, the leading Dutch newspaper. He was formerly for five years in the U.S.A.—studying at the university and then gaining experience on Wall Street.

So far the Government has only conceded to its critics the introduction of compulsory physical fitness for youth under 18, but the National Campaign is conceived on the traditional lines of the voluntary system. We are privileged to include a progress report by Lord Aberdare, the Chairman of the National Fitness Council, who is also Chairman of THE FORTNIGHTLY. A new and little-known enterprise of the Ministry of Labour is reviewed by our observer John Armitage, and other contributions include a personal document by Stephen Potter, author of *The Muse in Chains*, that entertaining study of 'Eng-Lit.', who has now established a special niche for himself as artificer and producer of feature programmes for the B.B.C.

THE FORTNIGHTLY BAZAAR

Saying farewell to one of our contemporaries is an all too common occasion, but we must shed a special tear for the *London Mercury*, which was distinctive in every way, living an honourable and valued life for twenty years. Apparently the public did not value it sufficiently, which is shocking, but not surprising; the world at the moment has no time for literature and good writing. It is true that *Life and Letters* will, in their next issue, incorporate the name of *London Mercury* on their cover, and it is encouraging to know that the editor of *Life and Letters* was a good *Mercury* man under Sir John Squire. But incorporation is a way of purchasing the good will of a paper, not of preserving it, and we cannot rejoice at what is after all the death of another old friend. The mortality rate among reviews is certainly very high, yet it is difficult to believe that the age of their usefulness is over. Nevertheless, it is probable that they would do well to re-arrange their ideas of what the public wants and reads.

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As usual at this time of year one is told that the London theatre business is in a bad way. But this year there is less bewailing of the quality of plays. And indeed the standard has improved, though it is still the theatre on the periphery rather than the West End which offers mental sustenance. For several weeks the production of Synge's 'Playboy of the Western World' at the little Mercury Theatre at Notting Hill Gate, has played to crowded houses. More caviare to the general, apparently, is T. S. Eliot's new play in verse 'The Family Reunion' at the Westminster Theatre. It is a translation into Christian terms, as it were, of the Orestes *motif* of Agamemnon. Both as play and book it is a memorable achievement. Some have called it 'Everyman' in modern dress; but one can enjoy the superb acting of Michael Redgrave, Catherine Lacey and a sterling cast without any probing into the real meaning of the poet's symbolism.

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Celebrations to mark the centenary of the birth of Henry George, the founder of the taxation of land values, are to be held this year in some countries, in many of which his single-tax system is at present in successful operation. British supporters of the taxation of land values are to hold a nation-wide conference in London, and in August an International Henry George Conference is being held in New York at which delegates from all over the world will attend. The British delegate will be Mr. F. C. R. Douglas, the Vice-Chairman of the London County Council Finance Committee. Henry George, who was born in Philadelphia on September 2nd, 1839, was the originator of the taxation of land values which is in operation to-day in

different parts of the Empire and in a number of foreign countries. In this country Parliamentary support for the taxation of land values comes from a group of 40 M.P.'s in the House who form the Parliamentary Land Values Group. They include Mr. George Lansbury, Col. Josiah Wedgwood, Mr. R. R. Stokes, Mr. Andrew MacLaren.

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On September 1 next, Unity Theatre Club takes over the Kingsway Theatre as a public professional theatre, for a trial period of three months, with an option on the lease. A new company will be formed to carry through the enterprise, which will be financed by Unity Theatre Club itself.

Unity will follow their policy of producing plays and revues with social content—and progressive in character, and the present theatre in Goldington Street will be retained as a private theatre for the presentation of uncensored plays. Recently, Unity's first pantomime, 'Babes in the Wood' caused something of a sensation on both sides of the Atlantic. It proved London's longest running pantomime, being extended to the end of March, after opening on November 15th—six weeks before any other pantomime. Since May last, the membership of Unity Theatre Club has grown from 3,000 to over 7,000, and, with members of affiliated organizations, nearly a quarter of a million persons comprise the largest 'organized' audience of any theatre.

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The British Railways inform us that there is no doubt that the month of August is becoming more and more a peak period for holidaymakers, when the demands for accommodation and service are everywhere increased. In numerical terms the position can be quickly appreciated. According to railway statistics, the issue of Monthly Return tickets (the principal type of reduced fare ticket used by passengers travelling for a period holiday) is 100 per cent. greater in July and August than in May and June. Including all types of tickets used by holidaymakers—that is, the daily Excursions as well as the period facilities—approximately 20,000,000 more passengers travel by train during August than in May or October. The average long distance holiday train has seats for 500 passengers, so that some 40,000 extra trains are needed to transport these additional travellers. During the summer months last year the number of passenger journeys, exclusive of workmen and season ticket holders, made over the main line railways was : in May, 42,335,000 ; in June, 54,963,000 ; in July, 61,230,000 ; in August, 62,240,000 ; and in November, 47,682,000. The railways suggest that those who can possibly avoid the peak period, which extends from the end of July until the third week in August, by even a week or a fortnight earlier or later would greatly help their neighbours and their friends as well as themselves.